Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

In the presidential debates between the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party, Barack Obama, and that of the Republican Party, John McCain, the Middle East and South Asia stand out prominently.  The four issues of discussion are: America’s continued presence in Iraq, relations with Israel, dealing with Iran, and the future modalities of American actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  However, regarding the Middle East more than about South Asia, American presidential candidates are required to wear a straitjacket that prevents them from taking bold actions once they win the presidency.  However, as in the context of every rule, there are exceptions in this one also.  Former President Jimmy Carter was an exception, for he succeeded in getting out of that straitjacket as President and presided over the conclusion of the Camp David Agreements in 1979.  No American President since was able to take off that straitjacket and accomplish a similar outcome, even though President Bill Clinton tried toward the end of his second term.

This straitjacket requires the American president to view the Arab-Israeli conflict from the point of view of Israel first, and only then from the U.S. perspectives.  Barack Obama, if elected, is likely to be more constrained by it than John McCain.  The first and foremost reason is the allegation that he is (was) a Muslim and allegedly holds strong sympathies for the Palestinian cause.  Consequently, as President, he is likely to bend over backwards to prove that he is really a friend of Israel.  He has already fired the first salvo in that direction by stating that the American embassy should be moved to Jerusalem, something that even the staunchly pro-Israeli President, George W. Bush, has not implemented.  Still, the Israelis are showing their strong skepticism of Obama by heavily favoring the Republican nominee for President, John McCain (by 25 points), according to a recent report.  McCain’s profound sympathy toward Israel is just another evidence of how his presidency would be a mere continuation of Bush’s steadfastly pro-Israeli policies.  As such, one cannot be any more hopeful about the increased prospects of breakthroughs under McCain than has been the case under George Bush.  

On the issue of withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, Obama and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki see eye to eye.  At least for now, that reality favors Obama.  However, if the security situation were to worsen in Iraq, it is difficult to predict whether Obama or McCain will have an upper hand.  A lot will depend on which way the American people would lean under such a condition.

Regarding Iran, the presidential straitjacket limits the chances of creating an approach, which was most imaginatively proposed by the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, when he discussed the prospects of offering a “grand bargain” to Iran.  Neither Obama nor McCain has made any reference to that proposition.  Still, Obama is somewhat original in insisting that the U.S. conduct a dialogue with Iran.  However, the stridency of Obama’s rhetoric explicating his description of Iran’s behavior may not be viewed with high optimism by Iranian leaders.  Nevertheless, Obama’s approach is markedly different from McCain’s militant rhetoric, and especially his recent juvenile demonstration of singing a parody of a  Beach Boy’s song, “Bar, Barbara Ann” to “Bomb, bomb, Iran,” while cameras recorded it for the view of future generations.  Needless to say, that event is one of the most visited sites on You Tube. 

Regarding South Asia, Obama is outdoing McCain in mouthing off ”McCainism,” when he proposed to take unilateral military action against the Taliban hideouts in Pakistan.  On this issue, the foreign policy handlers of Barack Obama have their work cut out for them to educate him extensively if he enters the White House in 2009.

Pakistan has long envisaged its security as inextricably linked to the security of Afghanistan.  The deciphering of that observation means that two preconditions have to be met. 

First, no government of Afghanistan will be allowed to be anti-Pakistan/pro-India.  This hyphenated relationship has to be both understood and empathized by the United States, characteristics that have been grossly absent from America’s foreign policy toward South Asia.  Second, from the vantage point of Pakistan, India’s heightened presence in Afghanistan is fully aimed at destabilizing Pakistan.  Consequently, as preemptive (or in some instances as a preventive) measure, Pakistan would do everything to destabilize Afghanistan.  This proposition is not likely to be spelled out by the Pakistanis through official foreign policy pronouncements in the future.  Only General Zia ul-Haq, in a moment of brutal frankness with the Journalist, Selig Harrison, in the 1980s, admitted the significance of Afghanistan for the ”strategic depth” of Pakistan. 

However, in the turbulent politics of South Asia—where bomb blasts speak more frequently than accomplishments stemming from quiet diplomacy—one is left to draw one’s own conclusions about why the Indian staff in Afghanistan was recently targeted in a suicide attack in Afghanistan and why there were several bomb attacks in Ahmadabad, India.

Even though the United States has long been involved in South Asia, the American foreign policy establishment has never impressed the world about its understanding of the highly nuanced and equally cataclysmic geopolitics of South Asia.  In the remainder of this decade, and under a new U.S. president, that fact is not likely to change perceptibly. 

America’s foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia is not likely to witness much change in the coming years.  The peace process in Israel awaits a new and highly credible leader—of the caliber of the late Yitzhak Rabin—whom Israelis can trust to make a deal with the Palestinians.  Long before that, the Palestinians have to unite behind one leader, a proposition that appears hard to materialize in the post-Arafat days, when the PLA and Hamas factions are busy fighting and killing each other. 

There is a serious crisis of legitimacy in the Palestinian nation.  The West perceives the diffident Mahmoud Abbas as a legitimate leader, a point of view that is not relevant from the perspective of the Palestinians.  The Palestinian voters, on the contrary, after voting overwhelmingly for Hamas in January 2006, have not yet renewed their mandate for that organization.  So, from their vantage point, one can only guess that Hamas still has a lot of support.  The U.S. and the EU continue to envisage Hamas as a “terrorist” entity with which they will not do business.  In the interim, the plight of the Palestinians continues to worsen.

Iran has long desired a negotiating process aimed at concluding a grand bargain with the lone superpower.  That might happen if Obama is elected.  However, even that accomplishment is buried underneath enormous historical baggage from the U.S. and Iranian sides.

In South Asia, the most crucial aspects are stabilization of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The U.S. plays virtually no role in materializing the stability of Pakistan, except if it decides to create massive economic plans towards that country whose purpose it is to ensure that Pakistan does not become a failed state.  As complicated as that process appears to be, it becomes comparatively simpler when one considers how awesome the task of stabilizing Afghanistan really is.

The winner of the American presidency in 2008 will be faced with the type of challenges that are marked by characteristics that promise to ensure failure.  Transforming those characteristics into a template for success will require a superhuman endeavor, which can be achieved only through multilateralism.  In this sense, a unilateral approach toward any of the aforementioned problems has to be discarded categorically and at least on a long-term basis.