Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

America’s so-called war on terror is developing a new focus—the frequent violation of Pakistani sovereignty through the use of UAV attacks and rapid raids by U.S. Special Forces.  This focus will continue, no matter who is sitting in the White House come January.  And the contours of that policy are emerging here in the waning days of George W. Bush’s presidency.

As Iraq appears to be calming down, U.S. national security officials are worried about the worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan.  What especially concerns them is that the arguable success of the Surge strategy in Iraq cannot be duplicated in Afghanistan.  The success of the Surge is not because it is a brilliant strategy.  In fact, there is nothing new about its modalities of “clear, hold, and build.”  Its success became possible entirely because of the decision made by the Sahwa or the “Awakening” movement (aka Sons of Iraq) to abandon a posture of suffering at the hands of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) terrorists without even lifting a finger, and joining the ranks of the U.S. military to fight them.  The U.S. forces were always in search of a way to gain support from some indigenous groups to fight against the AQI, and the Sons-of-Iraq support became the golden opportunity for the U.S. occupation forces–an opportunity that was fully exploited.

The confluence of the Sahwa movement’s decision to cooperate with the U.S. and the implementation of the Surge strategy was a sui generis historical development.  It may not be repeated anywhere else.  It is certainly not applicable in Afghanistan for several reasons.  First, the majority of the Afghan—which means the Pushtoon—envisage the Western forces as “enemies” of Islam and of the Pushtoon. 

Secondly, the Islamic zealotry of Afghanistan is also quite unique in nature and is a matter of historical significance.  They had shown that zeal in their fight against the Soviet military in the 1980s, which were considered as occupiers of Islamic Afghanistan.  Today’s U.S.-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are similarly depicted as foreign occupiers who should be expelled.  The U.S. campaign of public diplomacy has been copious in emphasizing that it is not present as an occupier.  But now we know how miserably that campaign failed. 

Thirdly, as Pakistan was supporting the Mujahideen forces in the 1980s (along with the United States), today’s Pakistan is not so openly supporting the Taliban-al-Qaida nexus, despite the fact that they are fighting Western forces.  The reason underlying this Pakistani policy is highly complicated.  It partially stems from the fact that Pakistan has become a country of a democratically elected government, which is trying to find its bearings.  In the process, it does not really know what is going to work in its dealings with the Islamists of the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA regions:  negotiations or military action, a combination of the two, and especially when to apply what tactic.  It has negotiated a “peace” agreement, which is regularly being violated.  The position of the Pakistani Army on this issue is far from clear at this point.

What is most important to bear in mind is the fact that, despite all the confusion about how to deal with the Pakistani Taliban and other Islamist groups in that country, the Pakistani government of all stripes is always very clear about India’s presence in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to the proportion that it has now. 

As the chief supporter of the Karzai government, the United States either did not bother to be sensitive about that issue, or has started to see India as so much a part of its strategic partnership in the region that it refuses to even empathize with the security concerns of Pakistan regarding the high Indian presence in Afghanistan.

What choices does Pakistan really have about lowering the Indian presence in Afghanistan?  Conventionally speaking, none.  However, there is that Taliban or   Islamist card that it has at its disposal, with the greatest benefit of using that card being deniability.  There is no suggestion here that Pakistan has used this option.  However, it has already been accused of using it by U.S. sources.

In the post-Musharraf era, the United States has no anchor in Pakistan to rely on.  So, it is very much a possibility that a decision has been made to intensify the use of the UAV and drones to attack and kill high-value targets in the Pakistan-Afghan border region, and even to use the Special Forces.  It is also likely that, at the conclusion of the recent highly publicized meeting between Pakistani and American top military brass on a U.S. naval ship, an understanding has been reached whereby the U.S. has been given a green light to use the drones as well as its Special Forces.  The only caveat might be that the Pakistani civilian leaders, and especially its Army leadership, will express a lot of public outrage every time those options are used.  Through such charades of ranting, Pakistani leaders can create a semblance of being angry with the United States’ violation of their sovereignty.  As long as they don’t take any visible action that would escalate the chances of skirmishes between the Pakistani and U.S. military forces on the Pak-Afghan borders, those ranting will not have any palpable impact.

But even these periodic attacks inside Pakistan are not likely to make a visible deterioration in the military capabilities of the Islamist forces.  That is why there is already a notable agreement between Senators Barack Obama and John McCain about the use of military forces inside Pakistan in the future.  In fact, on that point, Obama underscored a major difference between his approach to fight against terrorism versus that of McCain’s.  However, now both candidates agree on mounting attacks inside Pakistan.

No matter who wins the White House in 2009, the groundwork of attacking the Islamist forces inside Pakistan has already been laid by the Bush administration.  The next President has to develop further contours of that policy.  About the only way this option will be postponed is if the security situation in Iraq worsens in the coming months.

The United States has yet to learn that the so-called global war against terrorism cannot be fought and won purely through the use of military power.  Whatever success it has attained in Iraq in fighting the terrorists was the outcome of a strategy—Surge—that emphasized a combination of politics, economics, and the use of military force.  But, since that strategy appears unworkable in Afghanistan, the next administration will tread the familiar path of using the military to eradicate the terrorists with very little attention to the implementation of its other tools of national power.