Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

The saga of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may best be described by the phrase “use and abandon.”  That happened during the years following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan eagerly became America’s ally.  But when the Soviets were defeated and ousted from Afghanistan, the U.S. went home.  Pakistan was left alone to deal with the consequences of militant Jihad, which America was too happy to revive in order to defeat the communist superpower.

 

History repeated itself in a similar fashion when the U.S. went back to Pakistan in 2001, that time with a symbolic bazooka in its hand, and told its dictator General Pervez Musharraf to cooperate in America’s invasion of Afghanistan or his country would be bombed back into the stone age.  Musharraf joined the fight and got $10 billion worth of assistance from Washington. 

 

 

But Pakistan of the post-9/11 era was a hellish place for America.  People of that country remembered only too well that country’s “deceptions” of the past and they did not want their government to lift a finger to help the Americans.  Besides, in 2001, the United States went to Afghanistan for the explicit purpose of defeating the same type of people (Islamists) that it zealously nurtured and trained in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union.  Since then, Pakistan served as a visible base of support for the Islamists.

 

If Pakistan had been a democracy in 2001, the U.S would not have so cavalierly threatened to bomb it back into the Stone Age.  However, it knew how to deal with dictators who love to play tough guy in dealing with their citizens but are softer than melted cheese in cooperating with regional or global hegemons.

 

But this time, Pakistan has a gift for the United States.  That gift is wrapped in a lot of blood and gore; it contains threats of rising regional turbulence that can spillover into Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as the South of Pakistan into India. 

 

During the first presidential debate, John McCain called Pakistan a “failed state” before Musharraf came to power.  Barack Obama did not pause to explain how his frequently mentioned option of launching attacks on Pakistan is superior to what George W. Bush did in Iraq.  If the use of power is the solution, then Iraq should have been a haven from the American perspective.  As it happens, it is barely a quiet place with a highly uncertain future.  How can a bad option for Iraq becomes a good option for Pakistan?  But Obama is not in a reflective mode, and the media is in no mood to probe Obama on this issue.

 

This time, Pakistan’s gift (or revenge stemming from America’s policy of use and abandon) to the U.S. is coming in the form of a guaranteed failure of all short-range options and quick fixes, like the palpable (short-term) positive consequences emanating from the application of the Surge option in Iraq. 

 

 

 

 

 

This time, the issues in Pakistan are how to reverse the tide of radical Islamism without appearing to be doing America’s bidding.  Musharraf must have known that he was a doomed man the day he decided to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Lal Masjid (mosque) massacre of July 13, 2007, was the clincher.  Some say Musharraf had to use excessive force to satisfy the Americans.  But that may be only partially true.  By the time that event exploded, Musharraf was driven largely by his greed to stay in power, no matter the cost.  He knew that the only way he could to ride out the storm of protest (even though, as it turned out, it was wishful thinking) was to make sure that America remained on his side.  America, on the contrary, decided to cut its losses by forcing him to doff his uniform.  That was the day his rule was tacitly over.

 

A derisive adage in Pakistan describes the power of Allah, America, and the Army inside that country.  The manner in which Musharraf was dispatched to his retirement does not bode too well for the power of the Army, which is also increasingly coming under attack from the side of the Islamists.  In addition, the Army might end up using force to discourage America’s use of power inside their borders.  Unless the United States and the Pakistani Army reach a new modus vivendi, America’s power in Pakistan will become a myth or fairytale. 

 

If Pakistan remains a democracy, it will have to find its own niche away from the U.S.  Pakistan’s new President, Asif Ali Zardari, does not appear to hold much promise in terms of his ability to cultivate his image as an independent in the eyes of his constituents.  He might turn out to be a short-lived president. 

 

Even if democracy is ousted from Pakistan, once again, the next strongman will have to think hard and long before he decides to become America’s “stooge.”  This time, if Pakistan comes out intact from the current tumult and chaos, it might have to concern itself only about pleasing Allah and its own citizens, no one else.  Perhaps not even its Army.