Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

Reading about Indonesia from the United States in the post-9/11 era creates a picture of that country that has little to do with realities inside its borders.  One of the reasons is the obsession of the American media and even OpEd writing intellectuals with Jemah Islamiya (JI) at the expense of everything else.  As much as the “informed public” (defined as people who are interested in substantive news coverage in the print and electronic media) wants to know about Southeast Asia, somehow their interest in and about Indonesia has been reduced to reading or hearing reports that discuss how dynamic the JI still is, and about how many Indonesians are sympathetic to that entity.

It is a sign of the times that the U.S. media still sets the agenda and the tone for different regions of the globe.  Since terrorism has been very high on the U.S. agenda of “hot button” issues, that topic gets enormous coverage, as if other issues matter very little.  Even those who are critical of the U.S. “obsession” with terrorism wait with baited breath to hear and read about the dynamics of activities of terrorist groups. 

I hope I am not exaggerating the description of this trend, but the coverage of terrorism is “sexier” than the arcane discussions of economic turbulence, especially when those downturns cannot be explained with any amount of cogency and coherence.  Neither can terrorism.  But that has not stopped the so-called experts to pontificate about it.  In any event, my thinking was colored by these thoughts when I arrived in Indonesia in October 2008.

What I saw was remarkably different.  Here is a country that is bustling with optimism, even when the daily rat race of getting ahead promises to get more intense than it currently is because of the prevalence of the global economic crisis.  Here is a country that is most relaxed about and is equally proud of its Islamic heritage as well as about its religious pluralism.  Here is a country whose educators are exceedingly preoccupied with the modalities of elevating the standard and capabilities of modern education of their institutions. 

Here is a country whose foreign policy—even though it is not yet driven by the desire to be seen and heard globally—is becoming progressively visible.  Here is a country where the desire to build its armed forces (TNI) is becoming a source of controversy and debate.  However, that debate has not yet caught the intensity that it deserves.  Strangely enough, Indonesians view the TNI as some sort of a rogue element, perhaps because of its highly controversial record in the independence of Timor Leste. 

Still, Indonesia signed a defense deal for the purchase of $1 billion worth of military equipment (including tanks, helicopters, and submarines) from Russia during the September 2007 visit of the then President Vladimir Putin.  The United States watched that development with a mixture of rapt attention and concern.  As much as Washington wants Indonesia on its side, it has shown little evidence of giving that Southeast Asian country the significance that it deserves.  Besides, American arms purchases are heavily embroiled in a political tug-and-pull from the U.S. Congress, which consistently demands that the purchasing countries toe the American line regarding major foreign policy issues.  This reality is not popular inside any Asian country that wishes to remain on the U.S. list of friends.

But the modalities of Indonesia’s foreign policy are not adequately covered in the global media.  At the same time, visiting that country, I felt that Indonesia’s foreign policy specialists whom I encountered are not driven by a sense of self importance that has emerged among the strategic thinkers of India in the past eight or ten years.  Of course, Indonesia, unlike India, is not a possessor of nuclear weapons.  It, unlike India, has yet to emerge as another “rising power” of Asia.  Consequently, it has not yet attracted the kind of attention that is currently showered on India by the world media.  However, a country like Indonesia does not have to acquire nuclear weapons to enhance its regional significance.  It is the largest member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and a country with the largest Muslim population.  In those capacities, it is likely to enjoy considerable sway in global affairs in the coming years.

In the post-9/11 era—when the United States is having so much trouble in the realm of winning the hearts and minds of Muslims—Indonesia can deftly position itself as a friend of the U.S.  There have to be sizeable side benefits for such a role for that country, especially in the form of economic and military assistance.  However, for some reason, Indonesia has not yet decided to play that role.

From extensive contacts with its young community of strategic thinkers that a short visit can provide, I was not persuaded that Indonesians are paying much attention to have their country become an important actor in the regional politics of Southeast Asia.  Perhaps its newness to democracy is the reason why that country’s strategic thinkers are waiting for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to set an ambitious foreign policy agenda.  One option for them is to start that debate and let the foreign ministry of Indonesia catch up with them.  However, such is not yet the case.

I came away with a sense that Indonesia is at the cusp of making up its mind to assert its significance as a major nation-state of Southeast Asia.  It has already begun to make some strides in the world of Islam, including its offer to participate in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iran.  Considering the fact that Iran has attached ample significance to ties with Indonesia, it has the potential of serving as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran.  If it were to become such an intermediary, that will be a major development in Indonesia’s importance for the U.S. as well as in the world of Islam.