The United States is number one in the realms of nuclear and conventional weapons.  Its conventional superiority is so awesome that no nation-state would dare challenge it.  Yet it has no intention of reducing the size of its huge nuclear arsenal. 

So, the question is where is the threat to the U.S. security coming from?  There is no more USSR, no more Cold War, and no more “peer competitors.”  There is only one country that even comes close to being called a peer competitor, save the People’s Republic of China.  Even that country is not interested in militarily challenging the lone superpower.

Nuclear deterrence—the doctrine that stated that only a potential use of nuclear weapons would deter both the US and the USSR against attacking each other during the Cold War years—is not relevant anymore.  The USSR has imploded and its chief successor, Russia, is not a threat of any significance to the United States.  Under these circumstances, the lone superpower is using nuclear deterrence merely as a symbol of its awesome power.  There is no country left that could challenge it by using conventional power.  And the use of nuclear power against the United States by any nation-state will surely result in massive retaliation, which no nation-state wishes to experience.

However, for countries like North Korea and Iran, the concept of nuclear deterrence carries the same meaning as it did to deter the two superpowers during the Cold War years.  Both Pyongyang and Tehran feel that if they acquire it by developing nuclear weapons of their own, their regime survival is guaranteed.  They have seen what the United States did to Iraq under Saddam Hussein, knowing full well that it had no nuclear weapons.

Consequently, Pyongyang has already become a country with nuclear weapons.  A general understanding is that it possesses somewhere between 6-10 nuclear weapons.  Thus, the United States has proven the truth underlying the doctrine of nuclear deterrence: a nuclear-armed nation-state is not likely to be attacked even by the lone superpower.

Iran, on the contrary, falls into a different category.  It has not yet developed nuclear weapons of its own, but seems to be heading in that direction, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding.  Iran seems to be operating on the same unstated premise that its regime survival will only be guaranteed if it acquires nuclear weapons.

For Iran, the fear of American intention to bring about regime change is not the result of any paranoia.  It had experienced it in 1953, when the United States and the U.K. cooperated to overthrow a constitutionally elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq.  When the presidential election of June 2009 came under global scrutiny and controversy, the top leaders of Iran reacted harshly to protestors.  The fact that the CIA and British Intelligence spent a lot of money organizing street protests in 1953–which became the chief source of overthrowing the government of Dr. Mosaddeq–was very much on the minds of the current Iranian rulers when they ruthlessly put down protestors in the streets of urban Iran.  

Even though in 2009, Iran is a power of considerably higher significance than it was in 1953, its military power is totally insignificant when compared to the United States.  Moreover, in is made in Washington to take on Iran, at least purely from the perspective of the use of military power, Iran will be a sure loser. 

Iran’s considerable power stems from what its resistance forces can do to any invading forces once the main military operation comes to an end, very much like what happened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime.

In 2009, in the aftermath of the election-related instability, if anything, the rulers of Iran are likely to be even more determined than ever before to develop nuclear weapons.  Despite President Barack H. Obama’s overtures towards Iran, the fear of potential military action by United States against their country looms large among current Iranian rulers.

As they examine the whole spectrum of options at their disposal, the idea of developing nuclear weapons still appears attractive, despite the risks of an Israeli attack or even a U.S. military action.  The only question is not whether Iran would develop its own nuclear weapons, but exactly when it would do it. 

The only way the Iranian regime’s survival is guaranteed is if the regime acquires nuclear deterrence capabilities of its own.  That seems to be the dominant thinking, especially among Iran’s hardliners.  For Iran, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence means creating a “permanent” constraint or an obstacle in the way of the United States’ desire to bring about regime change.