Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

President Barack Obama’s recent admission that the U.S. is not winning in Afghanistan is quite refreshing when compared to George W. Bush’s arrogant declaration of “mission accomplished” in Iraq in June 2003.  Obama’s candor notwithstanding, the most important thing is that the U.S. should not lose in Afghanistan.  Allowing Afghanistan to descend into chaos once again is akin to issuing al-Qaida an invitation to succeed.  No one needs reminding that Afghanistan was the place where the 9/11 attacks on the United States were planned.  It was also the country from where Usama Bin Laden declared his infamous “fatwa” of Jihad against the United States in 1998.  So, a defeat of the lone uberpower in Afghanistan will be envisaged by the self-styled “Jihadists” as the beginning of the ultimate defeat of the “infidel in-chief.” 

That is not an acceptable choice.  But one has to keep thinking about how to win in Afghanistan.  The victory is not going to be either quick or without a radically different approach toward that troubled country.

The Obama administration has the right approach of coupling Afghanistan’s security with that of Pakistan’s.  The appointment of Richard Holbrooke as Special Envoy is also a good thing, provided that he does not adopt a “bull-in-the-china shop” approach toward creating a winning strategy.  Holbrooke needs to take time in his long and boring journeys to South Asia to read the history of the great power involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Afghanistan has been an historical burial ground of all mighty warriors of the past, from Alexander the Great to the second superpower of the Cold War years—the Soviet Union.  Secondly, as much as the Afghan’s unity against the invaders and occupiers of their homeland is legendary, so is their internecine war among themselves once the occupier is expelled.  That is just another reason Afghanistan needs a helping hand to evolve itself into a stable place, which will require a lot of patient involvement of the United States and enormous economic and knowledge capital.

The United States is increasingly being viewed as an occupier of Afghanistan. 

That notion has to be defeated by conducting elections and by developing an approach that enhances the legitimacy of the next elected government.  As unpopular President Hamid Karzai has been inside Afghanistan, prospects of someone’s election as his replacement might not be too bright.  Thus, U.S. strategy must be focused on enhancing the legitimacy of whoever is the next elected president of Afghanistan, including Karzai. 

In this context, Washington must revisit the political strategy that was applied toward enhancing the legitimacy of the government of Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki.  Karzai is not Maliki, but the next elected president (even if it is Karzai) must operate by adopting a new governing strategy.  A starting point for that strategy ought to be nullification of the rule of the warlords and eradication of the opium trade.

A popular suggestion inside the U.S. is to destroy the opium crop and thereby take away the livelihood of poor Afghan farmers.  An alternative is not to destroy that crop, but only to purchase it, or use it in legal worldwide use for medicinal purposes.  That approach is likely to get a lot of criticism inside the U.S., but the option of destroying the opium crop without providing a substitute crop or an alternate way of living for Afghan farmers is also a recipe for disaster.  On this particular issue, the United States needs to heavily rely on the expertise of Afghan specialists in Asia and Europe in order to develop policy options.    

The Obama administration’s consideration of offering massive economic assistance to Pakistan is an approach in the right direction.  Senators John Kerry and Chuck Hagel have already made a good start by endorsing a “strategy” for Pakistan that was developed by the Atlantic Council. 

Pakistan needs massive economic assistance, but with high standards of transparency and accountability.  A large part of that assistance must go to revamping the educational institutions in that country, especially religious schools.  The issue of reforming religious curricula has been a highly controversial one.  However, Islamists should not be given a free hand in implementing their half-baked theological perspectives as the only correct interpretation of Islam. 

Pakistan has a large number of religious scholars whose expertise in this regard should be fully utilized.  This issue will probably lead to intense controversy, and even violence.  However, it has to be tackled with the same vigor as the highly contentious objectives of the Islamization of Pakistan that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Haq implemented.  As a secular politician, Bhutto adopted the Islamization policy only to appease the Islamists in the 1970s, and to counterbalance the powerful Army.  Zia was most resolute in following up the precedent of Bhutto, except Zia had no problem in becoming a hero of the Islamists, who were pursuing the same agenda at that time.

Another thrust of educational reforms of the Pakistani educational institutions ought to be insertion of a massive dosage of modern scientific and technological education.  The future stability of Pakistan is largely dependent upon its continued emergence as a modern state and not a place where religious obscurantism prevails.

Regarding the military aspect of a winning strategy, the solution is not just in providing 30,000 more American troops, even though that approach, in tandem with other measures, is likely to be helpful, but definitely not by itself.  The United States has already recognized the fact that the security of Afghanistan is intrinsically linked with that of Pakistan’s and vice versa.  But the Obama administration has not gone far enough. 

The next step is to involve India in the security-related negotiations.  India has been paranoid about the possible American decision to reintroduce the “hyphen” in its handling of the Indo-Pak ties, which India abhors.  However, no negotiations regarding the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan is complete without insisting on the reentry of India into such negotiations.  This is not tantamount to reentering the “hyphen” in the Indo-Pak ties.  It only ensures Pakistan that the U.S. comprehends Islamabad’s legitimate security concerns and is determined to take it fully into consideration by getting India involved. 

The Obama administration has to recognize the fact that Pakistan is as much concerned about cross-border “shenanigans” from the Indian side as India has been of similar activities initiating in Pakistan.  In the Indo-Pak power games there are no “good guys.”  Both countries have a record in destabilizing the other side.

The U.S. invitation to Iran to participate in the impending March 21, 2009 conference is also remarkable.  It sets up the first face-to-face meeting between the Obama administration and Iranian officials.  More to the point, it creates ample stakes for Iran regarding the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In terms of defeating the Taliban and al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan, the United States needs a version of counterinsurgency strategy that is markedly different from the one implemented in Iraq.  Such a strategy requires opening a negotiating front with the Taliban and attempting to drive a wedge between them and the al-Qaida forces.  There is no negotiating with al-Qaida elements who only know the language of death and mayhem.  They should be dealt with by implanting the tactic of “fighting fire with fire.”

The very proposition of winning in Afghanistan is not just a paradigm shift; it is, indeed, an earth shattering proposition, and the potential creation of a new historical precedence.  That approach also requires highly unique measures.  Fortunately, the United States has a President who appears to be much more revolutionary in his actions than he sounded in his rhetoric as a presidential candidate.  The only question is how resolute will he remain in his sustained departure from using “conventional” and tired old approaches of stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan.  He has a number of ill-wishers inside his own country.  But the most important reality is that the entire world wants him to succeed in South Asia and everywhere else.