What’s in a Name?: “GWOT” Versus “OCO”
April 25, 2009
Posted in: United States
Tags: "Christian-Zionist Crusade", "Global War on Terrorism", "Overseas Contingency Operation", "Talibanization", "Win the Hearts and Minds", 1972 ABM Treaty, Afghanistan, Campaign Against Terrorism, George W. Bush, Global Diplomatic Campaign, GWOT, Indonesia, Iraq, Muslims, Nation-Building, OCO, Pakistan, Suicide Bombings, Surge Strategy, Turkey, U.S. Foreign Policy, Unilateralism, World of Islam
As the international community is witnessing the debate over the use of torture during the presidency of George W. Bush, another radical change has taken place over naming the United States’ campaign against terrorism. It used to be called the “global war on terrorism” (GWOT). President Barack H. Obama has quietly changed that name to “Overseas Contingency Operation” (OCO). The significant development is that not only has the name been changed, but, more to the point, the actual practices of the United States dealing with its campaign against global terrorism are undergoing major transformation.
More than the practice of unilateralism, GWOT was a policy that emphasized the use of force to “eradicate” global terrorism at the expense of all other “tools of national power,” such as the use of diplomacy, economic assistance, etc. Bush wanted every terrorist “dead or alive” and he wanted to eradicate all terrorist groups anywhere in the world. The outcome of the Iraq war created a slew of images and symbols in the global arena that proved to be extremely detrimental from the vantage point of the United States. As one source notes, “Even before Bush left office, his ‘war on terror’ had come to represent the most unpopular hallmarks of his presidency: secret CIA prisons, domestic spying, the use of since-banned interrogation techniques, and Guantanamo Bay.”
George W. Bush came to realize the mistake of his presidency regarding “GWOT” when he stated in August 2004, “We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the… struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try and shake the conscience of the free world.”
The two most significant reasons why the United States failed to be effective in dealing with global terrorism was that, first, despite all its endeavors to “win the hearts and minds” of Muslims, and despite its frequent insistence that the war on terrorism is not a fight against Islam, the Bush administration found few believers. Muslims all over the world envisioned it as a war against their religion. Second, the United States’ decision to invade and occupy Iraq buttressed the argument of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, according to which, the United States was bent on “enslaving” Muslims, especially in the Middle East, in order to make that region safe for Israel. Thus, “the Christian-Zionist crusade” became a phrase that was not just part of the rhetorical repertoire of the Islamists and extremist groups. Islamic preachers and orators all over the world of Islam fervently and repeatedly used it to whip up antipathy and even hatred toward the United States and the West.
President Obama not only was aware of those realities, but had plans to quickly neutralize the highly adverse effects of Bush’s handling of global terrorism. He took a series of actions in that regard. But the most effective and least publicized was his memorandum of March 25 which stated, “This administration prefers to avoid using the term ‘long war’ or ‘global war on terror.’ Please use ‘Overseas Contingency Operation. ‘”
Obama is proving that the United States can win in the realm of public diplomacy—defined as actions taken by the government “to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.” Through his speeches, interviews, visits to Turkey, and by sending his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Indonesia, the United States has initiated a proactive global diplomatic campaign to win the hearts and minds of Muslims.
However, no one needs to remind President Obama that public diplomacy requires much more than a series of symbolic actions. It requires changes in policy. In the past weeks, Iraq has been showing troubling signs of increasing instability and suicide bombings in the Shia holy places. If those bombings trigger another round of “ethnic cleansing,” then it appears that any progress related to the Surge strategy of the Bush administration is gone. It is too early to tell, but the signs are pointing toward an upsurge in an al-Qaida-related campaign of terror.
So the Iraqi front remains as challenging for Obama as it was under his predecessor.
In the meantime, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not showing any signs of progress. In Pakistan, the process of “Talibanization” is creeping along with a palpable momentum, and neither Pakistan nor the United States seems to know exactly what to do other than to use military force.
Unfortunately, the process of “persuading” or negotiating with the Taliban has never shown any signs of hope. They have demonstrated every resolve to fight and die for their cause. The question is whether the Pakistani Army will do the same. Even if implemented, that ominous option provides no hope for the stability for Pakistan anytime soon.
The only other option for Pakistan is a multipronged strategy of rebuilding its economy, ambitious and radical reform of its educational institutions, enhancement of the characteristics of “good governance” among the Pakistani elite through massive training and educational programs, substantial assistance for the Pakistani military for modernization, and civil-military education. The United States has to bankroll all these activities. In addition, the U.S. must assist the Pakistani Army to fight and win against the Taliban.
A patient and prolonged implementation of such a policy by the Obama administration might create an environment of democracy, economic prosperity, and Islamic moderation. At the same time, care should be taken not to overemphasize the military option of stabilizing Afghanistan at the expense of “nation-building.” Such policy will only emerge through a process of “trial and error.” In the interim, President Obama has to be very careful never to personalize the “war in Afghanistan” as his predecessor did in the case of the war in Iraq.
In the final analysis, the most certain reality is that, in its attempts to tackle global terrorism, the Obama administration “won’t be judged on the rhetoric” but on the outcome of policies it implements in stabilizing Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even Iraq.
As the international community is witnessing the debate over the use of torture during the presidency of George W. Bush, another radical change has taken place over naming the United States’ campaign against terrorism. It used to be called the “global war on terrorism” (GWOT). President Barack H. Obama has quietly changed that name to “Overseas Contingency Operation” (OCO). The significant development is that not only has the name been changed, but, more to the point, the actual practices of the United States dealing with its campaign against global terrorism are undergoing major transformation.
More than the practice of unilateralism, GWOT was a policy that emphasized the use of force to “eradicate” global terrorism at the expense of all other “tools of national power,” such as the use of diplomacy, economic assistance, etc. Bush wanted every terrorist “dead or alive” and he wanted to eradicate all terrorist groups anywhere in the world. The outcome of the Iraq war created a slew of images and symbols in the global arena that proved to be extremely detrimental from the vantage point of the United States. As one source notes, “Even before Bush left office, his ‘war on terror’ had come to represent the most unpopular hallmarks of his presidency: secret CIA prisons, domestic spying, the use of since-banned interrogation techniques, and Guantanamo Bay.”
George W. Bush came to realize the mistake of his presidency regarding “GWOT” when he stated in August 2004, “We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the… struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try and shake the conscience of the free world.”
The two most significant reasons why the United States failed to be effective in dealing with global terrorism was that, first, despite all its endeavors to “win the hearts and minds” of Muslims, and despite its frequent insistence that the war on terrorism is not a fight against Islam, the Bush administration found few believers. Muslims all over the world envisioned it as a war against their religion. Second, the United States’ decision to invade and occupy Iraq buttressed the argument of al-Qaida and other extremist groups, according to which, the United States was bent on “enslaving” Muslims, especially in the Middle East, in order to make that region safe for Israel. Thus, “the Christian-Zionist crusade” became a phrase that was not just part of the rhetorical repertoire of the Islamists and extremist groups. Islamic preachers and orators all over the world of Islam fervently and repeatedly used it to whip up antipathy and even hatred toward the United States and the West.
President Obama not only was aware of those realities, but had plans to quickly neutralize the highly adverse effects of Bush’s handling of global terrorism. He took a series of actions in that regard. But the most effective and least publicized was his memorandum of March 25 which stated, “This administration prefers to avoid using the term ‘long war’ or ‘global war on terror.’ Please use ‘Overseas Contingency Operation. ‘”
Obama is proving that the United States can win in the realm of public diplomacy—defined as actions taken by the government “to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.” Through his speeches, interviews, visits to Turkey, and by sending his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Indonesia, the United States has initiated a proactive global diplomatic campaign to win the hearts and minds of Muslims.
However, no one needs to remind President Obama that public diplomacy requires much more than a series of symbolic actions. It requires changes in policy. In the past weeks, Iraq has been showing troubling signs of increasing instability and suicide bombings in the Shia holy places. If those bombings trigger another round of “ethnic cleansing,” then it appears that any progress related to the Surge strategy of the Bush administration is gone. It is too early to tell, but the signs are pointing toward an upsurge in an al-Qaida-related campaign of terror.
So the Iraqi front remains as challenging for Obama as it was under his predecessor.
In the meantime, Afghanistan and Pakistan are not showing any signs of progress. In Pakistan, the process of “Talibanization” is creeping along with a palpable momentum, and neither Pakistan nor the United States seems to know exactly what to do other than to use military force.
Unfortunately, the process of “persuading” or negotiating with the Taliban has never shown any signs of hope. They have demonstrated every resolve to fight and die for their cause. The question is whether the Pakistani Army will do the same. Even if implemented, that ominous option provides no hope for the stability for Pakistan anytime soon.
The only other option for Pakistan is a multipronged strategy of rebuilding its economy, ambitious and radical reform of its educational institutions, enhancement of the characteristics of “good governance” among the Pakistani elite through massive training and educational programs, substantial assistance for the Pakistani military for modernization, and civil-military education. The United States has to bankroll all these activities. In addition, the U.S. must assist the Pakistani Army to fight and win against the Taliban.
A patient and prolonged implementation of such a policy by the Obama administration might create an environment of democracy, economic prosperity, and Islamic moderation. At the same time, care should be taken not to overemphasize the military option of stabilizing Afghanistan at the expense of “nation-building.” Such policy will only emerge through a process of “trial and error.” In the interim, President Obama has to be very careful never to personalize the “war in Afghanistan” as his predecessor did in the case of the war in Iraq.
In the final analysis, the most certain reality is that, in its attempts to tackle global terrorism, the Obama administration “won’t be judged on the rhetoric” but on the outcome of policies it implements in stabilizing Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even Iraq.
