Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

There is something about revolutionary change that keeps us from recognizing it while it is happening.  Only when it picks up its pace beyond control that we wake up from our slumber of ignorance and recognize that something really “big” is either happening or about to happen.  Such is the case in Iran today.

Iran is a country where the Islamic revolution overthrew a tyrant in 1978.  The Sunni world, as intrigued and fascinated as it was, considered it as not for emulation in their polities.  One can understand—though never sympathize with—that feeling because the Sunni religious scholars attempted to dismiss the Islamic Revolution as merely a “Shia phenomenon,” and not relevant to their countries. 

The Sunni religious establishment has always been co-opted by the autocrats and emirs to give their stamp of approval.  However, that wasn’t the case in Shia Islam.  The religious establishment of that sect always envisaged the “shahensha-e-waqt” (ruler at one time) as an illegitimate one.  Thus, it was easier for the Shia religious establishment to rise up against the Shah.

Those who read Crain Brinton’s classical work, The Anatomy of a Revolution, know that the Islamic Revolution of Iran is due for a major transformation or a radical change.  The current regime’s handling (dismissal or even contempt) of the people’s exercise of their will is just another evidence of that reality. 

Since Iran has no practice or tradition of tracking polls or public opinion polls, one is tempted to say that Mir Mousavi really won and that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lost.  While no one can rule out that possibility, it is also probable that Ahmadinejad won by a narrow margin. 

However, by announcing the results of the election so quickly, and by being so categorical about his victory, the Iranian government has no credibility in the eyes of the international community.  Even the Supreme Leader, Ali Khameini, labeled Ahmadinejad’s election as a “blessed” or even “divine” victory.  Then he changed his mind and called for the investigation by the Council of Guardians.  That body, which is subservient to the Supreme Leader, has even less credibility.  It regularly disqualifies reformers from running for office.  It is regarded as a super-conservative body of the current Iranian governmental structure.  Thus, we have very little (or even no) reason to believe that it will be fair in admitting that a mistake was made and Moussavi really won.

Consequently, Iran is only waiting for the turbulence to pick up once the Council of Guardians declares Ahmadinejad as the real winner.  We have no idea how strong the protest will be as a result of that.  Even if the current government were to survive the resultant turbulence, it will be operating only under a façade of legitimacy.

If Brinton is right, then the Islamic revolution—like the Shah’s regime that it replaced—has gone through the first phase and is ready for another revolutionary change.  Whether that change will be for the better or for the worse is only a matter of speculation.  In the case of Iran, there is likely to be more bloodshed before the current government is overthrown, and then even more bloodshed before political stability returns.

When thinking about continued turbulence in Iran, one has to keep in mind that its neighbor, Iraq, is barely stable.  If Iran were to become turbulent, then Iraq is bound to face a similar situation.

President Barack Obama’s measured reaction toward Iran’s internal troubles is a right one.  However, pressure on him from the conservatives is increasing.  So he is likely to raise the level of his own rhetoric, which is exactly what the hardliners in Iran want to see.

Even Obama’s reaction is not that relevant at this time.  Iran’s destiny will be decided by sixty percent of its young population (who are under the age of 30).  This group is the major cause of concern for aging and conservative Ayatollahs. These youngsters know about the Islamic Revolution through history books.  They know the legacy of strident anti-Americanism through anecdotes.  They have not experienced anything American except what they see on television or what they purchase on black-markets.  Most of them like what they see or hear about America, its market economy, and its rambunctious democracy.  This is bad news for Khameini, Ahmadinejad and their cohorts.

Grand Ayatollah Hossain Ali Montazari, once an heir-apparent to Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, has recently spoken his mind to the young Iranians.  He is urging them to continue protesting against the current regime.  That is both a good and a bad sign.  It is good news because Montazari’s model guarantees that reform-oriented Ayatollah’s would play a major role in Iran in the future.  It is bad sign in the sense that the current regime cannot afford criticism from one or more Ayatollahs of the caliber of Montazari.

By bringing about a regime change in 1979, Iran revolutionized the Middle East.  The Iranian revolution made possible the notion of the establishment of the Islamic government in contemporary times.  That fact shook the Sunni autocrats in their shoes.  They were having nightmares about potential regime change in their own respective countries.

Now as Iran seems to be heading toward another regime change, the entire Middle East—indeed the entire world—is watching with rapt attention.