The Vietnam Syndrome is Dead—Long Live…
September 9, 2009
Posted in: Afghanistan, Iraq, Islam, Pakistan, United States
Tags: Afghanistan, al-Qaida, Arab Ruler, General McChrystal, General McKiernan, Iraq, Muslim Ruler, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, President Obama, Saddam Hussein, South Vietnam, Taliban, United States
As the Obama administration ponders America’s warfighting strategy for Afghanistan, there are muted comparisons between the current U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and its involvement in South Vietnam in the 1960s. Given that the United States was defeated in South Vietnam, such comparison serves as an added burden for the mandarins of America’s national security strategy, both in the White House and the Pentagon.
Another troubling factor is that President Barack Obama is calling America’s war in Afghanistan a war of necessity and not a war of choice. That depiction was also used by his predecessor for the war in Iraq. With as many books as have been written on the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the burden of evidence is that, indeed, it was a war of choice. Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of mass destruction, nor did his government have any connections with al-Qaida. In fact, Osama bin Laden and his ilk hated the Iraqi dictator as much as they hated any contemporary Arab or Muslim ruler. But Bush’s handling of the Iraq war and what the U.S. went through before the spirals of violence and mayhem were lowered in Iraq, the American people seem to have developed a “war fatigue.” Recent polls have shown that they do not want their country to get involved in Afghanistan. This is not a manifestation of a “new fortress America” mentality. Rather, it reflects the fact that the American populace has decided that Afghanistan is not worth the fight.
Given such attitude, President Obama might have to think about reviving another concept that was popular in the 1960s when the United States was fighting the war in South Vietnam. That concept is the “domino effect.” This domino effect, indeed, appears real for Afghanistan and Pakistan—places where the Taliban are active. Even though they are different groups with the same name in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they both share one purpose—to oust the existing governments (thereby defeating the United States) and to formulate the beginning of an Islamic caliphate. However, Pakistan also possesses nuclear weapons, a reality that makes the thought of the Taliban victory absolutely unthinkable and, indeed, unacceptable. But Pakistan cannot be saved from the Taliban threat unless Afghanistan is also saved from it, and vice versa. That is why President Obama characterizes America’s war in Afghanistan as a war of necessity.
But, the difference between the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that the war in Iraq became unpopular in the American domestic arena only after Iraq became a quagmire between 2005 and 2007. On the other hand, the war in Afghanistan is becoming unpopular soon after it became “Obama’s war”—a duration that began when General David D. McKiernan was replaced by General Stanley McChrystal. That fact makes it very difficult for President Obama to implement his new strategy which is not yet fully developed. There is little doubt that he will be under pressure to establish deadlines for a phased American withdrawal way before his strategy will have an opportunity to be implemented without pressure.
As one ponders the reasons why the Obama administration is facing such a high level of public opposition, three explanations come to mind. First, the moniker that best describes Afghanistan is a “graveyard for empires.” Perhaps that historical fact already haunts a large number of Americans. They do not want their country to lose in a place that, historically speaking, appears “unfixable.”
Second, as a presidential candidate who strongly opposed the Iraq war, President Obama would not be given a break to shed more American blood before realizing that the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable. If this explanation is correct, then the American people are ahead of their leaders. That is a bitter pill for the new president to swallow.
Third, perhaps the Vietnam syndrome has emerged as the chief driving force behind the popular opposition to America’s continued involvement in Afghanistan. That is also troubling because there is no palpable antiwar movement in the streets of America.
Regardless of which of these reasons describes the ground realities of the popular opposition to the Afghan war, all three of them are related. And for all three reasons, public opinion seems to be pushing President Obama to set forth the specifics of his Afghan strategy, a situation that none of his predecessors has faced.
