Turbulent Aspects of A Proposed “Grand Bargain”
September 19, 2009
Posted in: Afghanistan, China, Great Power Relations, India, Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, United States
Tags: "G-2" Approach, Admiral Keating, Admiral Mehta, Afghanistan, AfPak Strategy, Bush Administration, China, Chinese Aircraft Carriers, Eastern Pacific, Hawaii East, Hawaii West, India, Indian Ocean, PACOM, Pakistan, PRC, President Obama, Russia, South Asia, United States, Western Pacific
The Indian Press was recently full of stories that Chinese naval officials have proposed to Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) that the two countries ought to divide the world oceans into two camps: China would take Hawaii West and Indian Ocean and the U.S. would be in charge of Hawaii East. The Chinese officials were reported to have told their American counterparts “… you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if something happens here, we will let you know.” Admiral Keating shared that story with the Indian Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, in the context of China’s high interest in developing aircraft carriers.
Even though Keating minimized the significance of that story by tagging it as a “tongue in cheek” type of narrative and also stated that the United States declined that proposal, it has caused palpable consternation in Indian circles. The chief reason is that New Delhi is already worried that the U.S. commitment to India’s emergence as a great power is not that significant under the administration of President Barack H. Obama. India’s apprehension on this issue is not without foundation.
President Obama has a coterie of advisors who are too focused on developing a strategy for South Asia aimed at stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan. From India’s point of view, as a major regional power, it should be invited to play a key role in that strategy. However, from the U.S. perspective, any high visibility assigned to India would instantaneously infuriate Pakistan, which is already highly discontented that the lone superpower no longer treats Pakistan as an equal of India.
Unlike President George W. Bush, President Obama has no special affinity toward India. The aphorism of U.S. foreign policy toward South Asia—as it is towards all regions of the world—is “pragmatism.” Consequently, Washington has developed a compartmentalized approach toward South Asia which, while integrating the security affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan, keeps it on a different plane with that of India. Under this approach, India would be consulted regarding America’s AfPak strategy, but not as a potential veto-welding actor, for such an Indian role will become a major reason for Pakistan to ensure the failure of that strategy.
More to the point, the United States under President Obama is more interested in developing closer ties with the PRC than it was under Bush. There is no suggestion here that, under the current U.S. administration, China is no longer envisaged as a potential competitor. Rather, such perception is given low priority, while a preferred approach in Washington is to engage China. That is one reason why no major American official has pooh-poohed the proposition in the world press that real decisions affecting global economic problems ought to be made by the United States and the PRC under the so-called “G-2” approach.
India is visibly annoyed by such suggestions, because the leaders in New Delhi have maintained their calculations of U.S.-India and U.S.-China strategic relations purely on the basis of a zero-sum game, whereby gains made by China would be tantamount to losses on the part of India, and vice versa.
If the United States and China were to agree to anything that is remotely similar to the aforementioned grand bargain, India’s only option would be to seek a balance with Russia—India’s “all-weather friend.” However, Russia of the 21st Century is doing its own strategic scrambling, in which close Sino-Russian strategic cooperation plays a crucial role. Even though Russia would be equally unhappy if that grand bargain between Washington and Beijing materializes, it will have to think long and hard about the consequences of upsetting the applecart by cooperating with India, and thereby annoying China.
In the final analysis, India’s best hope is that the United States would not consider seriously what India regards as China’s “wild proposal.” The emergence of India as a great power is not ready for major turbulence emanating from such happenstance.
