Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

On the front page of Saturday’s Financial Times (September 26, 2009) there was a somber looking picture of the American President Barack H. Obama, U.K.’s Premier Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy heading toward a podium to address the world press condemning Iran’s secret uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom. The United States and its allies believe that Iran is getting closer to making nuclear weapons. However, the how much closer is still a matter of speculation.

What is important to note is that the United States has already made a major concession toward Russia related to Iran—a measure that was virtually unthinkable for the former President George W. Bush—by abandoning the previous administration’s decision to station anti-missile sensors in Hungary and Poland.  Instead, the United States will station them on ships.  The rationale for this volte-face is that, by stationing the anti-missile systems on ships, the United States will acquire ample advantage and high maneuverability over the option of stationing the ground-based systems.  The American conservatives are already having a field day condemning the Obama administration’s “appeasement” of Russia.

The United States, as a quid pro quo, would like Russia’s consent for imposing harsh sanctions against Iran in the wake of its non-compliance with the IAEA’s demands for inspections and increased transparency.  There is no clear picture yet that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would go along with the U.S. expectations about Russia’s foregoing the use of the veto if the United States pushes a harsh sanction through the U.N. Security Council.  Russia also has the twin leadership of Medvedev and Premier Vladimir Putin.  The latter is almost gleeful about making things harder for the U.S. by not agreeing to have any strict sanctions on Iran for non-compliance.

Then there is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), another actor that maintains strong ties with Iran, and a country that has also been— besides Russia—helping Iran in nuclear and missile technology.  There is no indication that China would agree to American proposals of making it hard for Iran’s non-compliance even if Russia were to support that measure.

Why did the United States, the U.K., and France decide to raise the decibel level of their criticism of Iran at this point?  The first reason is because of the latest U.S. intelligence disclosure that Iran is secretly developing uranium enrichment facilities at Qom, in addition to the previously known facility at Natanz.  It is also understood that the new facility will be used to develop weapons-grade uranium.  Iran publicly admitted the existence of the facility near Qom, but only after finding out that the United States had known about it and was about to publicize it. 

Secondly, the Perm-5 of the U.N. plus Germany are about to start negotiations with Iran.  By dramatizing Iran’s alleged intentions to develop nuclear weapons, especially when the Russian and Chinese leaders were also present during the G-20 summit, the Western leaders choreographed their statements—along with somber faces while making their respective announcements—to escalate pressure on Iran and its two major supporters—Russia and China.

In response, China remained unfazed and neutral, while Medvedev sounded only a bit obliging, when he asked Iran to be forthcoming in the upcoming rounds of negotiations.

The most important missing variable in this convoluted narrative is that there has not been a change of posturing between the United States and Iran, even after the election of Obama.  Only the U.S. rhetoric regarding Iran has mellowed a bit.  Another important development is that, due to allegations of fraud in the recently-held presidential election in Iran, the United States felt obligated to issue statements critical of Iran—though they were mild in rhetoric compared to the ones used by Obama’s predecessor regarding Iran.

Consequently, as much as the Iranian government has been facing internal protests related to the election, it found no reason to be cooperative with the United States.  The best thing going for Iran is that the United States and the U.K. had a shameful history of destabilizing an elected government in Iran in 1953. 

So every time the United States criticizes Iran for not conducting fair elections, the hardliners blow off that disparagement merely as the 21^st Century version of meddling in Iran’s internal affairs.

All of this antagonism on both sides—Iran as well as the West—minimizes the chances of a significant breakthrough when Iran sits down at the negotiating table with the representatives of the Perm-5+1.  Such a reality suits Iran just fine, because it is not really interested in giving up its nuclear program.

Under these circumstances, the United States might be faced with giving a serious look at the military option.  The hardliners in Iran would welcome it.  If the U.S. or Israel were to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, both Afghanistan and Iraq would turn into hellish places for Western troops.  Iran would do all it could to promote such a scenario.  Iran knows well how unpopular “Obama’s war” in Afghanistan really is inside the United States.  The more pressure the lone superpower comes under with the prospects of increased violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the more welcome news that would be for Iran’s current rulers.

As President Obama acquires more experience in the White House, he will realize that there are no easy options for the United States when dealing with the Middle East, only more bloody or less bloody ones.