Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

The Obama administration is entering a crucial phase of its existence. President Barack Obama is about to determine his new strategy governing the Afghan war. He has a lot at stake because wars have a bizarre way of making heroes and villains out of presidents and prime ministers.

There was President Abraham Lincoln, who went to war to save the American union.  The northern states won that war, he is known as the savior of the republic, and the world has had a dexterous superpower.  Then there was Sir Winston Churchill.  His greatest claim to fame might have been his leadership during the World War II.  But, in my view, his even greatest claim to fame is that he knew how to find a niche for his tiny country, which was fast becoming a declining power toward the end of the Second Great War.  That niche was his decision to emerge as the vital ally of the United States.  In that capacity, the United Kingdom has played more of a crucial role during the Cold War than France or any other European power.

The world will not forget a failed American president, Lyndon Johnson, because he did not know when to decelerate his country’s commitment to the war in Vietnam.  He was not served well by a brilliant Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who was not persuasive enough to talk his boss into getting out of Vietnam, but decided to write a book publicizing his doubts in the 1990s.  President George W. Bush will go down in history as another failed president because he chose to get his country embroiled in a war of choice in Iraq.  His Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, saw eye-to-eye with his boss.  However, when the American people had enough of the Iraqi quagmire, Rumsfeld became Mr. Dispensable and Bush dumped him.  His successor was Robert Gates, who is now serving President Obama in the same capacity.  However,  Gates has been emerging as Mr. Indispensable by serving his boss quite well, at least for now.

President Obama entered the White House as a sort of a protest candidate regarding the war in Iraq, but he kept making a case for the Afghan war as the right kind of war.  When he became president, he had a choice of either talking himself out of committing American troops or bring about further escalation of troops, but on the basis of ample reflection, consultation, and thoughtfulness.  He is doing all that.  However, the neoconservatives (neocons) of America, whose darling, Senator John McCain, lost the election against Obama and McCain himself are on the sideline doing all the drumbeating for heightened commitment of troops in Afghanistan.  Consequently, Obama has become a double hostage of his own rhetoric related to Afghanistan during the presidential campaign and now that of pressure from American conservatives.

General Stanley McChrystal and General David Petraeus are also advocating increased engagement of American forces, because that was regarded as one of the chief reasons why the Surge strategy resulted in stabilizing Iraq.   

What is important now is that a General with a proven record of success in the new counterinsurgency doctrine (McChrystal) is arguing to implement the same doctrine in Afghanistan.  And he has the support of one of the original authors of that doctrine (Petraeus).  On this point, President Obama’s lack of experience in foreign policy and his total lack of knowledge and experience in military matters are making him somewhat wobbly-minded about coming out with the kind of strategy that he really wishes to implement in Afghanistan.   On this test of leadership, he is becoming increasingly pragmatic and appears to be seeking the support of his Secretary of Defense Gates.  Robert Gates does not belong to the neocon camp, but is highly respected in the conservative circles of the Republican Party as well as in the military, whose majority usually votes for that party.

Secretary Gates has shown a lot of class by repudiating McChrystal (albeit quite indirectly) for being bluntly discussing the modalities of his recommendations to President during his recent appearance at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).  Gates has wisely stated that whatever advice the top advisors have to offer to the President, they should do that “privately” (italics added). At the same time he seemed to be agreeing with McChrystal’s advice of raising the troop level. In this manner, Gates is reminding the military of the “rules of engagement” related to the President, while signaling to the President that he needs to give a hard consideration to McChrystal’s advice, while overlooking his brusque mannerism during his appearance at the IISS.

That type of sagacity is refreshing when one compares the style and substance of Gates’ leadership as Secretary of Defense with those of Rumsfeld.  What is even more important is that his ponderous operating style seems to complement that of President Obama.  There is no guarantee that Obama will succeed in implementing whatever strategy he is developing right now.  What is guaranteed is that he is doing his level best to be inclusive in his style of decisionmaking.  He is consulting with a slew of legislators of both parties and other experts.  The press coverage of free-wheeling debates governing the making of his strategy on Afghanistan reminds one of the decisionmaking style of President John Kennedy.  And Robert Gates is an important player in that process.

The most important aspect of Gates’ indispensability to President Obama is that he is not in the camp of those who are promoting a counterterrorism approach to Afghanistan (using high-tech platforms or Special Forces to eradicate the terrorists).  What he really seems to favoring is that the United States should stay engaged in Afghanistan.