Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

Watching the developing spat between the PRC and the U.S. over the latter’s decision to sell $6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan, one is reminded of the reality that security affairs have remained part and parcel of “low politics,” if that type of politics can be redefined as politics where suspicion, the dark shadows of zero-sum-related competitiveness, and one-upmanship are still lurking and ready to poison the ties between these two important actors. Contrast that version of low politics with its counterpart, “high politics,” if that phrase can be redefined as a description of the new realities where China is catching up with the United States, and the latter is beginning to look like an old curmudgeon, getting grumpy about its declining economic power and the related effects.

If one watched the debates at the recently concluded World Economic Forum 2010, one was left with the definite feeling that the shift of global power is unremittingly becoming a potent trend. China’s emergence as the next superpower is already happening, more in the realm of economics and less in that of the military, for now. But that could also change within a matter of a decade or so. With an annual economic growth of 9 percent per annum, the Chinese economy is making the West envious of that phenomenon. The spillover effect of China’s economic growth is emerging in the form of its growing clout in Africa and South America, where the Chinese development model has become a new trend worth emulating, while the West is claiming “sour grapes,” by accusing China of using “checkbook diplomacy.” The African nations are also becoming increasingly envious of “China’s rise,” and are trying to figure out which aspects of China’s development they can incorporate in the not too distant future.

The European nations are also befuddled and even depressed as a result of a mounting sense of their irrelevance in the global arena. One recent example of that irrelevance was accentuated by the fact that President Barack Obama refused to attend the next U.S.-EU summit in Spain. His was reportedly unimpressed with the results of last year’s meeting held in Prague.

China’s reaction to the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan was rather harsh, in the sense that it threatened to impose sanctions on American companies involved in selling weapons platforms to Taiwan. Military contacts between Beijing and Washington are expected to come to a standstill.

At one level, China is only trying to emulate the United States when it habitually imposes economic sanctions on any country doing business with Iran. Yet, at another level, China’s threatened reaction is likely to trigger a trade war at a time when the protectionist forces inside the United States are chomping at the bit to come up with punitive measures in response to the traditionally nagging issues being discussed under the general rubric of “China’s unfair trade practices.”
An important question is why is China overacting to the U.S. weapons sale to Taiwan? After all, Beijing knew that was a leftover from the days of the Bush administration. China would have had a better reason for being annoyed, if the Obama administration had sold Taiwan the controversial F-16 C/D aircraft, which it recently requested.

The answer is that China may be feeling its oats as a rising power. After pronouncing that the chief purpose of its emergence (“rise” or “development”) is peaceful, the Chinese adopted a cooperative posture toward the lone superpower in finding solutions to the global economic meltdown in 2009.

It is possible that, after establishing an impressive record of cooperation with the lone superpower, China, as a quid pro quo, wanted the United States to show it special consideration by not selling arms to Taiwan. Such calculation, if true, ignores how serious the U.S. Congress remains in supporting a fledgling but nevertheless vibrant democracy in Taiwan. Besides, manifesting a change of mind about selling weapons to Taiwan, or even reluctance toward that option, would be harmful for the United States at a time when East Asia is undergoing palpable realignments among states in that area. So, at least from the U.S. side, not selling arms to Taiwan, or postponing it, would have been quite harmful.

Even though the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan remains an important source of U.S.-China discord, there is no doubt that it is likely to get over its annoyance on that issue. However, it is also likely to adopt its own version of quid pro quo by refusing to cooperate with Washington’s propensity for tightening the screws of economic sanctions on Iran, something that is also quite important to the Obama administration. In addition, Washington should not expect any major Chinese overtures about pressuring North Korea to be forthcoming in future negotiations on the nuclear weapons issue with the U.S.
In the final analysis, issues of “low politics” (as defined in this essay) are likely to intensify the U.S.-China rivalry in the coming months. No favors should go unrewarded; no exercise in realpolitik should go unreciprocated. That is the thinking of China’s up and coming mandarins, who are quickly learning the behavior of the superpower of the future!