Strategic Paradigms by Ehsan Ahrari

The continuing economic crisis has created new pressures and demands for reduced expenditures inside the United States.  The chief question is how to lower defense spending without damaging America’s capacity to project power globally and being able to fight more than one war in different regions of the world.  The fact that no such situation would present itself in the near future is irrelevant; the requirements of contingency planning make it vital that top U.S. civilian and military leaders remain prepared for emergencies.  An added variable is the presidential campaign that is currently being waged inside the United States.  This is also a time when a sitting president becomes a target of challengers to his job for not paying adequate attention to America’s military strength.  These realities also necessitate a declaration of a “new” strategy.

However, one does not have to read too long the Obama administration’s new document entitled, “Sustained U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21^st Century,” issued today (January 5, 2012) before realizing that there is not much therein.  Its hallmark is the absence of really new ideas.  South Asia and the Middle East continue to be envisaged as “primary loci” of threats to America’s interests (Page 2).  The long-standing promise of the Obama administration that America is a Pacific power was already formalized when President Barack Obama visited the Asia-Pacific last November.  He also formally opened a new military base in Australia during that trip.  In the context of escalating U.S.-China rivalry, that was indeed a major wrinkle.  A number of East Asian nations applauded that move, while China appropriately expressed its annoyance.

The current document further embellishes that development by stating, “U.S. economic and security interests are “inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities.”  Consequently, the United States’ investment for its prestige, attention, and the focus of its military expenditures emphasizes the role of its old allies, as well as its U.S.-India strategic partnership.  On the latter issue, the Obama administration reiterates its resolve “to support its [India’s] ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and providers of security in the broader Indian region” (Page 8).  Needless to say, this statement would delight India’s leaders.  At the same time, it would also reinvigorate the Sino-Indian naval competition in and around the Indian Ocean.

The new strategic document also restates America’s long-standing gripe that China’s growing military power is not “accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region” (Page 8).  One can rest assured that China will continue to ignore that grumble.

The newly intensified U.S.-Iran rivalry is given its proper space in the new document.  The only added variable is the document’s mention of the increased interactions between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to contain Iran.  Giving the GCC states a new significance is a deft move in the sense that the Gulf sheikhs and emirs are looking for a pat on the back from Washington, at a time when the long-term prospects of their regime survival appear rather bleak, because of the sustained dynamism of the Arab Awakening (aka the Arab Spring).

Another important aspect of this document is the reiteration of “power projection despite anti-access/area denial challenges.”  The focus of this warfare is the PRC, which has been investing mega-capital in the development of its own asymmetric warfare capabilities against the United States.  In this context, cyber warfare, anti-ship missiles, ballistic and cruise missiles, and even drone warfare have captured major attention of military planners and thinkers in both Washington and Beijing.

What is also important to note is that the U.S. military is fully aware that Iran’s military is also busy emulating China’s asymmetric warfare-related countermeasures either on its own or through secret contacts with the Chinese military.  As was recently highlighted, Iran’s naval doctrine is heavily focused in denying access to the U.S. navy by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The necessity of issuing this document has a lot to do with the need of the Obama administration to signal to his Republican presidential rivals that he is not about to create a “hollow” military, a phrase that almost invariably comes into vogue during the presidential election campaign.  One can readily recall the spurious “missile gap” between the United States and the USSR, which became a hot issue of debate during the 1960 presidential contest between Jack Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

The bottom line of this document is to assure America’s friends and adversaries that the military is gearing up to doing at least as much in the realm of providing security to the United States as before.  Given its very impressive record of creating new and highly effective warfighting strategies and operational concepts, its adversaries need no further convincing.  China knows that fact only too well and its planners are busy studying the modalities of the AirSea battle concept.