However, one does not have to read too long the Obama administration’s new document entitled, “Sustained U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21^st Century,” issued today (January 5, 2012) before realizing that there is not much therein.  Its hallmark is the absence of really new ideas.  South Asia and the Middle East continue to be envisaged as “primary loci” of threats to America’s interests (Page 2).  The long-standing promise of the Obama administration that America is a Pacific power was already formalized when President Barack Obama visited the Asia-Pacific last November.  He also formally opened a new military base in Australia during that trip.  In the context of escalating U.S.-China rivalry, that was indeed a major wrinkle.  A number of East Asian nations applauded that move, while China appropriately expressed its annoyance.

The current document further embellishes that development by stating, “U.S. economic and security interests are “inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities.”  Consequently, the United States’ investment for its prestige, attention, and the focus of its military expenditures emphasizes the role of its old allies, as well as its U.S.-India strategic partnership.  On the latter issue, the Obama administration reiterates its resolve “to support its [India’s] ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and providers of security in the broader Indian region” (Page 8).  Needless to say, this statement would delight India’s leaders.  At the same time, it would also reinvigorate the Sino-Indian naval competition in and around the Indian Ocean.

The new strategic document also restates America’s long-standing gripe that China’s growing military power is not “accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region” (Page 8).  One can rest assured that China will continue to ignore that grumble.

The newly intensified U.S.-Iran rivalry is given its proper space in the new document.  The only added variable is the document’s mention of the increased interactions between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to contain Iran.  Giving the GCC states a new significance is a deft move in the sense that the Gulf sheikhs and emirs are looking for a pat on the back from Washington, at a time when the long-term prospects of their regime survival appear rather bleak, because of the sustained dynamism of the Arab Awakening (aka the Arab Spring).

Another important aspect of this document is the reiteration of “power projection despite anti-access/area denial challenges.”  The focus of this warfare is the PRC, which has been investing mega-capital in the development of its own asymmetric warfare capabilities against the United States.  In this context, cyber warfare, anti-ship missiles, ballistic and cruise missiles, and even drone warfare have captured major attention of military planners and thinkers in both Washington and Beijing.

What is also important to note is that the U.S. military is fully aware that Iran’s military is also busy emulating China’s asymmetric warfare-related countermeasures either on its own or through secret contacts with the Chinese military.  As was recently highlighted, Iran’s naval doctrine is heavily focused in denying access to the U.S. navy by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

The necessity of issuing this document has a lot to do with the need of the Obama administration to signal to his Republican presidential rivals that he is not about to create a “hollow” military, a phrase that almost invariably comes into vogue during the presidential election campaign.  One can readily recall the spurious “missile gap” between the United States and the USSR, which became a hot issue of debate during the 1960 presidential contest between Jack Kennedy and Richard Nixon.

The bottom line of this document is to assure America’s friends and adversaries that the military is gearing up to doing at least as much in the realm of providing security to the United States as before.  Given its very impressive record of creating new and highly effective warfighting strategies and operational concepts, its adversaries need no further convincing.  China knows that fact only too well and its planners are busy studying the modalities of the AirSea battle concept.

A number of students of global affairs are steadily predicting a power shift from the West to the East and the consequent emergence of a post-American era.[2]  In reality, however, the global power shift might not be from the West to the East, but a multi-directional one, as we also witness the emergence of Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa as new global centers of economic dynamism, along with the PRC and India – two spectacularly rising powers.

Perhaps recognizing that it has long been stuck in the dizzying whirlpool of the Middle East and the need to catch its breath by refocusing on its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, President Barack Obama has already withdrawn America’s forces from Iraq; and has redeployed 10,000 troops out of Afghanistan.  This is part of his promise to bring about complete withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.  However, the United States is opening a new military base in Australia.  By withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, the lone superpower might also be tacitly conceding its defeat.  The politics of Iraq remains as volatile and divisive as ever.  Except this time, along with the explosive Shia-Sunni division, it is also characterized by the growing presence of al-Qaida.  Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to prove itself to be the graveyard of empires.  As such, the war in that country continues to underscore the mounting power of the Taliban.

The Asia-Pacific, on the contrary, is welcoming the United States’ decision to escalate its presence, with open arms.  China — whose escalating hegemony appears ominous from the perspectives of small nation-states of East Asia – is creating ample apprehension among them.  Thus, these nation-states initiated a policy of “circling the wagons,” and appear determined to balance the power of China by asking for a resurged presence of the old hegemon, the USA, which has an established record of creating a benign hegemony.[3]  Washington could not have been happier.  The East Asian nations’ welcoming of America to their region only complemented the insistence of the Obama administration that America is a “Pacific power.”  President Barack Obama reiterated that resolve during his trip to Australia by stating that “…we are here to stay.”

India and China, the poorest countries of the not-too-distant past, have long passed the label of “rising powers.”  Now, they appear to be the economic power houses, indeed superpowers, of the future.  China is way ahead of India in this race, and thus remains a focal point of America’s attention.  As the foremost rising power of our time, China has the American example of the post-World War II era to follow.  Its rise not only has to be peaceful, but it also should be eminently constructive in revamping the rules underlying the functioning of the premier global political and financial institutions, like the U.N., the World Bank, and the IMF, etc.  Thus far, however, its leaders have not impressed the world by their proactivism or imagination for playing a constructive role.  They are standing on the sidelines, while being critical of the U.S. and Europe for not being “responsible” in their respective economic policies.  In the meantime, China continues to act as a rising power most comfortable in implementing parochial and inward looking policies of currency manipulation, as well as a heavy reliance on pushing its merchandise to the West.  It behaves as if it is only interested in reaping the benefits of appearing to be a superpower of the future without paying the political or economic price for being one.

India is gradually learning to act as a rising power in its neighborhood.  It has enhanced its presence in Southeast Asia by deciding to explore for oil in the South China Sea and in its cooperation with Vietnam, which has been one of the most vocal critics of China’s assertiveness in that region.[4]  India also has escalated its military presence along its border with China by announcing “$13 billion plans to raise a new mountain strike corps and four mountain divisions.”[5]  That was a clear response to China’s reported buildup on the Sino-Indian borders.   However, the jury is still out regarding the future performance of the successors of the Sun Tzu and Kautilyan styles of Realpolitik.

Europe is facing a crisis related to the future of the Eurozone, which was recently depicted as “a crisis of apocalyptic proportion” by Radoslaw Sikorski, Foreign Minister of Poland.[6]  As Europe is standing at the edge of a precipice, Turkey is emerging as the new power center of Europe.  In that capacity, it is implementing a “truly multidimensional foreign policy” in which it secretly conducted a joint air force exercise with China last October.[7]  In economic affairs, Russia became Turkey’s number one trade partner, replacing Germany.

Turkey is playing a similarly spectacular role in the Middle East.  Its intermingling of secularism and Islam is emerging as a popular example for the next corps of Arab leaders replacing the autocrats in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening.  In view of these developments, Turkey is transforming itself from a “peripheral state of Europe” into a “central power” of that region.[8]  Its model of secular democracy is already being emulated in Tunisia; and chances are that it would also be emulated in Egypt, as Islamists are winning electoral majority in that country but promising to opt for a coalition with the secularist parties.

The Arab Awakening (aka Arab Spring) continues to capture the world’s attention.  As the aging dictators fall, Islamists are emerging as some of the most prominent leaders of the Arab world.  The question is not an imminent one, but should be asked:  What is the Arab world going to look like in the next 3-5 years?  Are there prospects for the emergence of democracies, Islamic democracies, or would some of those Arab countries slide under the rule of theocracies?  Three current models of theocracy – Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia – have not made those countries places of economic prosperity, political stability, or the focal point of enlightenment.  If anything, obscurantism is on the rise in Pakistan, and theological autocracy is the order of the day in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

If the convergence of Islam and pluralistic democracy occurs in the post-awakening Arab world, then the opportunities for people of that part of the world are enormous.  There is tremendous human potential waiting to be liberated, educated, enlightened, and to make a dash toward the globalized world from which it was more or less excluded because the autocrats feared progress related to the information age.  And they were right for fearing it, because modernity was bound to become their enemy.  The Arab Awakening arrived in the Middle East and North Africa riding on the shoulders of some of the most recent advances in social/electronic media.  It was the power of social media that the autocratic and archaic control machine could not control, fight, or stifle.

One of the secrets of the Arab Awakening is that it has been an inclusive movement.  Another shocking aspect of it is that there were no leaders who could issue commands for the masses to follow, or whose arrests or assassinations by the ruling autocrats could have seriously undermined the movement.  As liberated Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are struggling to create a constitutional system of governance, the most important question is whether they will adhere to the principle of inclusiveness, or will they become victims of fissiparous tendencies for which their societies have been notorious?

One has every reason to be wary of the Islamists of the Arab world.  They have spent long years in the dungeons of the autocrats and the Pharaohs.  They have no experience with governance.  They have repeated the slogan, “Islam is the solution,” without having the responsibilities for spelling it out into specific policies.  As they become part of the ruling elites, it will be a test for them.  Their ultimate success may not be that they govern well, even though that would be a wonderful outcome.  Their ultimate success as participants in a democracy is their willingness to accept defeat, if or when they are voted out of office.

One “odd man out” in the rising tide of political change in the Middle East is Iran.  It has increased its influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, most ironically, because of the dismantlement of the Taliban regime and that of Saddam Hussein by its arch enemy, the United States.  However, the Green Movement’s abortive attempt to bring about regime change in Iran has left that country exposed to the covert shenanigans of the United States to overthrow the rule of the Ayatollahs.  Iran’s recent capture of the CIA’s, RQ-170 “Sentinel” drone is evidence of that reality.  The CIA’s monitoring of Iran is only the exposed aspect of its covert actions against that country.  The covert actions that are unbeknownst to the theocratic rulers of Iran are likely to hurt their regime the most.[9]  To add insult to injury, Iran’s strong ally, Syria, appears to be the next country to undergo a bloody regime change.  The loss of Syria would also seriously damage Iran’s presence and influence in Lebanon.

However, Iran is not the only country increasingly troubled by the prospects of regime change in Syria.  Israel is equally concerned, because the ouster of the Assad regime promises to bring about the rising presence and clout of the Islamists, who are not likely to loathe the Jewish state any less than the current Baathist/Alawite rulers of that country.

The emerging realignment of power should be worrisome, especially for the great powers of the West, because it is not only aimed at threatening their erstwhile privileged status in the global hierarchy of nation-states, but it also promises to bring to prominence actors and forces that have not been viewed by them as particularly friendly or cooperative.  There are likely to be many uncertainties, even the outbreak of minor or even major military conflicts, before a new hierarchy of nations is formulated.  The emergence of China and India does not promise the evolution of a Sino-Indian condominium of power.  Instead, the two rising powers might be headed toward an era of increased friction and even military conflict, especially on the issue of border dispute.  One minor example of that friction is underscored by the fact that India’s new Agni-V long-range ballistic missile is being dubbed by its defense analysts as the “China-killer.”

The lessening of the economic status of European states and the rising power of Turkey direly requires the emergence of a new set of “rules of engagement,” whereby Turkey can decide whether it is still interested in joining the EU, and, if so, on what terms?  The “sick man” of Europe toward the conclusion of the first decade of the 21^st Century is Europe, not Turkey.  The rising presence and influence of Islam requires a new rapprochement between the Islamists and the secularists for the emergence of Islamic democracy or a new model of democratic pluralism that resembles the Turkish model.  All of these are tall orders.  But they are also in need of acceptance by the powers of the past and the future.

The United States finds the Asia-Pacific as a region where it is still welcomed as a dominant power of the Cold War years.  As China’s economic power and military preparedness is on the rise, East Asia’s small nations as well as important military and economic actors—Japan and South Korea, for instance—are getting increasingly nervous about the “real” purpose underlying China’s rising
military power.  Of course, China’s rulers have not given any reason for small nations of their region not to suspect their intentions by declaring the South China Sea as an area of their country’s “core interests.”  Since the Chinese authorities have declared that it would not tolerate any dissent
regarding its areas of core interests, issues or items including therein were also regarded as “non-negotiable.”  Such a rigid stance has caused a lot of consternation among small nations of East
Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, etc.  Their natural reaction was to increase their preference for a proactive American role and presence as a counterweight to the PRC.

The United States on its part was delighted to have such an exuberant clamoring for its presence and
proactive role in East Asia from the countries of that region.  The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warmed the hearts of East Asians when she declared in a speech last year that her country had a national interest in the freedom of navigation in South China Sea, which remains an important passage for world’s trade.  In addition, she insisted that all territorial claims in that area must be settled amicably—not unilaterally, which was China’s modus operandi—and through multilateralism.  As expected, China was infuriated by this American “interference.”  More to the point, China finds itself outmaneuvered by the lone superpower, a situation to which the leaders in Beijing are not frequently accustomed.

As President Obama gets ready to attend the East Asia Summit, the issue of South China Sea will definitely be discussed, much to the chagrin of the Chinese leaders.  Again, outsmarting China, the United States has been encouraging its allies in East Asia to stand up to China and protect
freedom of navigation in South China Sea.  The Obama officials have made their intentions clear that their country seeks to play a larger role in countering China’s claim in the South China Sea.   While
the United States is not interested in confronting China, keeping it at a disadvantage among East Asian nations is an opportunity that the lone superpower relishes.  The East Asian nations are hoping that the United States remains serious about making its presence felt in their region on a long-term basis.  That would be the only way they envision themselves being able to stand up to the rising assertiveness of the PRC.

The United States is also getting ready to establish a new military base in Australia.  Given the significance that both Australia and China attach to the sustained development of mutual economic and diplomatic ties, the U.S.-Australian strategic partnership seems to have outweighed in the
calculation of that country as compared to a potential concern regarding China’s reaction to that decision.  That is another evidence of the success attached by the Obama administration to multilateralism.

The United States’ AirSea Battle concept is another deft move to counter the PRC’s consistently
growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.  As a country whose military capabilities are
not likely to match the awesome power of the United States, China has long relied on “anti-access” strategy.  The chief purpose of that strategy is to severely damage the high-tech capabilities of the U.S. forces in the very early phases of a military conflict, preferably by taking preemptive measures.
Consequently, the focus of the AirSea Battle concept is on preserving America’s power projection capabilities as a counter to the PRC’s growing A-2/AD capabilities.   Since China would want to
blind America’s space-based assets and cripple the high-tech gears based on its aircraft carriers in the wake of a conflict, cyber warfare has also become an incessantly developing area of capabilities on both sides.

It should be emphasized that the propagation of the AirSea Battle concept was not intended to create a war mania toward the PRC.  However, now that China knows quite a bit of unclassified details of that concept, it will have to rethink its own countermeasures to counter that concept.  Such a realization also plays an important role in deterring China from getting overly anxious about resolving the Taiwan issue or about becoming too ambitious about its seeming growing list of core interests.  During the Cold War years, the United States and the Soviet Union developed nuclear doctrines and then negotiated reduction of nuclear arms to transform the potential outbreak of war a distant possibility.  In a similar manner, China’s growing reliance on A-2/AD concept found its match in America’s AirSea Battle.  If the United States and China are assuming that such measures and countermeasures would keep the danger of war to a distant future, they both are on the right track.

Espionage is the world’s second oldest profession, especially among the top echelon of nation-states who, in their never-ending scuttle for modernization, are looking for short-cuts in their rush to get ahead of others.  The United States, despite all of the chatter about becoming a declining superpower, remains the foremost target of those countries who aspire to become its equal, especially in the realm of technological excellence.  Two countries with a dissimilar state of technological development – China and Russia – are accused of conducting technological espionage, or to put it bluntly, stealing the best U.S. technology and technological know-how.  That is the charge of the latest report issued by the U.S. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.  It ought to know, because it has long been tracking the activities of these two (and other) countries.

The United States has been a global leader in the field of technological development because it has understood that “…technical progress is by far the most important source of economic growth of the industrialized countries….”[1]

China has known it, especially since 1978, when it initiated massive programs of civil and military modernization. As its economy remained highly vibrant, China’s industrial growth has remained an excellent source for financing modernization.  But espionage has also remained its effective tool.  The Soviet Union also understood that lesson. Before its collapse, it “was widely regarded
as a science and technology powerhouse…” In that capacity, it was “able to hold its own in fields such as theoretical physics and nuclear technology and a world leader in space technologies.”[2]

As a general principle, investments in research and development (R&D) play an extremely crucial role in any country’s ability to remain atop the pile of nations. A report issued by Battelle – an international science and technology enterprise – on global R&D funding, states that, for the United States, “a recession-related drop in industrial R&D spending in 2009 is expected to be recovered by increases in 2010 and 2011 at levels exceeding the rate of inflation.”  Regarding China, the same report quotes a
Reuters headline that stated, “While the world slashed R&D in a crisis, China innovated.”  The Battelle reports goes on to note:

“China entered the recession with a decade of strong economic growth.  During that time, it increased R&D spending roughly 10% each year – a pace the country maintained during the 2008-2009 recession.  This sustained commitment sets China apart from many other nations.”[3]

A table contained in the Battelle report entitled, “Forecast Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (GERD),” depicted in billions of dollars, places the United States in the number one position, followed by the PRC, with Russia ranked number 10.  The table of perceived country by country technical strength for 2010 in the same report places the United States at the top, while China and Russia are ranked 4th and 10th, respectively.  However, the ranking of countries for 2015 on the same subject places China as number one and the U.S. as number three.  Russia remains at 10.[4]

What we can extract from the preceding is the fact that China not only understands the significance of R&D for its attainment of superpower status, but – when one reads the aforementioned report of the U.S. Office of the Counterintelligence Executive – it is also determined to get that status, by hook or by crook.

Russia is following the same tactic to get ahead, but its R&D is in a poor state compared to a number of great powers.  Its
defense-related R&D rose in response to the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s, but then it suffered a sharp drop after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The main reason for Russia’s poor state of R&D is the fact that the industrial sectors of its economy are not doing well.  “The collapse of the Soviet economy, particularly the industrial/military complex, to which most Russian R&D investment was directed, brought down a system that was based largely on technological prestige and bureaucratic planning.”[5]  The poor state of its civilian R&D is also showing its effect in military-related R&D.  As one study correctly surmises, “…the Russian machinery for pulling through military R&D to the field may well be broken.”[6]

In the information age, a country’s capabilities to hack into its competitor’s super-secret computers have become a major way of getting ahead by hook or by crook.  No country is generally considered to be as effective in hacking into the highly sensitive computers of the U.S. government as the PRC.  One can glance through Defense News or other military-related publications and come up with a list of incidents of hacking where the PRC is suspected as the major culprit.  However, when considering the actual incidents of hacking, one has to keep in mind that not all such incidents are reported by the U.S. national security agencies, for security reasons.  Thus, the actual incidents are likely to be more frequent than reported in the news media.  As the New
York Times dispatch on cyber espionage by China and Russia states, “Many companies are unaware when their sensitive data is pilfered, and those that find out are often reluctant to report the loss, fearing potential damage to their reputation with investors, customers and employees.”[7]

Consequently, the United States has remained very much on the defensive through establishing a national cyberspace strategy and countless other defensive as well as offensive tactics to neutralize potential hacking from China, Russia, or its so-called nameless friends and allies.  However, getting ahead through cyber-theft will not only continue, but, no group of nations is
likely to come up with a code of conduct for others to follow.  One of the chief reasons is that individual hackers may be arrested, prosecuted, or even put into jails, but no such disciplinary measures will be taken against a country accused of hacking,
especially when it makes a lot of noise every time it is accused of conducting this “cyber theft.”

[2] Mario Cervantes and Daniel Malkin, “Russia’s innovation gap,” OECD Observer, page 10, http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/554/Russia_92s_innovation_gap.html

[3] “2011 Global R&D Funding Forecast,” R&D Magazine, December 2010, http://www.battelle.org/aboutus/rd/2011.pdf, p. 3.

[4] Ibid., p. 30.

[5] Cervantes and Malkin, Op. Cit. http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/554/Russia_92s_innovation_gap.html

[6] Steven Bowns and Scott Gebicke, “From R&D investment to fighting power, 25 years later,” http://www.technology-futures.co.uk/MoG5_DefenseR&D_VF.pdf

[7] Thom Shanker, “U.S. Report Accuses China and Russia of Internet Spying,” New York Times, November 4, 2011, http://mobile.nytimes.com/article?a=862593&f=19

First, the republics of Central Asia, like the Arab states, are predominantly Muslim.  Second, they are being ruled by aging autocrats; they have a high number of people that are below the age of 30; a number of them have acute poverty; and they have highly corrupt and inept governments.  Third, even though Islamic practices are not as prevalent in a number of Central Asian
states as they are in the Arab countries, Islamist forces have been active inside the borders of a number of them.  The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 turned out to be a major setback for the Islamist groups of Central Asia.  A number of them were in that country because they had fled their home countries or they were there to receive insurgent training from al-Qaida.  The most well-known Central Asian Islamist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was cause for much insomnia for
President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan (who was ousted in 2006, but not by the Islamists), and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan.  No one knows for sure how strong the Islamist forces really are in today’s Central Asia.

While the Islamist groups of Central Asia may not pose a serious threat to Central Asian regimes, the dictators of those countries are fearful of an Arab Awakening-like social movement, which is secular and staunchly pro-democratic.  As such, it can garner
worldwide support and encouragement once it gathers momentum.  It is these features of a social movement that are the constant source of consternation in the capitals of the Central Asian republics, as well as in Moscow and Beijing.

In order to fully comprehend how afraid those countries really are about a potential birth of an Arab Awakening-like social movement inside their own borders, one has to examine the foremost objective underlying the military exercise – Tsentr-2011 – of the Russian-dominated military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  Aside from Russia, its membership comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus.  Prior to that military exercise, which lasted from September 19 through 27, General Nikolai Makarov, head of the Russian Army, said that the focus would be to deal with any Arab Awakening-like “social uprisings” and “the increasing threat from military Islamists.”

The Central Asian dictators are reported to have been studying how the Arab Awakening was born and grew like a tsunami of change.  Since the global media presented a comprehensive picture of the role of the social media in the awesome surge of
that movement, Central Asian rulers are already reported to be monitoring social media websites within their respective borders.  Nursultan Nazerbayev spoke about “the need to build an ‘impregnable wall’ to prevent any spillover of such revolutions in Central Asia.”  Referring to the Arab Awakening, he also expressed high concern about “an unregulated information space” that posed “threats to regional security and stability in the CSTO member states, especially in light of the latest developments in the
world.”  Kazakhstan is also studying the possibility of constantly monitoring the Internet cafes nationwide by requiring the installation of video cameras.

The Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolai Bordyuzha, provided a comprehensive view of what CSTO has on its planning board, in terms of what he labeled as “cyberterrorism.”  He said CSTO aims to develop new plans of “information counteraction” to fight cyberterrorism, which, to him, included all cyberspace activities aimed at destabilizing a state.

It should also be noted that Kazakhstan, after studying the fate of former Egyptian ruler Hosni Mubarak, abandoned a previous plan to declare Nazerbayev the country’s unelected leader until 2020.  Instead, the government hastily organized another sham election to “prove” Nazerbayev’s “democratic credentials.”  Another country, Uzbekistan, systematically endeavored to filter out all images of the Arab Awakening from the Internet.

A number of Arab autocrats have found out that a social movement is considerably stronger than their tanks and their repressive security forces.   Those dictators who refused to believe that reality are still fighting, the rulers of Yemen and Syria, for instance. When people are willing to die for what they believe in – in the case of the Arab Awakening, it is the powerful will to be free – no force can crush them.  That may be by why the autocratic regimes of Central Asia (and even of China and Russia) are trembling in anticipation of the time when political change becomes an inevitable reality.  In their hearts they know a paraphrased version of Victor Hugo’s immortal words – no matter how much they attempt to suppress, they cannot resist an idea whose time has come.

What is making the emerging American decline more believable, if not ominous, is that the world seems to have run out of ideas  related to sustaining steady economic development and growth.  The EU and the dream of European integration seem to be unraveling.  The EU has always been looked upon by the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a model to emulate sometime in the future.  If that arrangement falls apart, then what is to take its place?  Since no one has an answer to that, the best option for the Europeans, for now, is to do their utmost to save it.  But how?  No one knows that yet.

Looking at this evolving mega-change (or the impending mega-chaos) from Asia, a number of strategic thinkers of that region  have been touting the prospects of a power shift, without proposing which country will take the lead or emerge as heir-apparent to the United States.  One obvious answer is China, but China has a long way to go before it could emerge as an heir to the United States.  While thinking about China’s potential role as the next leader, Asian thinkers miss the point that that country’s economic growth, while a remarkable work in progress, is not providing much evidence from its leaders that they have been seriously thinking or debating the modalities of their potential leadership role.

America’s global leadership emerged from the visionary thinking of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who yanked his country from the jaws of isolationism, then used its economic wealth to fight the Second World War, and then applied its still-intact economic power to rebuild the post-WWII global order.  Even keeping in mind that history does not repeat itself by exactly following the trends of the past, Chinese leaders will have to develop something akin to the Rooseveltian leadership model, if China is to become a successor to the United States in the next decade or so.

One of the chief reasons the United States was able to persuade the non-communist countries of the world to become a member of the post-WWII global economic order was that it was also promoting an economic template that was based on free market, less-to-least regulations, and Keynesian economics.  At least the “developed” nation-states believed in that model.  The so-called non-aligned bloc never subscribed to it, due to the romanticism their leaders had developed about Fabian Socialism or even Marxism.  However, all of them – with India in the lead – realized later on how wrong they really were.  India emerged as a “convert” to capitalistic economy in the early 1990s, thereby becoming a promising rising power of the future.

While one examines China’s role as a successful economy, the so-called “Beijing consensus” is being viewed as one of the models that developing countries ought to consider emulating.  China’s Beijing consensus, according to Joshua Cooper Ramo, has three characteristics: “innovative policymaking,” “rejection of per capita GDP as the be-all and end-all” of developmental priorities – a trait that is envisioned as a rejection of Western policies – and “self determination.”  This last characteristic “emphasizes the need for developing countries to actively seek independence from outside pressure, as it is imposed by ‘hegemonic powers’ such as the United States.”   China’s economic growth is an export-based growth, while its economy is tightly controlled from within.  To top it all, China’s political system is an authoritarian one.  As such, it envisions sustained economic growth as the only way that its system is likely to survive, while allowing minimal political freedom.  So, the Beijing consensus will be attractive to authoritarian countries, where the autocrats are afraid of allowing political freedom to their peoples, and regard economic growth as the only way to sustain political status quo.  This limited appeal notwithstanding, it is too early to declare that another competing model – the Washington consensus, also referred to as the market-based approach – is either dead or proven irrelevant.

For the long-term “proof” of the success of the Beijing consensus, it has to prove its viability in the Chinese economy.  At the same time, it has to be applied, with noticeable success, outside of China.  Similarly, the alleged failure of the Washington consensus has to last for a long time.  There is little doubt that the long-term success and failure of the Beijing consensus and the Washington consensus, respectively, will bring about a power shift the likes of which the world has not seen in quite awhile.

A powerful side-effect of the seeming decline of the United States and the ascendance of the PRC is how those developments would affect East Asia and the Middle East.  East Asia is important to both China and the United States because China considers it as its backyard, while the United States has long maintained its strategic dominance in that region by building an intricate network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.  This is also a region where the United States also maintains a powerful naval presence.

Two conflicts of East Asia not only continue to simmer, but they also promise to bring about potential major changes, depending upon the outcome, if they are resolved through the use of the military.  They are North Korea and the Taiwan disputes.  China is very much involved in both of them.  In the case of nuclear-armed North Korea, China wishes to see some type of a political compromise, which would leave the regime of Kim Jong Il or his successor in power.  The PRC will do its utmost to avoid the outbreak of hostilities.  The second conflict of East Asia is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.  The PRC is determined to see reunification materialize even with the use of military power.

Aside from these issues, what worries the East Asian countries is a palpable Chinese determination to increase its hegemony in East Asia by such actions as declaring the South China Sea as an area of its “core interests.”  Such a declaration implies that leaders in Beijing would unilaterally determine the modalities of their behavior involving the strategic interests and sovereignties of a number of East Asian nations.  It is this unyielding Chinese resolve that also forces the United States not to allow China’s bullying of its East Asian neighbors.  Consequently, the United States has been consistently conveying to China that it is siding with the East Asian countries in their resolve to seek a political solution and will not allow China to follow the principle of “might is right.”

The Middle East is also quite important to both the U.S. and the PRC.  The former has been a dominant strategic actor in that region for the past several decades.  Plus, that region has large oil reserves that both China and the United States need for their continued growth.  Without making too much publicity, China does envision the Middle East as an area where it could enhance its presence and influence as America’s clout dwindles.

The Arab Awakening in the Middle East and North Africa has created different challenges for the United States and China.  First and foremost, it has established once and for all that the long-term American idiosyncrasy of promoting a political status quo that guaranteed autocratic rule and the related subservience of that region to the American hegemony are things of the past.  Second, since the Arab Awakening has already resulted in the ouster of three notorious and enduring dictators from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the chief American worry is about what political arrangements will replace those dictatorships.  The best case scenario is that a pluralistic democracy emerges in all three countries, and the political subservience of those countries to the United States does not materialize.  What that means is that the policies of the future governments of those countries – and of other Arab states where dictatorships are under constant challenge – toward the Palestinian conflict will also undergo radical change, thereby forcing the United States to revisit its own long-standing policy of remaining at peace with Israel’s continued occupation of Palestine.  The worst case scenario for the United States is the capturing of political power by the Islamists in one or more of these countries.

Speaking of changes in the Middle East, Israel’s policy toward the Palestinian conflict has been anachronistic.  It also belongs to a era when sustaining Israeli dominance of the Palestinians was envisaged only through its continued occupation or, at the most, offering the Palestinians paltry changes that would still retain their status as an occupied nation.  As such, that era appears to be already under a lot of pressure from the Arab side.  As the Arab Awakening is radically altering the nature and style of politics of the Arab Middle East, there is a dire need for the birth of an “Israeli Awakening,” whereby its leadership foresees living with the Palestinians as free people with all the dignity that the acquisition of sovereignty promises them.

The Chinese leadership is very apprehensive about the repeat of the Arab Awakening inside its borders.  The mere mention of the phrase “awakening” triggered an overreaction in February 2011, whereby the security thugs were sent to suppress any outbreak of anti-regime demonstrations.

Even assuming that there will not be an outbreak of a Chinese version of an awakening in the future – a rather audacious assumption, to say the least – leaders in China know that they will have to change their ways of doing business with a democratic Middle East.  The report that Chinese officials met with the officials of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in July of this year to sell arms – when the uprising to his rule was in full swing – underscores how serious the PRC was in its attempt to forestall the tide of internal change in Libya.  China now knows that gone are the days when the representatives of the dictators from the Middle East were sent to Beijing, or representatives of the Chinese government would sneak into Arab capitals to sign lucrative arms or economic deals without any fear of publicity or its related negative spillover effects.  The PRC also understands that it has to adapt and adopt a new style of doing business with a democratic Arab world.

All changes almost inevitably are analyzed along the continuum of good news and bad news for the winners and losers, respectively.  However, given the global implications and attendant intricacies of the impending power shift, it cannot be all good news for the emerging superpower and bad news for the declining one.  The winner and the loser will have to deal with a mixed bag of good and bad news.

The greatest challenge for the United States is that it has to come to grips with becoming a second- or even a third-rate nation.  It will also have plenty of opportunities to do its utmost to reverse its decline, and even to become an ascendant power.  It has not been successful in its attempts to reverse its fortune between 2008 and 2011.  However, that does not mean that it will continue to fail in the coming years.  The good news for the United States is that, even its reduced global power status will not affect its political stability.  So, being able to maintain its system stability while it looks for avenues to regain its global power status is indeed better than just good news.  On the contrary, we cannot think along the same lines about the PRC.  As an authoritarian system, it has no choice but to sustain its economic prosperity.  Otherwise, the revolution related to the “rising expectations” is likely to prove deadly for survival of the Chinese political system.  No one is more aware of that reality than the Chinese leadership.

As a democracy, the United States’ chances of adaptability to the radically altering global realities are very good.  As a weakened, but still a stable polity, it can continue to find avenues for new ways of dealing with change and even in terms of coming out on top of rising challenges.  The same cannot be said about the PRC.  In this sense, China has more reason to ensure its success both globally and internally, in order to survive.

For instance, in analyzing Mao and even his disastrous policies — viz., the Cultural Revolution and the Great Famine — Kissinger’s judgment is that millions of Chinese died as unintended consequences of his failed policies.  Even a casual reader of those incidents would have to strongly disagree with Kissinger’s palpable charitable treatment of Mao.  Citing Frank Dikotter’s masterful work, “Mao’s Great Famine,” Patten writes, “Through his meticulous sifting of party reports, Dikötter is able to show that millions died as a result of coercion and systematic violence.” [emphasis added]

What really bothers me about Kissinger’s analysis of China is that it was not written with the objectivity of the geostrategist that Kissinger is known for.  He frequently sounded reluctant to criticize China for its gross violations of human rights.  Even while appearing on the Charlie Rose Show, he insisted that whatever he had to say to the Chinese leaders about their violations of human rights, he should say (and he has said) in private sessions.  Admittedly, in the realm of human rights violations, the China of today is not the same as the China of yesteryear. However, one expects a lot of candor from Kissinger, whose reluctance might stem from the fact that he likes to maintain access to China’s top leadership for business reasons.

When President Richard Nixon decided to embark on the diplomatic campaign of bringing China to the global community in 1972, the United States needed that communist giant to place America’s ties with the USSR in a new strategic framework.  What Nixon might not have known was that China needed America’s friendship even more desperately because of its own then deteriorating ties with its communist neighbor.  What emerged from that diplomatic episode was that China was given almost instant status as a great power, which it did not then deserve.  A number of Sinologists read that episode as an outcome of Mao’s mastery of strategic maneuverability.  As contentious as that argument sounds, in today’s world, the United States has to remain quite hard-nosed about dealing with an assertive China.  For such a policy, the last thing the Obama administration needs to do is to use Kissinger as an impartial source of advice on its dealings with Beijing.

As China’s rise casts a shadow over East Asia, one dominant question is whether that rise will remain peaceful.  Looking at America’s resolve to assert its presence in East Asia by insisting on a peaceful resolution of China’s claim that the South China sea is part of its “core interests,” one would be correct in concluding that Washington remains wary about China’s alleged peaceful intentions.  Even if China were not to indulge itself in an exercise of military adventurism in East Asia, the mere exercise of intimidation of small nations of that region is not a good sign.  So, the United States’ resolve of asserting its presence and interest in remaining an interested party in East Asia is a good one.

In this symbolic exercise of power, substantive aspects play a minor role, especially at a time when the symbolic aspects of America’s decline are becoming so pronounced.  In another example of the exercise of symbolism — and also as a demonstration of one-upmanship — Taiwan also decided to capture China’s attention by releasing the picture of its own ‘aircraft carrier killer,’ an anti-ship missile (Hsiung Feng III).  Taiwan’s message was certainly not lost on China.  Beijing has been displaying its own inventory of ASMs for quite some time, to signal to the United States how prepared it is becoming to deter any threats related to America’s intervention to stop China’s potential military takeover of Taiwan.

The real message associated with these symbolic maneuvers is not to underscore the mounting threat of a military conflict between the PRC and the lone superpower.  In fact, if China were to recall the assertion of its grand strategist Sun Tzu — “know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster” — it would do everything to avoid even going to the brink of war, much less waging war.

Besides, looking at the escalating economic problems of the United States and China’s continued economic rise, things could not be better for the latter.  The United States appears bent on expediting its own decline from the top echelon of global power.  As the table below points out, the estimated cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will reach $1.29 trillion by the end of fiscal year 2011.

If US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, and if its defense-related research and development decelerates as has been reported, then China will have an easier time narrowing the gap between its military modernization and the military prowess of the US military.  And having aircraft carriers for its navy has long been considered a vital requirement for narrowing that gap by the PLAN.  China’s naval officials are reported to be interested in developing “a maximum of three carriers to main a constant sea presence…”  Even when the PLAN develops such capabilities, it will still be no match for the US Navy, whose global presence is guaranteed through its ownership of 11 aircraft carriers.  But that will be a good start in the right direction from China’s perspective.

“The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Amy Belasco, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33110, p. CRS�9).  Source:  http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0933935.html

Going beyond the symbolic aspects of having an aircraft carrier, the development itself speaks volumes about China’s resolve to develop a blue-water navy.  Right now, its focus is not on matching US naval capabilities.  Rather, the PRC is concentrating on increasing its global presence and showing its resolve to be self-reliant against the threat of piracy around the Gulf of Eden — through which China’s oil supplies pass — to secure “approaches to Taiwan and deny the US access to it,” “to deny the US and other near Asian neighbors access to the South China Sea,” “to protect China’s sea lane lines of communication,” and to “hinder generally others sea lane lines of communication.”  Given the Chinese aspirations to become the superpower of the future, those are important objectives.  China will be very curious to see how the declining superpower responds.

One relevant example of urging an ally to acquire the leadership role was Washington’s advocacy that Japan should emerge as a “normal” military power.  That was a euphemism for the remilitarization of Japan, at least as envisaged by the PRC and South Korea, two countries that still nurture horrible memories of Japan’s “rape” of their polities when it occupied them.  One wonders how much thought the United States gave to the Chinese and South Korean reactions to a potential emergence of a militarized Japan.  Alternatively, the U.S. suggestion might also be part of its strategic maneuvers to put pressure on China in the same manner in which Richard M. Nixon decided to develop a strategic nexus with the PRC in 1972, to put pressure on the Soviet Union.  Another example of such an advocacy was the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s advocacy during her latest visit to that country that it is time for India to act as a leader in South Asia and in the Asia Pacific.   That advocacy, though genuine, is highly controversial and may not be welcomed among the countries of South Asia.

The fact that the United States will be lowering its military profile in Afghanistan in the near future has become a major source of apprehension for India.  It knows that the immediate outcome of that development will result in an instant heightened presence of Pakistan in Afghanistan.  And India is as opposed to an increased presence and influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan as Pakistan is about a similar development involving India in that country.  Even if one were to temporarily ignore the Indo-Pak loathing of each other’s increased role in Afghanistan in the future, an important question is what exactly does the United States want India to do in Afghanistan?  Should it become an occupying force in a manner similar to that of the United States or should it become a peacekeeper?  Both of these alternatives are highly untenable.  Keeping these facts in mind, one wonders how much time the United States has really spent in thinking about the issue of India’s leadership in Afghanistan.

A possible alternative for India to consider in Afghanistan is to establish some sort of a nexus with Iran and Russia to minimize the chances of the emergence of al-Qaida as a major force.  Even on this issue, a lot depends on what kind of a compromise the United States would be able to reach with the Taliban of Afghanistan before pulling out of that country.  If there is even a remote possibility of the Taliban’s emergence as co-rulers of Afghanistan, any emergence of an India-Iran-Russia nexus influencing the internal power dynamics of Afghanistan is entirely out of the question. Moreover, given the intense antipathy that Iran and the United Sates hold toward each, it is highly unlikely that Washington would endorse any political compromise that would enable Iran to escalate its power and influence in Afghanistan.

In the Asia-Pacific region, on the contrary, India has a good chance of exercising its leadership.  The ASEAN countries have been quite receptive, indeed some of them have been eager about, India’s increased leadership role in their region as a balance against the PRC’s rising influence.  India has been quite successful in building on that support by becoming a member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005 and by signing free trade deals with the ASEAN countries in 2009.

India as a naval power (it has world’s fifth largest navy) also has a great potential in cooperating with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in conducting joint patrolling of the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 80 percent of China’s oil supplies from the Middle East and Africa passes.  Indeed, India has been involved with the U.S., Japanese and Australian navy in conducting joint naval exercises in that region, much to the chagrin of the PRC.  India has also been conducting joint naval
exercises with Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia.  India’s Andaman and Nicobar tri-services Command has a potential of playing a major role in India’s naval maneuverings in Southeast Asia.

One Indian maneuver vis-à-vis China in the South China that is worth making a mention is the evolving Indo-Vietnamese strategic ties.  Operating on the axiom that my enemy’s enemy is my friend, India has been seeking increased strategic cooperation with Vietnam, which also includes gaining access to the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base. Even though Vietnam has been reluctant about granting India access to that facility, the Vietnamese-Indian strategic partnership remains a work in progress.  The worsening of Vietnam-China ties in the future would make rulers in Hanoi reconsider India’s sustained interests in the Cam Ranh Bay base.

Even though India’s immediate neighborhood in South Asia does not appear promising about its emergence as an effective leader, leaders of that country can still work on most challenging aspects of creating a rapprochement with its arch adversary, Pakistan.  Such a development—even though it remains hard to develop—would open up considerable opportunities for India’s exercise of leadership in South Asia.  In the meantime, Asia-Pacific holds enormous opportunities for India.  It should work on equally proactively to foster them.  It behooves India to remember that its greatest challenge in the Asia-Pacific is coming from China, which regards that region as its area of special (if not “core”) interests.

When it comes to East Asia, the United States has been following a comprehensive strategy toward sustaining its strategic dominance.  It has long recognized how important East Asia remains as an area where China’s strategic profile must rise in order to complement its global presence and influence.  Since China, because of its awesome economic power, maintains a clear advantage over the United States in escalating its presence and influence in distant regions of the world, the United States has to escalate its maneuvers in maximizing its own presence and influence in East Asia, knowing that China would envisage it as a challenge (if not an obstacle) in its strategic goals of affecting East Asia and the rest of the world.

In Washington’s comprehensive strategy toward East Asia, the annual Shangri-La Asian security meetings serve as a forum where it has been elaborating on and adjusting its strategic posture in response to the latest developments related to the concerns of Southeast countries involving China.  The June 2011 session of Shangri-La was most significant because China sent its military delegation to do its own posturing in order to mollify the fears of its Southeast Asian neighbors related to China’s hyperactivism in South China Sea.  But that symbolism did not do much to change the minds of China’s neighbors about its mounting regional assertiveness.  At the same meeting, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated that his country would increase “its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts” to build the capacity of regional actors “to address challenges.” That veiled reference to China was clearly welcomed by a number of East Asian countries.

Secondly, the United States is conducting its own strategic maneuvers to undermine China’s growing posture in East Asia.  The latest evidence in this regard was the U.S.-Vietnam naval exercise, which was more of a sweeping maneuver than China has been doing in Iran.   Like the U.S.-Iran animosity, China and Vietnam have had their considerable baggage of mistrust, suspicion, and even a military conflict in 1979.

Thirdly, the United States has expanded its annual military exercises called “Cobra Gold,” which involves Thailand.  However, the newest participant of this exercise is Malaysia.  In addition, under the general rubric of “CARAT” (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), Washington is conducting bilateral military exercises involving the U.S. Navy and a half-dozen countries of Asia.  The latest additions to the CARAT are Cambodia and Bangladesh.

America’s greatest advantage stems from fact that most Southeast Asian countries remain highly suspicious of China’s military preparedness, its precipitous decision to label the South China Sea as part of its “core interests,” and China’s continued refusal to remain flexible on the issue of resolving its territorial disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbors in a region that is expected to contain large oil reserves.

China not only knows that the United States has a palpable advantage over it in East Asia, but is also aware that it (China) has a lot of work to do to engage its neighbors in a dialogue on its South China Sea territorial dispute.  Just stating that the purpose of its strategic rise is peaceful will no longer satisfy the East Asian countries, which are demanding substantive action.  In the meantime, China is expected to increase its own maneuvers involving a country like Iran, which has remained one of the top U.S. strategic concerns for the past thirty-plus years, especially in reference to Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons aspirations, and regarding Iran’s growing maneuvers in Iraq to undermine America’s chances of sustaining its long-term military presence in that country.

Iran desperately needs China’s support and assistance as the American-sponsored economic sanctions are steadily closing its avenues of global trade.  China’s willingness to go along with those sanctions was a crucial factor in their passage at the U.N.   So, as an immediate adjustment in its policy toward Iran, China, aside from increasing its economic ties with Tehran, is expected to reject any further economic sanctions.  Secondly, if or when the U.S.-China power games become more intensely competitive in the future than they currently are, one can expect increased Sino-Iranian defense cooperation, which would also include a possible membership of that country in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Iran currently remains an observer in that organization, largely because China did not wish to antagonize the United States by allowing it to become a member.  However, that may change if the Chinese calculations involving its own ties with the U.S. undergo visible transformation.

It will be interesting to see whether China will be able to transform its disadvantages into advantages in Southeast Asia.  However, that will require a clear departure of Beijing from its hollow rhetoric about its peaceful rise.  It will have to sit down with all of the countries in that area to find common ground that would be beneficial to all the parties involved, especially on the distribution of oil reserves in the South China Sea.   In addition, the PRC has to persuade its neighbors that the purpose of its military preparedness is really peaceful.  China’s ties with Iran may not be as crucial as its ties with the East Asian countries.  It would not hesitate to substantially scale down or even to end its strategic relations with Iran in the future, if or when it serves its purpose.