A number of students of global affairs are steadily predicting a power shift from the West to the East and the consequent emergence of a post-American era.[2]  In reality, however, the global power shift might not be from the West to the East, but a multi-directional one, as we also witness the emergence of Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa as new global centers of economic dynamism, along with the PRC and India – two spectacularly rising powers.

Perhaps recognizing that it has long been stuck in the dizzying whirlpool of the Middle East and the need to catch its breath by refocusing on its dominance in the Asia-Pacific, President Barack Obama has already withdrawn America’s forces from Iraq; and has redeployed 10,000 troops out of Afghanistan.  This is part of his promise to bring about complete withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.  However, the United States is opening a new military base in Australia.  By withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, the lone superpower might also be tacitly conceding its defeat.  The politics of Iraq remains as volatile and divisive as ever.  Except this time, along with the explosive Shia-Sunni division, it is also characterized by the growing presence of al-Qaida.  Afghanistan, on the other hand, continues to prove itself to be the graveyard of empires.  As such, the war in that country continues to underscore the mounting power of the Taliban.

The Asia-Pacific, on the contrary, is welcoming the United States’ decision to escalate its presence, with open arms.  China — whose escalating hegemony appears ominous from the perspectives of small nation-states of East Asia – is creating ample apprehension among them.  Thus, these nation-states initiated a policy of “circling the wagons,” and appear determined to balance the power of China by asking for a resurged presence of the old hegemon, the USA, which has an established record of creating a benign hegemony.[3]  Washington could not have been happier.  The East Asian nations’ welcoming of America to their region only complemented the insistence of the Obama administration that America is a “Pacific power.”  President Barack Obama reiterated that resolve during his trip to Australia by stating that “…we are here to stay.”

India and China, the poorest countries of the not-too-distant past, have long passed the label of “rising powers.”  Now, they appear to be the economic power houses, indeed superpowers, of the future.  China is way ahead of India in this race, and thus remains a focal point of America’s attention.  As the foremost rising power of our time, China has the American example of the post-World War II era to follow.  Its rise not only has to be peaceful, but it also should be eminently constructive in revamping the rules underlying the functioning of the premier global political and financial institutions, like the U.N., the World Bank, and the IMF, etc.  Thus far, however, its leaders have not impressed the world by their proactivism or imagination for playing a constructive role.  They are standing on the sidelines, while being critical of the U.S. and Europe for not being “responsible” in their respective economic policies.  In the meantime, China continues to act as a rising power most comfortable in implementing parochial and inward looking policies of currency manipulation, as well as a heavy reliance on pushing its merchandise to the West.  It behaves as if it is only interested in reaping the benefits of appearing to be a superpower of the future without paying the political or economic price for being one.

India is gradually learning to act as a rising power in its neighborhood.  It has enhanced its presence in Southeast Asia by deciding to explore for oil in the South China Sea and in its cooperation with Vietnam, which has been one of the most vocal critics of China’s assertiveness in that region.[4]  India also has escalated its military presence along its border with China by announcing “$13 billion plans to raise a new mountain strike corps and four mountain divisions.”[5]  That was a clear response to China’s reported buildup on the Sino-Indian borders.   However, the jury is still out regarding the future performance of the successors of the Sun Tzu and Kautilyan styles of Realpolitik.

Europe is facing a crisis related to the future of the Eurozone, which was recently depicted as “a crisis of apocalyptic proportion” by Radoslaw Sikorski, Foreign Minister of Poland.[6]  As Europe is standing at the edge of a precipice, Turkey is emerging as the new power center of Europe.  In that capacity, it is implementing a “truly multidimensional foreign policy” in which it secretly conducted a joint air force exercise with China last October.[7]  In economic affairs, Russia became Turkey’s number one trade partner, replacing Germany.

Turkey is playing a similarly spectacular role in the Middle East.  Its intermingling of secularism and Islam is emerging as a popular example for the next corps of Arab leaders replacing the autocrats in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening.  In view of these developments, Turkey is transforming itself from a “peripheral state of Europe” into a “central power” of that region.[8]  Its model of secular democracy is already being emulated in Tunisia; and chances are that it would also be emulated in Egypt, as Islamists are winning electoral majority in that country but promising to opt for a coalition with the secularist parties.

The Arab Awakening (aka Arab Spring) continues to capture the world’s attention.  As the aging dictators fall, Islamists are emerging as some of the most prominent leaders of the Arab world.  The question is not an imminent one, but should be asked:  What is the Arab world going to look like in the next 3-5 years?  Are there prospects for the emergence of democracies, Islamic democracies, or would some of those Arab countries slide under the rule of theocracies?  Three current models of theocracy – Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia – have not made those countries places of economic prosperity, political stability, or the focal point of enlightenment.  If anything, obscurantism is on the rise in Pakistan, and theological autocracy is the order of the day in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

If the convergence of Islam and pluralistic democracy occurs in the post-awakening Arab world, then the opportunities for people of that part of the world are enormous.  There is tremendous human potential waiting to be liberated, educated, enlightened, and to make a dash toward the globalized world from which it was more or less excluded because the autocrats feared progress related to the information age.  And they were right for fearing it, because modernity was bound to become their enemy.  The Arab Awakening arrived in the Middle East and North Africa riding on the shoulders of some of the most recent advances in social/electronic media.  It was the power of social media that the autocratic and archaic control machine could not control, fight, or stifle.

One of the secrets of the Arab Awakening is that it has been an inclusive movement.  Another shocking aspect of it is that there were no leaders who could issue commands for the masses to follow, or whose arrests or assassinations by the ruling autocrats could have seriously undermined the movement.  As liberated Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya are struggling to create a constitutional system of governance, the most important question is whether they will adhere to the principle of inclusiveness, or will they become victims of fissiparous tendencies for which their societies have been notorious?

One has every reason to be wary of the Islamists of the Arab world.  They have spent long years in the dungeons of the autocrats and the Pharaohs.  They have no experience with governance.  They have repeated the slogan, “Islam is the solution,” without having the responsibilities for spelling it out into specific policies.  As they become part of the ruling elites, it will be a test for them.  Their ultimate success may not be that they govern well, even though that would be a wonderful outcome.  Their ultimate success as participants in a democracy is their willingness to accept defeat, if or when they are voted out of office.

One “odd man out” in the rising tide of political change in the Middle East is Iran.  It has increased its influence in Iraq and Afghanistan, most ironically, because of the dismantlement of the Taliban regime and that of Saddam Hussein by its arch enemy, the United States.  However, the Green Movement’s abortive attempt to bring about regime change in Iran has left that country exposed to the covert shenanigans of the United States to overthrow the rule of the Ayatollahs.  Iran’s recent capture of the CIA’s, RQ-170 “Sentinel” drone is evidence of that reality.  The CIA’s monitoring of Iran is only the exposed aspect of its covert actions against that country.  The covert actions that are unbeknownst to the theocratic rulers of Iran are likely to hurt their regime the most.[9]  To add insult to injury, Iran’s strong ally, Syria, appears to be the next country to undergo a bloody regime change.  The loss of Syria would also seriously damage Iran’s presence and influence in Lebanon.

However, Iran is not the only country increasingly troubled by the prospects of regime change in Syria.  Israel is equally concerned, because the ouster of the Assad regime promises to bring about the rising presence and clout of the Islamists, who are not likely to loathe the Jewish state any less than the current Baathist/Alawite rulers of that country.

The emerging realignment of power should be worrisome, especially for the great powers of the West, because it is not only aimed at threatening their erstwhile privileged status in the global hierarchy of nation-states, but it also promises to bring to prominence actors and forces that have not been viewed by them as particularly friendly or cooperative.  There are likely to be many uncertainties, even the outbreak of minor or even major military conflicts, before a new hierarchy of nations is formulated.  The emergence of China and India does not promise the evolution of a Sino-Indian condominium of power.  Instead, the two rising powers might be headed toward an era of increased friction and even military conflict, especially on the issue of border dispute.  One minor example of that friction is underscored by the fact that India’s new Agni-V long-range ballistic missile is being dubbed by its defense analysts as the “China-killer.”

The lessening of the economic status of European states and the rising power of Turkey direly requires the emergence of a new set of “rules of engagement,” whereby Turkey can decide whether it is still interested in joining the EU, and, if so, on what terms?  The “sick man” of Europe toward the conclusion of the first decade of the 21^st Century is Europe, not Turkey.  The rising presence and influence of Islam requires a new rapprochement between the Islamists and the secularists for the emergence of Islamic democracy or a new model of democratic pluralism that resembles the Turkish model.  All of these are tall orders.  But they are also in need of acceptance by the powers of the past and the future.

It is India’s obsession with Pakistan that is forcing it to increase its strategic presence in Afghanistan.  India knows that, given the geographic propinquity to Afghanistan, Pakistan will always enjoy an unsurpassable strategic advantage over India.  Still, India has a number of additional advantages.  First, it is a rising economic power and can entice Afghanistan by offering huge amounts for economic development.  As a country whose economy is teetering at the edge of a calamitous precipice, Pakistan has little to offer Afghanistan in terms of developmental assistance.  Second, as a strategic partner of the United States, India is given pretty much a green light by the administration of President Barack Obama to escalate its strategic presence in its immediate
neighborhood.  As recently as only a few days ago, President Obama – who knows as much about the tortured history of South Asia as he does about the convoluted history of Afghanistan – gave Pakistan a public lecture that it should not view India as its “mortal enemy.”  Needless to say, India also believes along the same line.  However, what is more noteworthy is that Pakistan does not.  Thus, it makes a lot of sense for India to persuade Pakistan of that through its foreign policy behavior – its non-threatening posture – rather than a near-obsessive pursuit of enhancing its strategic presence in Afghanistan.

A complete picture of the reality of South Asia is that both Pakistan and India have been behaving obsessively when it comes to Afghanistan.  The darkest days of India’s foreign policy were when Pakistan succeeded in enabling the capture of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.  After that, India, along with Russia and Iran, did its best – albeit quite unsuccessfully –
to provide military and economic assistance to the Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah Masood in his uphill but enormously courageous military campaign to dislodge the Taliban from power.  The United States succeeded in obtaining that goal where the collective endeavors of India, Russia and Iran failed.  The Taliban regime was dismantled in November 2001 as a result of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

Pakistan brought the Taliban to power in Afghanistan substantially in its quest for “strategic depth,” which was supposed to provide it some advantage over India in future military conflicts.  India, for its part, had every reason to be fearful of the growing power of Islamist extremism in relation to the Taliban rule of Afghanistan, which provided an enhanced strategic advantage of Pakistan.  That advantage was expressed through numerous incidents of terrorism in the Indian-administered Kashmir.

As the Islamist groups inside Pakistan turned against their own government in the first decade of the current century, and as the U.S.-Pakistan ties remain under enormous stress, the shoe is on the other foot.  India is exploiting the situation to enhance its strategic presence in Afghanistan.  The recent strategic partnership between New Delhi and Kabul, which might turn out to be not worth the paper it is written on – is a persuasive example of that reality.  There is little doubt that it is aimed at undermining the strategic advantage of Pakistan, the strong denials of India and Afghanistan to the contrary.  In that sense, those ties remain the legitimate target of Pakistan’s own future endeavors to undermine them.

One wonders how much of this egregious reality of South Asian power politics President Obama knows, understands, and internalizes, when he stood atop his soap box and started lecturing Pakistan that India is not its mortal enemy.  If the United States were not embroiled in finding a political solution to the war of Afghanistan – a war that it seems to be losing at present –  it may have played a role in bringing the two South Asian arch-rivals together.  However, upon reflection, India is not at all perturbed that the United States is too busy with the war to be playing such a role.  In fact, India is of the view that its best interest will be served while the United States plays no such role, for it is afraid of losing its strategic advantage in its negotiations with Pakistan; negotiations that are not really aimed at resolving anything.

Pakistan, for its part, knows that it does not have much of a strategic advantage over economically powerful and politically resourceful India.  So Pakistan seems to be operating on a slightly different version of the old adage: “The strong do whatever they will, and the weak suffer what they must.”  Pakistan’s version of that adage involving India seems to be “weak will do unto the strong whenever they can.”  Afghanistan serves (and will continue to serve) as an ideal place for Pakistan, regardless of whether the United States stays or leaves that country.  Since it considers that country as a legitimate part of its sphere of  influence, Pakistan regards the “encroachment” of India in that country as a serious “offense,” which deserves an appropriate response.  Thus, and sadly so, the unending Indo-Pak rivalry in Afghanistan promises to be both brutal and bloody.

What is making the emerging American decline more believable, if not ominous, is that the world seems to have run out of ideas  related to sustaining steady economic development and growth.  The EU and the dream of European integration seem to be unraveling.  The EU has always been looked upon by the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a model to emulate sometime in the future.  If that arrangement falls apart, then what is to take its place?  Since no one has an answer to that, the best option for the Europeans, for now, is to do their utmost to save it.  But how?  No one knows that yet.

Looking at this evolving mega-change (or the impending mega-chaos) from Asia, a number of strategic thinkers of that region  have been touting the prospects of a power shift, without proposing which country will take the lead or emerge as heir-apparent to the United States.  One obvious answer is China, but China has a long way to go before it could emerge as an heir to the United States.  While thinking about China’s potential role as the next leader, Asian thinkers miss the point that that country’s economic growth, while a remarkable work in progress, is not providing much evidence from its leaders that they have been seriously thinking or debating the modalities of their potential leadership role.

America’s global leadership emerged from the visionary thinking of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who yanked his country from the jaws of isolationism, then used its economic wealth to fight the Second World War, and then applied its still-intact economic power to rebuild the post-WWII global order.  Even keeping in mind that history does not repeat itself by exactly following the trends of the past, Chinese leaders will have to develop something akin to the Rooseveltian leadership model, if China is to become a successor to the United States in the next decade or so.

One of the chief reasons the United States was able to persuade the non-communist countries of the world to become a member of the post-WWII global economic order was that it was also promoting an economic template that was based on free market, less-to-least regulations, and Keynesian economics.  At least the “developed” nation-states believed in that model.  The so-called non-aligned bloc never subscribed to it, due to the romanticism their leaders had developed about Fabian Socialism or even Marxism.  However, all of them – with India in the lead – realized later on how wrong they really were.  India emerged as a “convert” to capitalistic economy in the early 1990s, thereby becoming a promising rising power of the future.

While one examines China’s role as a successful economy, the so-called “Beijing consensus” is being viewed as one of the models that developing countries ought to consider emulating.  China’s Beijing consensus, according to Joshua Cooper Ramo, has three characteristics: “innovative policymaking,” “rejection of per capita GDP as the be-all and end-all” of developmental priorities – a trait that is envisioned as a rejection of Western policies – and “self determination.”  This last characteristic “emphasizes the need for developing countries to actively seek independence from outside pressure, as it is imposed by ‘hegemonic powers’ such as the United States.”   China’s economic growth is an export-based growth, while its economy is tightly controlled from within.  To top it all, China’s political system is an authoritarian one.  As such, it envisions sustained economic growth as the only way that its system is likely to survive, while allowing minimal political freedom.  So, the Beijing consensus will be attractive to authoritarian countries, where the autocrats are afraid of allowing political freedom to their peoples, and regard economic growth as the only way to sustain political status quo.  This limited appeal notwithstanding, it is too early to declare that another competing model – the Washington consensus, also referred to as the market-based approach – is either dead or proven irrelevant.

For the long-term “proof” of the success of the Beijing consensus, it has to prove its viability in the Chinese economy.  At the same time, it has to be applied, with noticeable success, outside of China.  Similarly, the alleged failure of the Washington consensus has to last for a long time.  There is little doubt that the long-term success and failure of the Beijing consensus and the Washington consensus, respectively, will bring about a power shift the likes of which the world has not seen in quite awhile.

A powerful side-effect of the seeming decline of the United States and the ascendance of the PRC is how those developments would affect East Asia and the Middle East.  East Asia is important to both China and the United States because China considers it as its backyard, while the United States has long maintained its strategic dominance in that region by building an intricate network of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.  This is also a region where the United States also maintains a powerful naval presence.

Two conflicts of East Asia not only continue to simmer, but they also promise to bring about potential major changes, depending upon the outcome, if they are resolved through the use of the military.  They are North Korea and the Taiwan disputes.  China is very much involved in both of them.  In the case of nuclear-armed North Korea, China wishes to see some type of a political compromise, which would leave the regime of Kim Jong Il or his successor in power.  The PRC will do its utmost to avoid the outbreak of hostilities.  The second conflict of East Asia is the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China.  The PRC is determined to see reunification materialize even with the use of military power.

Aside from these issues, what worries the East Asian countries is a palpable Chinese determination to increase its hegemony in East Asia by such actions as declaring the South China Sea as an area of its “core interests.”  Such a declaration implies that leaders in Beijing would unilaterally determine the modalities of their behavior involving the strategic interests and sovereignties of a number of East Asian nations.  It is this unyielding Chinese resolve that also forces the United States not to allow China’s bullying of its East Asian neighbors.  Consequently, the United States has been consistently conveying to China that it is siding with the East Asian countries in their resolve to seek a political solution and will not allow China to follow the principle of “might is right.”

The Middle East is also quite important to both the U.S. and the PRC.  The former has been a dominant strategic actor in that region for the past several decades.  Plus, that region has large oil reserves that both China and the United States need for their continued growth.  Without making too much publicity, China does envision the Middle East as an area where it could enhance its presence and influence as America’s clout dwindles.

The Arab Awakening in the Middle East and North Africa has created different challenges for the United States and China.  First and foremost, it has established once and for all that the long-term American idiosyncrasy of promoting a political status quo that guaranteed autocratic rule and the related subservience of that region to the American hegemony are things of the past.  Second, since the Arab Awakening has already resulted in the ouster of three notorious and enduring dictators from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the chief American worry is about what political arrangements will replace those dictatorships.  The best case scenario is that a pluralistic democracy emerges in all three countries, and the political subservience of those countries to the United States does not materialize.  What that means is that the policies of the future governments of those countries – and of other Arab states where dictatorships are under constant challenge – toward the Palestinian conflict will also undergo radical change, thereby forcing the United States to revisit its own long-standing policy of remaining at peace with Israel’s continued occupation of Palestine.  The worst case scenario for the United States is the capturing of political power by the Islamists in one or more of these countries.

Speaking of changes in the Middle East, Israel’s policy toward the Palestinian conflict has been anachronistic.  It also belongs to a era when sustaining Israeli dominance of the Palestinians was envisaged only through its continued occupation or, at the most, offering the Palestinians paltry changes that would still retain their status as an occupied nation.  As such, that era appears to be already under a lot of pressure from the Arab side.  As the Arab Awakening is radically altering the nature and style of politics of the Arab Middle East, there is a dire need for the birth of an “Israeli Awakening,” whereby its leadership foresees living with the Palestinians as free people with all the dignity that the acquisition of sovereignty promises them.

The Chinese leadership is very apprehensive about the repeat of the Arab Awakening inside its borders.  The mere mention of the phrase “awakening” triggered an overreaction in February 2011, whereby the security thugs were sent to suppress any outbreak of anti-regime demonstrations.

Even assuming that there will not be an outbreak of a Chinese version of an awakening in the future – a rather audacious assumption, to say the least – leaders in China know that they will have to change their ways of doing business with a democratic Middle East.  The report that Chinese officials met with the officials of the regime of Muammar Qaddafi in July of this year to sell arms – when the uprising to his rule was in full swing – underscores how serious the PRC was in its attempt to forestall the tide of internal change in Libya.  China now knows that gone are the days when the representatives of the dictators from the Middle East were sent to Beijing, or representatives of the Chinese government would sneak into Arab capitals to sign lucrative arms or economic deals without any fear of publicity or its related negative spillover effects.  The PRC also understands that it has to adapt and adopt a new style of doing business with a democratic Arab world.

All changes almost inevitably are analyzed along the continuum of good news and bad news for the winners and losers, respectively.  However, given the global implications and attendant intricacies of the impending power shift, it cannot be all good news for the emerging superpower and bad news for the declining one.  The winner and the loser will have to deal with a mixed bag of good and bad news.

The greatest challenge for the United States is that it has to come to grips with becoming a second- or even a third-rate nation.  It will also have plenty of opportunities to do its utmost to reverse its decline, and even to become an ascendant power.  It has not been successful in its attempts to reverse its fortune between 2008 and 2011.  However, that does not mean that it will continue to fail in the coming years.  The good news for the United States is that, even its reduced global power status will not affect its political stability.  So, being able to maintain its system stability while it looks for avenues to regain its global power status is indeed better than just good news.  On the contrary, we cannot think along the same lines about the PRC.  As an authoritarian system, it has no choice but to sustain its economic prosperity.  Otherwise, the revolution related to the “rising expectations” is likely to prove deadly for survival of the Chinese political system.  No one is more aware of that reality than the Chinese leadership.

As a democracy, the United States’ chances of adaptability to the radically altering global realities are very good.  As a weakened, but still a stable polity, it can continue to find avenues for new ways of dealing with change and even in terms of coming out on top of rising challenges.  The same cannot be said about the PRC.  In this sense, China has more reason to ensure its success both globally and internally, in order to survive.

One relevant example of urging an ally to acquire the leadership role was Washington’s advocacy that Japan should emerge as a “normal” military power.  That was a euphemism for the remilitarization of Japan, at least as envisaged by the PRC and South Korea, two countries that still nurture horrible memories of Japan’s “rape” of their polities when it occupied them.  One wonders how much thought the United States gave to the Chinese and South Korean reactions to a potential emergence of a militarized Japan.  Alternatively, the U.S. suggestion might also be part of its strategic maneuvers to put pressure on China in the same manner in which Richard M. Nixon decided to develop a strategic nexus with the PRC in 1972, to put pressure on the Soviet Union.  Another example of such an advocacy was the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s advocacy during her latest visit to that country that it is time for India to act as a leader in South Asia and in the Asia Pacific.   That advocacy, though genuine, is highly controversial and may not be welcomed among the countries of South Asia.

The fact that the United States will be lowering its military profile in Afghanistan in the near future has become a major source of apprehension for India.  It knows that the immediate outcome of that development will result in an instant heightened presence of Pakistan in Afghanistan.  And India is as opposed to an increased presence and influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan as Pakistan is about a similar development involving India in that country.  Even if one were to temporarily ignore the Indo-Pak loathing of each other’s increased role in Afghanistan in the future, an important question is what exactly does the United States want India to do in Afghanistan?  Should it become an occupying force in a manner similar to that of the United States or should it become a peacekeeper?  Both of these alternatives are highly untenable.  Keeping these facts in mind, one wonders how much time the United States has really spent in thinking about the issue of India’s leadership in Afghanistan.

A possible alternative for India to consider in Afghanistan is to establish some sort of a nexus with Iran and Russia to minimize the chances of the emergence of al-Qaida as a major force.  Even on this issue, a lot depends on what kind of a compromise the United States would be able to reach with the Taliban of Afghanistan before pulling out of that country.  If there is even a remote possibility of the Taliban’s emergence as co-rulers of Afghanistan, any emergence of an India-Iran-Russia nexus influencing the internal power dynamics of Afghanistan is entirely out of the question. Moreover, given the intense antipathy that Iran and the United Sates hold toward each, it is highly unlikely that Washington would endorse any political compromise that would enable Iran to escalate its power and influence in Afghanistan.

In the Asia-Pacific region, on the contrary, India has a good chance of exercising its leadership.  The ASEAN countries have been quite receptive, indeed some of them have been eager about, India’s increased leadership role in their region as a balance against the PRC’s rising influence.  India has been quite successful in building on that support by becoming a member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005 and by signing free trade deals with the ASEAN countries in 2009.

India as a naval power (it has world’s fifth largest navy) also has a great potential in cooperating with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in conducting joint patrolling of the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 80 percent of China’s oil supplies from the Middle East and Africa passes.  Indeed, India has been involved with the U.S., Japanese and Australian navy in conducting joint naval exercises in that region, much to the chagrin of the PRC.  India has also been conducting joint naval
exercises with Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia.  India’s Andaman and Nicobar tri-services Command has a potential of playing a major role in India’s naval maneuverings in Southeast Asia.

One Indian maneuver vis-à-vis China in the South China that is worth making a mention is the evolving Indo-Vietnamese strategic ties.  Operating on the axiom that my enemy’s enemy is my friend, India has been seeking increased strategic cooperation with Vietnam, which also includes gaining access to the Cam Ranh Bay naval and air base. Even though Vietnam has been reluctant about granting India access to that facility, the Vietnamese-Indian strategic partnership remains a work in progress.  The worsening of Vietnam-China ties in the future would make rulers in Hanoi reconsider India’s sustained interests in the Cam Ranh Bay base.

Even though India’s immediate neighborhood in South Asia does not appear promising about its emergence as an effective leader, leaders of that country can still work on most challenging aspects of creating a rapprochement with its arch adversary, Pakistan.  Such a development—even though it remains hard to develop—would open up considerable opportunities for India’s exercise of leadership in South Asia.  In the meantime, Asia-Pacific holds enormous opportunities for India.  It should work on equally proactively to foster them.  It behooves India to remember that its greatest challenge in the Asia-Pacific is coming from China, which regards that region as its area of special (if not “core”) interests.

When it comes to East Asia, the United States has been following a comprehensive strategy toward sustaining its strategic dominance.  It has long recognized how important East Asia remains as an area where China’s strategic profile must rise in order to complement its global presence and influence.  Since China, because of its awesome economic power, maintains a clear advantage over the United States in escalating its presence and influence in distant regions of the world, the United States has to escalate its maneuvers in maximizing its own presence and influence in East Asia, knowing that China would envisage it as a challenge (if not an obstacle) in its strategic goals of affecting East Asia and the rest of the world.

In Washington’s comprehensive strategy toward East Asia, the annual Shangri-La Asian security meetings serve as a forum where it has been elaborating on and adjusting its strategic posture in response to the latest developments related to the concerns of Southeast countries involving China.  The June 2011 session of Shangri-La was most significant because China sent its military delegation to do its own posturing in order to mollify the fears of its Southeast Asian neighbors related to China’s hyperactivism in South China Sea.  But that symbolism did not do much to change the minds of China’s neighbors about its mounting regional assertiveness.  At the same meeting, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated that his country would increase “its port calls, naval engagements, and multilateral training efforts” to build the capacity of regional actors “to address challenges.” That veiled reference to China was clearly welcomed by a number of East Asian countries.

Secondly, the United States is conducting its own strategic maneuvers to undermine China’s growing posture in East Asia.  The latest evidence in this regard was the U.S.-Vietnam naval exercise, which was more of a sweeping maneuver than China has been doing in Iran.   Like the U.S.-Iran animosity, China and Vietnam have had their considerable baggage of mistrust, suspicion, and even a military conflict in 1979.

Thirdly, the United States has expanded its annual military exercises called “Cobra Gold,” which involves Thailand.  However, the newest participant of this exercise is Malaysia.  In addition, under the general rubric of “CARAT” (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), Washington is conducting bilateral military exercises involving the U.S. Navy and a half-dozen countries of Asia.  The latest additions to the CARAT are Cambodia and Bangladesh.

America’s greatest advantage stems from fact that most Southeast Asian countries remain highly suspicious of China’s military preparedness, its precipitous decision to label the South China Sea as part of its “core interests,” and China’s continued refusal to remain flexible on the issue of resolving its territorial disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbors in a region that is expected to contain large oil reserves.

China not only knows that the United States has a palpable advantage over it in East Asia, but is also aware that it (China) has a lot of work to do to engage its neighbors in a dialogue on its South China Sea territorial dispute.  Just stating that the purpose of its strategic rise is peaceful will no longer satisfy the East Asian countries, which are demanding substantive action.  In the meantime, China is expected to increase its own maneuvers involving a country like Iran, which has remained one of the top U.S. strategic concerns for the past thirty-plus years, especially in reference to Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons aspirations, and regarding Iran’s growing maneuvers in Iraq to undermine America’s chances of sustaining its long-term military presence in that country.

Iran desperately needs China’s support and assistance as the American-sponsored economic sanctions are steadily closing its avenues of global trade.  China’s willingness to go along with those sanctions was a crucial factor in their passage at the U.N.   So, as an immediate adjustment in its policy toward Iran, China, aside from increasing its economic ties with Tehran, is expected to reject any further economic sanctions.  Secondly, if or when the U.S.-China power games become more intensely competitive in the future than they currently are, one can expect increased Sino-Iranian defense cooperation, which would also include a possible membership of that country in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Iran currently remains an observer in that organization, largely because China did not wish to antagonize the United States by allowing it to become a member.  However, that may change if the Chinese calculations involving its own ties with the U.S. undergo visible transformation.

It will be interesting to see whether China will be able to transform its disadvantages into advantages in Southeast Asia.  However, that will require a clear departure of Beijing from its hollow rhetoric about its peaceful rise.  It will have to sit down with all of the countries in that area to find common ground that would be beneficial to all the parties involved, especially on the distribution of oil reserves in the South China Sea.   In addition, the PRC has to persuade its neighbors that the purpose of its military preparedness is really peaceful.  China’s ties with Iran may not be as crucial as its ties with the East Asian countries.  It would not hesitate to substantially scale down or even to end its strategic relations with Iran in the future, if or when it serves its purpose.

The ultimate objective of the Arab awakening is to democratize the Arab world.  The Arab youth that are fighting for democracy and, in a lot of instances, paying the price for the attainment of that objective with their blood, are not beholden to any Arab leader or the so-called champions of democracy in the West.  Those youth have also watched the struggle between the authoritarian rulers and the Islamists for the past twenty-five plus years (since the Islamic Revolution of Iran popularized the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic government), and have definitely rejected the options of either living under dictatorships or under a theocratic rule.  That was why they did not even consider the Islamists as one of the flag bearers for their cause.  They have also witnessed what kind of failing, near failed, or a failed state the Islamists have created in Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan.

The best aspect of the Arab awakening was that it had both men and women protesting side by side, it had religious minorities (as was the case in Egypt), the overwhelming majority of the participants of this movement was in their twenties and thirties, and the movers of the awakening were practitioners of social media to disseminate their cause. Above all, they wanted to bring democracy inside their borders.  As such, the Arab awakening promises to be one of the greatest movements of this young century.

As much as the impending political change in Tunisia and Egypt appeared imminent, it is not surprising that the forces of status quo (reactionary forces) had to react one last time to cling on to power and attempt to postpone the seemingly inevitable transformation. The forces of reaction seem to have been tremendously encouraged by the intensity of bloody battles the dying dictatorships of Muammar Qaddafi and Bishara Assad are waging against the forces for change. It is logical to think that the remainder of the forces of reaction in Tunisia and Egypt are spending a lot of time in conducting “what if” type of futuristic thinking related to re-sabotaging the reform movement.

However, there are three factors that are favoring the forces of reform in Arab world.  First is the fact that the movements for reforms in both Tunisia and Egypt are very much alive and are refusing to trust the remnants of dictatorship to determine the modalities of reforms.  Secondly, the Islamists have adopted a low profile in both Egypt and Tunisia, even though in both these
countries the Islamist parties have a long-term political presence.  That reality defeats the frequently iterated scary propaganda of the dictators that if they were to be ousted the “Islamist terrorists” would take over their country. Third, the West, by and large, has maintained a strong profile of defending political change now that it has become, or about to become, pretty much of a fait accompli in a number of Arab countries.

However, the longer the forces of reaction linger on in Egypt and Tunisia and the longer the despicable dictatorships of Qaddafi and Assad succeed in prolonging the bloody battles the higher are the chances that the Islamists of the Arab world (I am not referring to the murderous terrorist groups but parties like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and An-Nahda movement of Tunisia) would be encouraged to come to the forefront of the political battles.  It is also a high possibility that the forces of reaction are operating on the basis of similar hopes because such a scenario would increase the prospects of their sabotaging the reform movements.

So, as much as one is tempted to celebrate the Arab awakening and its attendant promise of defeat of extremism of all variety, let us postpone the celebration, for the battle between the forces of reform and reaction is still waging, and will continue wage, without losing its intensity in the near future.  Democratic elections have to take place in Egypt and Tunisia. And if the outcome in both countries is the prevalence of a pluralistic democracy—where the Islamist parties also participate as important actors—then the next step would be the adoption of structural reforms that would lead to the creation of modern institutions, supremacy of the rule of law, gender equality, and protection of the rights of the minorities, to mention a few.

The chief significance of the Arab awakening is that it has no precedence in the Muslim world.  If it were to lose the long and arduous march of the Arabs toward democratic stability, economic opportunity and practice of political and religious pluralism, then the past battles between despotism and Islamism would recur with a vengeance—battles that have created nothing but a dark and bloody history, only for the Arab world, but also for the world of Islam at large.

The Saudi monarchy is truly afraid of the sustained revolutionary power of the Arab Awakening, which has no charismatic leaders. That factor makes it hard for the sitting autocrats to jail or kill the leaders and contain the uprising. It is a genuinely grass-roots movement that is riding the electronic shoulders of the social media — Facebook, twitter, electronic messaging, etc.

In response to this popular uprising, the Saudi rulers have adopted a variegated strategy. When the government of Bahrain “invited” the Saudi government to put down the popular uprising, it responded instantly and categorically through the use of force. That “invitation” was also endorsed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, all of whose members are monarchies.

Regarding the Yemen awakening, the Saudi strategy is focused on easing out President Ali Abdullah Saleh, hoping that such an outcome would enable Riyadh to play a major role in selecting the nature of the succeeding government and even Saleh’s heir. However, the Yemeni President, through his sustained intransigence to leave power, is not making the potential fulfillment of Saudi aspirations any easier. What is more important is that, after ousting Saleh, the Yemeni populace will certainly not allow the Saudis to impose another dictator on them. However, the Saudi monarchs seem to have great faith in their ability to persuade anyone by showering petrodollars on them.

Saudi Arabia will be faced with a major power if the Arab awakening succeeds in ousting Saleh and if Yemen becomes a democracy. The Saudi rulers are currently faced with an almost “no-win” situation in Yemen. They cannot afford to adopt a hands-off policy as Yemen undergoes a revolutionary transformation of its regime. The creation of democracy in Yemen is bound to escalate the aspirations for democracy of similar forces in Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the large number of the Shia population in Yemen is already keeping the political consciousness and activism of the Saudi Shias at a high level. That variable is keeping the Saudi rulers awake at night, even as Saleh becomes increasingly weaker in his hold on power.

As a response to the awakening of the Bahraini population, which is more than 65 percent of the population of that tiny emirate, Saudi Arabia is raising its level of suspicion about Iran’s complicity, even when American intelligence has found no credible basis for such a claim. The fact of the matter is that the Iranian government is just as much of a target of its own protest movement — the Green movements — as the Bahraini or the Yemeni governments are targets of their respective uprisings. So, by insisting on the alleged complicity by Iran in Bahrain, the Saudi rulers, quite unwisely, are raising the level of tension with Iran at a time when cooperation between those two countries is most crucial.

Another feature of the Saudi strategy about the Arab Awakening in their neighborhood is the establishment of an alliance of monarchies. For that purpose, the government in Riyadh has invited Jordan and Morocco. That type of alliance, even if it were to materialize, cannot stem the tide of change in the streets of Amman or Fez, and Manama or Riyadh, for that matter. However, Saudi Arabia can ill afford to recognize the capacity for political change on the part of a popular uprising and do nothing.

The only hope for Saudi Arabia is that, at least thus far, the monarchies have not yet been uprooted as a result of domestic uprisings. Bahrain came close, but the Saudis are doing their very best to put an end to it through the use of force.

The final feature of the Saudi strategy is to shower its citizens with money, hoping that such an attitude will buy their loyalty to the regime. Thus far, that attitude seems to have been keeping the level of fermentation inside Saudi Arabia at a manageable level. However, one has to wait and see what happens in Yemen and Bahrain. A potential civil war — stemming from Saleh’s refusal to step down from power — will be damaging to Saudi security. The general expectation is that al-Qaida will quickly emerge as a major player in the resultant chaos. The United States is not likely to stand aside and let the events take their own course. If it intervenes, even under the cover of U.N. sanctions, the level of violence in Yemen may be beyond the control of anyone.

The chief reason for prolongation of the autocratic regimes’ rule in the Arab world has been because  they were regarded by the West as safe alternatives.  They were there to stifle change and to prevent modernity in order to safeguard their rule.  But they were guarantors of security for themselves and the West.  The West was afraid of Pan-Arabism that was headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s.  When Nasser died in 1970, Pan-Arabism was also a dead force, since it was under its banner that the Arabs suffered their worst defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war.

There was no alternative idea the caliber of pan-Arabism to surface for a long time, while the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to boil.  Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, attempted to become a “peacemaker” with Israel.  However, he was widely condemned by the Arab side for even approaching Israel for conflict resolution.  He was forced to conclude a peace treaty for Egypt alone, instead of for the Arab nation.  As a precondition for making peace with Israel, Egypt had to agree to get out from under the future “fighting ranks” of the Arabs.  That development – along with America’s unflinching military and economic support of Israel – ensured that the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unresolved.  Arabs became so divided after Sadat’s alleged “sellout” to Israel that they had a tough time reuniting, even as a political force.  The Arab side could never again become a fighting force against Israel.

The Islamic alternative did emerge as another major idea, but only after the Iranian revolution of 1979.  The Sunnis had their own version of Jihad, under the American hegemonic purposes of defeating the Soviet Union which had invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979.  The Soviet Union was finally defeated and ousted from Afghanistan, and America left South Asia to become a victim in the 1990s of Jihadi militancy, which served so perfectly the American objective of defeating the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

That Jihadist notion turned against the Arab rulers in the 1990s, when American forces stayed in Saudi Arabia after ousting the invading forces of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.  It is hard to tell whether the United States really wanted to remain in Saudi Arabia permanently.  At least in the 1990s, it found another excuse to stay put in the Arabian Peninsula – to ensure Saddam’s compliance of the U.N. resolutions and to ensure that the Kurds emerged as a fighting force against the Iraqi dictator.

But the Arab world remained empty of any powerful idea that could resurrect the Arab masses to transform their miserable existence under suffocating tyrannical rule.  Indeed, in the post-9/11 era, every dictator in the Middle East and South Asia used the “threat” of an Islamist takeover as a persuasive excuse to ensure massive political, economic, and military assistance from the United States to stay in power.

The brutality of Islamist treatment of the opposition, their insistence on taking their societies back to the purity of the 7^th Century, the paucity of specific ideas about effective governance in an increasingly intricate globalized world, and their eagerness to kill anyone who disagreed with them made their entire frame of reference highly unpopular and impractical as a basis for recreating the Islamic Caliphate, which prevented the Islamists emerging as a revolutionary force in the Middle East. 

Even the United States’ much-touted “global war on terrorism” became a highly contentious idea, which was also perceived by most Arabs (and by a majority of Muslims throughout the world of Islam) as a declaration of war against Islam.  Instead of getting the much-desired cooperation from Muslims, it stalwartly alienated them from America.  So there was nothing inside the Arab or Muslim world, or in the West, in terms of a new idea or frame of reference that could stir up Arab or Muslim imagination in general, until the Arab awakening, which is currently sweeping through Arabian streets.

As much as it is still a fledgling idea, and as much as we do not know whether it will actually result in the emergence of democratic systems in various Arab countries, the Arab masses are now experiencing the brutal suppression of Muammar Qaddafi, who is quite unequivocal about sustaining his death grip on Libya.   Even that despicable face of tyranny does not appear invincible, because the international community has finally decided to impose a no-fly zone on Libya.  Sooner or later, that arrangement promises to bring an end to Qaddafi’s rule.

However, the ugliest face of Arab tyranny is currently emerging in the form of the Saudi invasion of Bahrain and in the Saudi resolve to use whatever force is required to crush protests and to stay in power.  The only reason the Saudi autocrats can get away with their cruel ways is because they have made it clear to the West that their continued rule over Saudi Arabia is the only way to ensure the guaranteed flow of oil to the West and as an alternative against the takeover by al-Qaida.  The highly-touted bargain between Ibn Saud and President Franklin Roosevelt in the 1940s is not only alive, but appears to have become more urgent for the Western leaders than it ever was before.

Even as Saudi forces are patrolling in Bahrain, it is still not certain as to how the world will react if they unleash their military dogs on the unarmed Shia masses of that tiny emirate.   Secondly, by the same token, no one knows how much violence Saudi rulers are willing to use against their own Shia citizens, who reside in the area that is legendary in terms of its very large oil reserves.  The Obama administration was palpably hesitant in taking the lead against imposing the no-fly zones on Libya because it did not wish to be seen as declaring a war against a third Muslim country.  One can fully understand that indecision.  But it is hard to understand why the United States is not calling the Saudi decision to intervene in Bahrain an invasion, and to tell the Saudis to get out of Bahrain.  Perhaps the days of monarchy for Bahrain are over.  If such is the case, then the citizens of that sheikhdom should be involved in determining whether it should become a republic.

Many years ago, a well-known political scientist, A.F. K. Organski,[1] argued that the power transition between a status quo power and a rising power is dangerous during the period when the capabilities of both of those actors remain roughly equal.  During that time, the propensities of the leaders of the rising power to take risks also play a crucial role in such a state of affairs.  In a unipolar global power arrangement – when the United States’ dominance in the realm of military power is indisputable, while its economic decline is apparent – the lone superpower continues to envisage China as a non-status quo, if not revolutionary, power.  Such a perspective compels the United States to question the actual purpose of China’s military preparedness, and, equally important, the absence of transparency regarding the actual size of China’s defense budget, as well as the modalities of its defense expenditures.  China, for its part, feels entitled to sustain a high degree of opacity on such matters for reasons of its own, thereby further fueling the suspicion of the United States, and a number of East Asian countries, about its rationale for the modernization of its military.

China’s former supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping, did not make matters easy for China when he advised his successors to lie low and not be candid about the purpose of their country’s power.  China’s revolutionary posture during the era of Mao Zedong was also too fresh in the collective memories of East Asian and American leaders to remain apprehensive about the dynamics of China’s future role in that region. 

Aside from the preceding, what is also problematic for China is that, with its (and India’s) rise, the power is inexorably shifting from the West to the East.  If that shift were to remain uninterrupted, Beijing (and New Delhi) would emerge as places from where the solutions to future global problems would be initiated.  As much as that pattern is palpably edging toward reality, the only power that remains wary of it is the United States.  The EU has long acknowledged its secondary role as a fate accompli.  Great Britain and France have also accepted – the latter more begrudgingly than the former –their respective subsidiary role to that of the United States. 

Thus, the lone superpower remains in the forefront of those who constantly insist that China should explain the real purpose of its rise.  Issues like how loyal China would remain regarding the primacy of the World Bank, the IMF, or the Asian Development Bank continue to simmer atop the list of global “hot button issues.”  Another resurging question is how committed would China be in seeking a basket of currency in which the U.S. dollar would not lose its importace?  Or, would China, in order to make its own contribution to the upsurge in global trade, start a major shift which would encourage a massive amount of domestic consumer spending?

For China, making its commitment to extant global economic institutions or to the global regimes of trade and economic interactions is quite easy.  It has decided to let its mounting participation in them speak for itself.  In this regard, the report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is quite positive, if not effusive, in endorsing its performance.  It notes, “Across the board, China has become more effective in utilizing international institutions to advance national interests, and to extract what it needs from these institutions.” It goes on to add, China’s growing role “is also frequently constructive and helpful for the organizations in which it participates.”

Regarding its use of soft power, China has also become quite adept in using its pocketbook diplomacy in Africa, but with the determined purpose that such expenditures would ensure its long-term influence and presence in regions like Africa and Latin America.  Africa has long been a region where the United States decided to keep its presence low because it was not deemed an area of high strategic value.  It was only after systematic endeavors by China to escalate its quest for equity shares in oil and gas reserves that Washington was rudely awakened from its deep slumber.  All of a sudden, it decided to establish the Africa Command, whose original purpose it was to conduct extensive “nation-building.”  However, the mega-expenditures of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge as a major obstacle in the way of carrying out capital-intensive nation-building projects in Africa.  Still, Africa remains a place where America wants to build a high presence.  Thus, another decision was made to refocus the purpose of the Africa Command on a mixture of military missions and small projects aimed at a limited amount of nation-building.  Despite these endeavors, China seems to have a palpable degree of advantage over the United States in Africa.

If one is looking for a broad statement on China’s emerging pattern of behavior in global affairs, there is little doubt that it would continue to act as a “positive” or a “pro-status-quo” power, as long as it promotes the larger purpose of its emergence as the superpower of the future.  Whether such behavior would be endorsed or criticized by others would matter little to the leaders in Beijing.  For instance, when the global agenda regarding climate change undermined its overall objective, China readily torpedoed the Copenhagen climate change conference. 

Similarly, on the matter of military preparedness, it is not likely to be become as candid as desired by the United States or China’s other neighbors in East Asia.  It seems that Beijing is not yet certain about the overall purpose of its power.  It knows that it wants a reunification of Taiwan; it also wishes to remain a dominant actor in the East and South China Seas.  However, it is still in the process of figuring out the stable patterns of its long-term policies, which would not terribly upset either regional actors of East Asia or the United States but still help it resolve those issues.

In the meantime, China does not seem to be pushing the envelope in terms of seeking military confrontation with any countries of East Asia, and especially with the United States.  With the passage of each day, China, through its actions, appears to be increasingly certain that the future holds nothing but great promises of success and all that goes with it.  And it will do nothing to upset that.  For this purpose alone, China will continue to escalate the use of soft power in almost all aspects of its strategic policies.  And becoming a conventional power (or pro-status quo power) suits China well.

President Hu Jintao and his cohorts inside the governing galleries of China may have shuddered when Muammar Qaddafi, the falling dictator of Libya, mentioned in his rambling speech on February 22^nd that the Chinese uprising of the Tiananmen Square of 1989 was brutally crushed by the Chinese leaders.  He was using that example to justify killing the protestors in Libya.  It is not a good omen when a falling dictator, in his desperation to save his regime, mentions China as an example to justify the massacring of his people.

That example came at a time when Chinese leaders were already highly jittery about the mere mention of the phrase “Jasmine Revolution” on a U.S.-sponsored website.  What makes them even more edgy is that the Chinese people are getting a huge doze – despite China’s censorship of mass media – of how to overthrow a tyrannical regime.  They may not be able to implement those lessons in their own country right now.  However, the enormous zeal for freedom must be fueling new hopes among the masses that yearn for regime change in their own countries.

The Chinese leaders’ crucial fear has to be the fact that regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt were leaderless.  They were carried out by the brave rioting masses of people, who seemed fearless of being crushed by the powerful security apparatus of the tyrants.  In both Tunisia and Egypt, the violence perpetrated by the regimes was minimal, considering the fact that people were demanding the ousting of the dictators.  That makes the Chinese leaders’ task of arresting or crushing movements of regime change in the future very difficult.  In the Arab awakening, the entire protesting populace was acting like a collective mass of leadership.  Applying that notion in China, when the “Chinese awakening” becomes a reality, it will be hard to put down.  Alternatively, it could be put down, but with a bloody outcome a la Libya, which, in this 21^st Century, will bring nothing but enormous shame to the Chinese leadership.  In this sense, Libya, not Egypt or Tunisia, is emerging as Chinese leaders’ worst nightmare. 

One has to watch the U.N. Security Council’s (UNSC) handling of the Libyan crisis to see what sort of position the Chinese representation is taking.  The UNSC condemned Libya’s killing of its citizens, but decided, at least for now, not to take specific action.  That was a shocking development.  Someone inside that body is still hung up on the fact that Libya is a sovereign state.  And one does not have to think hard to identify which nation in the past has shown a very high regard for sovereignty, even while the government of Serbia was killing its own citizens in 1999.  If the name China entered your mind, you are right!

If the Arab awakening results in making the Arab world democratic, that should definitely worry China.  Is that the only way for dictatorships to become democratic?  Can the Chinese regime proactively become democratic and still remain intact?  That did not happen to the Soviet Union.  Why should that happen in the case of China?  These are disconcerting questions.

One reason for taking positive measures to reform China is that history does not repeat itself in the same manner in all countries.  For instance, Eastern Europe became democratic in the 1990s, but the Middle East remained under the suffocating darkness of dictatorship.  The democratization of Eastern Europe was brought about because of the implosion of the Soviet Union.  However, no similar cataclysmic event brought about the Arab awakening. 

So, China could take a calculated risk and start reforming its closed system before the tsunami of popular demand for a democratic change forces it to do so.  Besides, as the popular uprising in Egypt has shown, once people start revolting, they are least impressed by a dictator’s concessions.  At that time, they want him out, nothing less.  China has not yet reached that moment, and a managed change can be ordered from the top without such transformation leading to a cataclysmic regime change.  That should be one lesson that Hu and his ilk ought to be considering regarding the Arab awakening.  Stay tuned…