The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has no clear-cut signs of “victory.”  The administration of President Barack Obama tried to negotiate a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.  When that did not work out to the satisfaction of Washington, the United States – contrary to its strong proclivity for having a long-term stay in Iraq – withdrew its forces.

The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was an ideal development, from the vantage point of Iran’s strategic interests.  Iran’s adversary, the United States, spent billions of dollars and shed the blood of thousands of its own troops and that of the Iraqis to transform Iraq from a staunch adversary of Iran to its strong friend.  In fact, in Prime Minister al-Maliki, Iran has a powerful ally.  One of Iraq’s chief adversaries in the area, Saudi Arabia, has been a strong supporter of al-Maliki’s nemesis, Iyad Allawi, the head of the al-Iraqiya party, a secularist, and a person preferred by the Sunni Iraqis.  Thus, Iran, by ensuring the prolonged existence of the government of al-Maliki, is definitely enjoying the upper-hand in keeping the Saudis at bay.  The unstated aspect of that development is that Iraq has emerged as an arena for the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and by proxy, the United States, which is very much in the corner of Saudi Arabia in undermining Iran’s growing power and influence, not only inside Iraq, but also in the Middle East.

This gathering storm is unique, in the sense that when the Persian Gulf states sided with the United States in 1991 to end Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait, they were not interested in destroying his regime.  In the case of Iran, there do not seem to be any red lines in the sand drawn by the Arab states that the United States should not cross in taking military action against Iran.

But the preceding is a minor subtext of the growing animosity between the United States and Iran.  The chief subtext is Iran’s continued nuclear research program, which the U.S. categorically depicts as aimed at developing nuclear weapons.  Iran’s denial to the contrary has few takers in the West.  Thus, while the United States is assiduously weaving complex webs of economic sanctions against Iran, Israel prefers military action against it – either of its own or that of the United States – to put an end to Iran’s nuclear research.

Viewing the issue from Israel’s point of view, if Iran indeed develops nuclear weapons, the Jewish state would lose its nuclear veto against any ambitious states in the Middle East – a veto that was strategically developed by the founding fathers of that country.  Even though a nuclear armed Iran would be no match against Israel’s military power, the mere fact that such a development is about to happen is alarming to the leaders in Jerusalem, and they have kept their pressure on the Obama administration for action against Iran.

Considering the fact that the Islamic regime of Iran has been under threat by the United States for the sake of regime survival, the Ayatollahs may be considering having nuclear weapons in the future.  Even though it has been serious about creating the circumstances for regime change in Iran, the United States – even though it denies it – does not think that Iran’s predilections for acquiring nuclear weapons has a legitimate or a rational basis.  Therein lies the rub: what Iran considers as a necessary requirement for regime survival, the United States regards as a threat to regional stability “justifying” waging another war.  Listening to the Republican presidential candidates casually talking about taking military action against Iran, and even the Obama officials’ frequent references to the phrase that George W. Bush and his officials used to iterate – that all options regarding Iran are on the table – it appears that the American political leadership is suffering from a collective sense of amnesia regarding the instability and destruction that resulted from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In the rising cacophony of claims related to ‘threats’ regarding Iran’s non-existent nuclear weapons, the Arab regimes’ siding with the United States, in reality, has an entirely different real reason.  Those states have long considered Iran as a threat to their own aspirations involving the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) capacity to manage regional stability.  For instance, GCC propaganda is trying to persuade the international community that political protests in Shia-dominated Bahrain are sponsored by Iran instead of being a manifestation of the Bahrainis to transform the shape of the tyranny of the Sunni regime.  Saudi Arabia – the dominant state of the GCC – has long regarded Iran as a threat to its own aspirations to dominate the larger Middle East.

Iran has deftly outmaneuvered the Sunni Arab states, but, most importantly, has outsmarted the United States in Iraq and in the Levant by creating a nexus with Syria.  That nexus, in turn, has dominated the distribution of power inside Lebanon in favor Hezbollah.  Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East in the aftermath of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq created a sense of long-term defeat among the Sunni rulers in Riyadh, Cairo, and Amman.  They did not know what countermeasures to take in order to undermine Iran’s enhanced power and influence.  America’s near obsession of “containing” Iran through the pretext of depriving it of nuclear weapons was perceived as a fantastic opportunity to outsmart Iran.

The upside of this American-Arab maneuvering is that Iran is likely to be forced to continue its nuclear research but would stop just short of developing nuclear weapons.  The downside is that political explosion in the Persian Gulf in particular – and in the Middle East in general – happens suddenly and with calamitous consequence.  And the next war, if it comes, promises to be highly explosive and equally catastrophic.

While NATO’s air war against the forces of Muammar Qaddafi played a crucial role in bringing the end to that murderous dictator’s regime, it seems that no such foreign intervention is in the cards for Syria.  The United States is afraid to play that role because the Arab leaders would immediately accuse it of doing Israel’s bidding.  Actually, come to think of it, I am not certain whether Israel really wishes to see the end of the regime of Bishara Assad.  Under Assad’s unrelenting tyranny, Israel can continue to occupy the Golan Heights in the pretext of security.  However, if Assad is ousted, and if a democratic government takes control of Damascus, then such an era would also witness the end of Israel’s occupation of the Syrian territory.  In this sense, Israel is as much afraid of a democratic Syria as it was about the emergence of a democratic Egypt.

I am almost positive that Assad cannot be ousted purely as a result of the protests of the unarmed civilians whom the dictator’s thugs are mowing down on a daily basis.  Even though the social media is regularly bringing the bloodletting campaign of the Assad regime to world’s attention, the dictator seems to be convinced that no great power would launch a military strike against his regime.

Economic sanctions — especially the ones recently imposed by the United States and the EU — might have some effect in the long run.  However, the dictator’s brutal thugs should not be allowed to continue their target practice on the innocent civilians in the meantime.  I know that any U.S. involvement in Syria would cause further uproar inside the United States about America’s “vital
interests” in ousting the dictator.  However, drone attacks, which would involve no U.S. forces flying missions over Syria, should not result in a lot of domestic criticism in Washington.

There will be a lot of differences between George W. Bush’s regime change campaign in Iraq and the one I am proposing for Syria.  The former campaign was a pretext to oust Saddam Hussein and was based on a slew of lies to hide the personal grudge of Bush against Saddam, while a regime change campaign in Syria would be waged truly on behalf of the people of that country.  During the Iraqi military campaign, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq.  During the proposed drone war in Syria, there would be no U.S. occupation of that country.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq imposed democracy in that country; the proposed regime change campaign in Syria will only facilitate the emergence of democracy.  The regime change in Iraq is still aimed at continuing the American hegemony in Iraq, while no such prospect is likely as a result of regime change in Syria.  A post-Assad Syria is likely to be (and I repeat, likely to be) a democracy.

The drone war in Syria should  be used along the same lines as NATO’s air power is being used in Libya:  knocking out the dictator’s command and control facilities and destroying all mobile Army units that are being used to attack its civilians.

When the Hezbollah party was created by Iran in the early in 1980s, it was based on the ideology that carried out the Islamic revolution, which had ousted “America’s Shah.”  That ideology was brimming with Shia pride.  The establishment of an Islamic government in Iran was not only a revolutionary idea in its own right, but it also created the possibility that such a major change had also paved the way for creating Islamic governments in other Muslim countries.  As participants of the Islamic revolution, the representatives of Iran went to Lebanon in their zealotry to politicize the Shias of Lebanon, who were disenfranchised and marginalized by an anachronistic Sunni-Christian power system that was ruling Lebanon.  The Mustadafeen (the deprived or dispossessed ones in the vocabulary of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini) of Lebanon had to be empowered through a process of militant politicization.  Hezbollah was created out of that endeavor.  Iran’s politicization of the Shias of Lebanon gave them a new self image.  They were taught that the Sunni-Christian power arrangement was highly corrupt, and that, in order to acquire what is their right, the Shias of Lebanon had to fight for it.

Consequently, the Shias of Lebanon erupted on the political scene with a vengeance. They had had enough of being pushed around by the corrupt elites of their country.  They were also getting especially tired of becoming victims of Israeli retaliations in response to the attacks launched on the Jewish state by the Palestinian refugees of Lebanon.

Around the same time, the Israeli government invaded Lebanon to “finish off” the Palestinian “terrorist” attacks.  However, in the process of invading Lebanon, the Israeli leaders also decided to become the kingmakers of that country by forging an alliance with the Christian Phalangists.  In fact, according to one source, creating a Christian state in Lebanon has been a long dream of the Israeli leadership.  Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, was of the view that Israel “should prepare to go over on the offensive with the aim of smashing Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria. The weak point of the Arab coalition is Lebanon for its regime is artificial and easy to undermine. A Christian state should be established, with its southern border on the Litani River. We will make peace with it.”[1]

It was during the initial phase of the Israeli invasion and the occupation of Lebanon that Hezbollah intensified its activities.  Its shadowy predecessor was blamed for the mass assassination of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983.  President Ronald Reagan, as much as he was interested in cooperating with the Israelis about promoting a Christian dominant regime in Lebanon, wisely decided to pull out the American forces from that country.  And Hezbollah continued its presence and dominance of the Lebanese political scenes.

Hezbollah’s finest hour was the 2006 war against Israel.  During that short war, the Jewish state swore to eradicate it, and unleashed a campaign of intense bombing of Lebanon.  However, when the dust settled, Hezbollah was bruised but still standing.  In the Arab world, the outcome of that campaign was interpreted as a “victory” for Hezbollah over Israel.  In the aftermath of that episode, the political popularity of Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, witnessed new heights in the Arab world.  No Arab leader had the reputation of challenging the military might of Israel and surviving it.  In fact, before the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, Israel had the reputation of handing a crushing defeat to the Arab armed forces, thanks to its decisive victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Along with Hezbollah, Iran’s political reputation as the chief backer of that party also grew in the aftermath of the 2006 war, as the entire Sunni Arab leadership watched with a mixture of envy and frustration. Even the United States, whose occupation forces were then fighting an uphill battle with the Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaida-related Islamists, appeared vulnerable to encountering a defeat in Iraq. While the Arab leaders were attempting to hide their envy of Iran and Hezbollah by coining highly pejorative phrases such as the threat of the rising so-called “Shia crescent,” Hezbollah proceeded to further dominate the internal
power distribution of Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s dominance of Lebanese politics might have lasted for quite awhile, except for the Arab awakening that is currently sweeping through the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. One of the current targets of that movement is the growing revolt inside Syria – one of the chief backers of Hezbollah.  As Bishara Assad has turned loose his killing machine against his citizens, his regime, instead of getting strong, is looking increasingly desperate and weak. That is bad news for Hezbollah and Iran, which had been playing a major role in Lebanon, thanks to the Syrian occupation of that country since 1976. Even though that occupation happily ended in April 2005, Syria remained an influential actor inside Lebanon because of its geographical proximity to that country, and also because of the highly proactive resolve of both Iran and Syria to influence the internal power
dynamics of Lebanon through their support of Hezbollah.

As the future of Bishara Assad’s murderous rule appears bleak in Syria, Hezbollah, and its long-standing nexus with Syria and Iran, looks increasingly anachronistic.  If or when the Assad regime falls, Iran’s influence in Lebanon will also suffer a major setback.

One option for Hezbollah is to revise its strategy of dependence on Syria and Iran.  But there is no alternate strategy for Hezbollah to fall back on.  As a Shia entity, it was heavily reliant on Shia Iran and on the Alawite-ruled regime of Syria.  Even though the Alawites (a minority Shia sect) comprise no more than 10 percent of the Syrian population, they have been ruling that country for several decades.  Hezbollah has no other friendly state supporting it.  In fact, some rare good news for the Sunni Arab leaders — who have been highly wary about Iran’s rising influence in Lebanon and Iraq, and who were also manifesting their antipathy toward Iran by airing their concern through muttering the phrase “Shia crescent” — is that the future of Hezbollah’s continued dominance of Lebanon’s  internal politics also appears shaky and highly questionable.

The Arab awakening is the revolutionary movement of today.  How it will change the political face of the Middle East is not yet known or understood. But, like the aging monarchs and dictators of the Middle East, Hezbollah has little reason to be optimistic. The march of history in the Middle East promises to throw Hezbollah — the revolutionary of yesteryear — into the dustbin of history.

The ultimate objective of the Arab awakening is to democratize the Arab world.  The Arab youth that are fighting for democracy and, in a lot of instances, paying the price for the attainment of that objective with their blood, are not beholden to any Arab leader or the so-called champions of democracy in the West.  Those youth have also watched the struggle between the authoritarian rulers and the Islamists for the past twenty-five plus years (since the Islamic Revolution of Iran popularized the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic government), and have definitely rejected the options of either living under dictatorships or under a theocratic rule.  That was why they did not even consider the Islamists as one of the flag bearers for their cause.  They have also witnessed what kind of failing, near failed, or a failed state the Islamists have created in Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan.

The best aspect of the Arab awakening was that it had both men and women protesting side by side, it had religious minorities (as was the case in Egypt), the overwhelming majority of the participants of this movement was in their twenties and thirties, and the movers of the awakening were practitioners of social media to disseminate their cause. Above all, they wanted to bring democracy inside their borders.  As such, the Arab awakening promises to be one of the greatest movements of this young century.

As much as the impending political change in Tunisia and Egypt appeared imminent, it is not surprising that the forces of status quo (reactionary forces) had to react one last time to cling on to power and attempt to postpone the seemingly inevitable transformation. The forces of reaction seem to have been tremendously encouraged by the intensity of bloody battles the dying dictatorships of Muammar Qaddafi and Bishara Assad are waging against the forces for change. It is logical to think that the remainder of the forces of reaction in Tunisia and Egypt are spending a lot of time in conducting “what if” type of futuristic thinking related to re-sabotaging the reform movement.

However, there are three factors that are favoring the forces of reform in Arab world.  First is the fact that the movements for reforms in both Tunisia and Egypt are very much alive and are refusing to trust the remnants of dictatorship to determine the modalities of reforms.  Secondly, the Islamists have adopted a low profile in both Egypt and Tunisia, even though in both these
countries the Islamist parties have a long-term political presence.  That reality defeats the frequently iterated scary propaganda of the dictators that if they were to be ousted the “Islamist terrorists” would take over their country. Third, the West, by and large, has maintained a strong profile of defending political change now that it has become, or about to become, pretty much of a fait accompli in a number of Arab countries.

However, the longer the forces of reaction linger on in Egypt and Tunisia and the longer the despicable dictatorships of Qaddafi and Assad succeed in prolonging the bloody battles the higher are the chances that the Islamists of the Arab world (I am not referring to the murderous terrorist groups but parties like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and An-Nahda movement of Tunisia) would be encouraged to come to the forefront of the political battles.  It is also a high possibility that the forces of reaction are operating on the basis of similar hopes because such a scenario would increase the prospects of their sabotaging the reform movements.

So, as much as one is tempted to celebrate the Arab awakening and its attendant promise of defeat of extremism of all variety, let us postpone the celebration, for the battle between the forces of reform and reaction is still waging, and will continue wage, without losing its intensity in the near future.  Democratic elections have to take place in Egypt and Tunisia. And if the outcome in both countries is the prevalence of a pluralistic democracy—where the Islamist parties also participate as important actors—then the next step would be the adoption of structural reforms that would lead to the creation of modern institutions, supremacy of the rule of law, gender equality, and protection of the rights of the minorities, to mention a few.

The chief significance of the Arab awakening is that it has no precedence in the Muslim world.  If it were to lose the long and arduous march of the Arabs toward democratic stability, economic opportunity and practice of political and religious pluralism, then the past battles between despotism and Islamism would recur with a vengeance—battles that have created nothing but a dark and bloody history, only for the Arab world, but also for the world of Islam at large.

The United States, indeed the West in general, always knew that their best bet in the Arab world was to deal with the dictators. In the 1950s and 1960s, the “Arab Cold War,” which was fought between the republican and monarchical states, made an opening for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. Britain was the declining hegemon of that era. As it further diminished into a posture of insignificance, the United States emerged as its heir and the leading power of the Cold War. In that capacity, it succeeded in establishing the rules of the game that the Arab monarchies had to follow if they were to survive the conspiracies hatched to overthrow them by the Nasserite “revolutionaries” of that era. They were to remain in the U.S. camp during the Cold War and not to make much over the American support of Israel. The Soviet Union similarly backed the states supporting pan-Arabism in their opposition to Israel, and it also became a source of arms to them.

Thus, the divided Arab world became permanently dependent on the backing of the two superpowers. That dependence lasted long after the end of the Cold War. Except that when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the prestige and the clout of the United States in the Middle East rocketed further. It could insist on having access to cheap oil, support the Arab dictatorships, and ensure that Israel remained militarily powerful while refusing to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The preceding could have been the modern version of the ending line of some old Arab fairytales: “…and they lived happily ever after,” but for the inception of the Arab Awakening in December 2010. To the extent that this social movement has emerged as a “giant killer” in its success in ousting Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zein el-Abideen of Tunisia — and more dictators to follow — it caused a near-panic inside the bowels of the American national security bureaucracy. There emerged an urgent need to somehow influence, if not control, it.

Since the Arab masses were crying to establish democracies within their borders, it became clear to the United States (and to the West in general) that the erstwhile notion of controlling the Arab governments and supporting the dead-end status quo on the seemingly permanent Israeli occupation of Palestine were about to become things of the past.

However, old habits die hard. The United States is not about to accept its ostensibly mounting irrelevance to the Arab world as the Arab masses protest and die to bring an end to the near-death grip of the old dictators. Even the U.N.-sponsored no-fly zone over Libya has not been given much enthusiasm outside of that country. The fervor of the U.K. and France to bomb the tanks and ships belonging to Muammar Qaddafi has yet to show its result in ousting that dictator. The palpable reluctance of the United States in using its military option and the related debate inside Washington about how Libya is not a part of “vital” U.S. interests have not been ignored by Bishara Assad’s regime, which is conducting its own bloody massacre of its citizens.

The enthusiasm with which the Arab masses have taken their destiny into their own hands is definitely one of the most awesome developments of this new century. What kind of potential change awaits the region is most evidenced by the fact that the United States and the West are groping to find a new paradigm of relevance. Israel is wary that, with all of its military prowess, it might be forced to offer a “land for peace” concession that the Arab side has been demanding and that leaders in Jerusalem – stemming from their smugness of indomitability – have been consistently ignoring.

The spillover effects of the Arab Awakening have also affected the quarrelling Fatah organization and the Islamist Hamas. They agreed to form a unity government, which, if it lasts, will be very hard for Israel, the United States, and the EU to ignore. However, the newly established Palestinian unity must also be ready, at some point, to recognize the existence of Israel and to renounce violence before the Jewish state agrees to a political resolution of the Palestinian conflict.

In the wake of these developments, the traditional Arab expectation — that America would put “pressure” on Israel to offer territorial concessions — has also become irrelevant. Israel has to size up the Arab Awakening and its attendant political mega-changes and then calculate the modalities of its own future negotiating position. It seems that the Likud leaders have not yet come to grips with the fact that their traditional sustained intransigence to swap land for peace has also become anachronistic in the wake of the Arab Awakening. What is not clear, however, is when will Israeli voters recognize that fact, throw the Likudin dinosaurs out of office, and elect a new corps of leaders who would be daring enough to negotiate peace with Israel. The first precondition for such a possibility is that the Arab world should continue the process of building democracy within its borders. For the Israelis, governmental changes related to regime change are not enough. In fact, they are quite wary to see Israel’s “favorite,” Hosni Mubarak, overthrown. They need to see the sustained prevalence of moderation and the evidence of an Arab resolve to live with them in peace.

While the Arab world is undergoing major political change, the United States remains trapped in its old way of thinking about the Cold War, and even the post-Cold War era, in dealing with the Arab autocrats, as well as “having its cake and eating it too” through its strong support for Israel’s resolve to keep the Palestinians under the bondage of occupation. President Obama’s speech — as much as it sounded ground-breaking in his own mind — is a total reflection of that conventional thinking regarding the Arab world, with the exception of a few “bread crumbs” that he has thrown in the form of debt forgiveness and further economic assistance. It was not enough to tell Israel to make the 1967 borders a frame of reference, because Israel is not likely to do that. The most important variable would have been to tell the Jewish state that it cannot continue to build illegal settlements on occupied land and expect the Palestinians to keep accepting it as a fait accompli. Similarly, he should have offered the carrot of recognizing Hamas as a legitimate political entity if it were to earnestly start negotiating with Israel (no prior condition for starting the negotiations from either side). But Obama is also mindful of getting reelected. And that variable is one of the chief driving forces of his presidency.

So, while the Arab Awakening requires equally unusual measures to bring about changes in the political landscape of the Arab world, neither the United States nor Israel is yet ready for it. That is the chief reason why President Obama continues to be viewed as an unexciting — if not an irrelevant — political actor in the Arab world. To be fair to President Obama, however, one has to keep in mind that no one is sure yet whether the ultimate outcome of the Arab Awakening will create a stable, secular, and democratic Middle East or whether it will make it a place where Islamist-dominated turbulence will surface in the coming months.

The chief difference between Obama and Bush is that, since the neoconservatives (neocons) are only watching the events in Egypt from the obscure margins of the American domestic arena (where they really belong), we are not hearing the scary scenarios of an Islamist takeover of Egypt. Still, if you listen carefully, that rhetoric is not completely absent from all official statements in Washington.

The Islamic revolution of Iran in the late 1970s is seared into the collective memories of American foreign policy elites. Perhaps because of that fear, the Obama administration is staying at the tail end of the revolutionary change being demanded – if not managed with any degree of clarity regarding its long-term objectives – by the youths of Egypt. The declining capability of the United States to influence the pace or the scope of change in Egypt is just another example of its dwindling power in the Middle East.

At the same time, the high level of concern inside Washington is understandable, in the sense that the ouster of Mubarak promises to start an era of uncertainty in Egypt. Consequently, the best course for the Middle East experts who are on the payroll of the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense is to issue to the media a variety of scenarios for the attention of the boisterous crowds in Tahrir Square – which wants an imminent end to the Mubarak regime – and for the ruling circles in Cairo who are still hoping to prolong his rule by agreeing to bring about minimum amounts of change. Essentially, the bottom line American preference is the lite-Mubarak version of authoritarianism as a tactic to appease forces of change in Egypt.

As much as the Obama administration insists that it is not trying to dictate the modalities of change in Egypt, it continues to harp on the fear of the Muslim Brotherhood’s takeover in Egypt and its implications for the security of Israel.

What is important to emphasize is that there is no amount of inevitability attached to the ouster of Mubarak and the ominous return of the Islamists in Egypt. The Brotherhood undoubtedly remains the most organized party in a country where political opposition has been systematically decimated by Mubarak. However, there is no monolithic ideology of that party that promises the instant insertion of rabid anti-Americanism, even if it were to emerge as a major ruling party in post-Mubarak Egypt.

In fact, an argument can be made that, if the United States is really afraid of the takeover of any extremist group in Egypt, it should push for the immediate ouster of Mubarak. That means getting him out of the country, instead of developing scenarios of “honorable exit,” or allocating for him a palace in Sharm el-Sheikh from where he will have opportunities to conspire to return to power. Why should Mubarak stay in a palace while the rate of abject of poverty in Egypt remains high and its unofficial unemployment rate is reported to be around 25 percent?

Thinking about the best course for Egypt, it is imperative that Mubarak resign and hands over power to Omar Suleiman. The flip side of that option is the assurance that Suleiman is doing everything to manage the transition of power to a committee of honorable civilians, after which he should also resign. In order to guarantee to the military that its interests will not be jeopardized, one military representative, probably Field Marshal Mohammad Hussein Tantawi, should also be appointed to that committee.

The current constitution of Egypt should be dissolved, along with its current parliament. The process of writing a new constitution is reportedly underway. If that is true, then the Egyptian people should be informed about it. When the specifics of the draft constitution are ready, they ought to be publicized in order to ensure that no hidden clauses are inserted that provide an exorbitant amount of power to the president. In a country where dictatorship has been such an integral part of its political culture, all attempts ought to be taken to de-fang the presidency. One of the most important features of the new constitution of Egypt ought to be to include term limits for president – no more than two four-year terms. No spurious notion of “national emergency” should be provided in the constitution for a future president to sabotage the principle of term limit in order to accumulate power.

While the current dictator is being removed and the constitution is being rewritten, close watch must be kept to ensure that the three current power holders appointed by Mubarak – Vice President (retired Army lieutenant general) Omar Suleiman, Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq (retired Air Force air marshal), and Abdel Moneim Qattou (another retired Army general) do not conspire to remain in power. Field Marshal Tantawi has a good reputation in Egypt, but no one who currently wears or wore a military uniform should be trusted to create a system of government based on civilian supremacy, which a democratic Egypt direly needs.

While such developments are taking place in Egypt, the best option for the Obama administration is to make it clear to all military hounds of Egypt that no shenanigans to undermine Egypt’s march to democracy will be tolerated. Since the United States has been providing $1.5 billion of economic and military assistance to that country, it is the only source of real influence that remains at the disposal of Washington. It should be exercised wisely and with utmost care.

Regarding American concerns about the future of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, a smooth transition to democracy will be the best way to ensure that the future Egyptian government remains committed to it. At the same time, the Israeli government should be told in no uncertain terms to abandon its current commitment to the status quo, which has resulted in its continued subjugation of the Palestinians and its sustained occupation of the Golan Heights and the Shebaa Farms (a strip of land that is claimed by Lebanon, but, according to the U.N. and Israel, belongs to Syria, and thus can only be part of a comprehensive peace negotiation between Israel and Syria). The return of democracy in Egypt means that both Washington and Israel have to find new zones of comfort where the freedom and dignity of the Palestinians has to be restored and a new modus vivendi between Syria and Israel ought to be found.

Of the three actors involved in the seemingly imminent change to the government in Egypt – the people of Egypt, the United States, and Israel – the last two actors will find it hardest to get used to the new political conditions. Hopefully, their readjustment to the evolving realities will not be too difficult.

Still, I worry about the excited Egyptians that have gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo, in Port Said and in Alexandria. I am hoping that the coming days do not hold any unpleasant surprises for them.

Being part of a revolution is like riding a tiger. You never know when the beast will turn against you. And the beast seems to have turned against the masses in the Tahrir Square of Cairo on February 2nd. The Egyptian dictator had to prove to President Obama how indispensable he really is. He was almost afraid of the peaceful gathering of millions who were screaming for him to go. He had to stir up the situation and create chaos.

Until yesterday, February 1, the mood in Tahrir Square appeared jubilant. People were celebrating, waving Egyptian flag, singing and congratulating each other about the possibility of hearing the good that the dictator had fled Cairo. However, Mubarak was not about to oblige them. Not yet anyway. So he let loose his security forces. In doing so, he has become more dangerous. He will spill a lot of blood before he gets out.
In the meantime, the Obama administration is determining its general strategy in dealing with the ostensibly impending demands for regime change in Yemen, whose dictator (Ali Abdullah Saleh) has been in power for thirty years. Like Mubarak, he was also grooming his son to take over. Yemen was no less of a personal fiefdom for Saleh than Egypt has been for Mubarak.

Political turbulence is expected to surface in Jordan, where King Abdullah has already taken the proactive measure of sacking the cabinet and appointing another one. But the chief characteristic of the revolution is that it cannot be anticipated or planned for. In that sense, Jordan might be spared, perhaps only temporarily. But don’t count on it. I am personally waiting to see the regime change in Syria, one of the two or three worst dictatorships of the Arab world, the others being that of Algeria and Libya.

If political change does not come soon in Egypt, false templates for forestalling regime change will be developed in Washington. The Middle Eastern autocrats are likely to be willing to listen. They don’t want to meet the fate of Bin Ali of Tunisia and (hopefully) of Mubarak. America also has most to lose. After all, the Middle East has been an area of its strategic dominance especially since the implosion of the Soviet Union, with all the dictators doing America’s bidding. That included guaranteeing the supply of oil to the West, and sustaining a harmonious political environment for Israel to keep postponing the ultimate resolution of the Palestinian conflict.

With all its army of experts and intelligence forces, the United States knows so little about the world of Islam. Speaking of Islam, America remains very much afraid of it. To be safe, the operative phrase is “Islamic fundamentalism taking over …..” You can fill in the name of any Arab state, since all of them appear vulnerable for change. Regarding Egypt, America is afraid of Muslim Brotherhood, in whose suppression it has remained a silent (but a highly agreeable) partner of Mubarak. However, it seems that MB is not in the lead of the revolutionary fervor in Egypt. But that might only be a temporary phenomenon. The MB is the most organized political party in a country where political opposition has been systematically obliterated. For the long-term stability of Egypt let us hope that Mubarak leaves soon and a moderate leader takes the helm of government for at least for a year or while democracy evolves in Egypt.

The Islamic Revolution brought an end to the rule of “America’s Shah.”  Even President Jimmy Carter, who has evolved as America’s best ex-president, attempted to encourage the Iranian Army to bring an end to the revolution.  Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, openly sided with Iraq in its aggression against the Islamic Republic.[1]  Iran has long been depicted as a “pariah” or a “rogue” state by Presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.  Bush’s Secretary of State, Condy Rice, in her quest for new phrases of affront, once characterized it an “outpost of tyranny.” 

When President Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009, he famously offered an “unclenched” America’s fist to Iran (which was more of a PR job than a promise of a substantive change in America’s policy toward that country), but for a price.  He wanted Iran to abandon its nuclear research program.  The United States is not wrong in its estimation that Iran ultimately wishes to develop its own nuclear weapons, which Israel already possesses since the late 1960s.  When Iran refused to comply with Obama’s demands, he came up with his own phrase to deriding it.  He called Iran “an outlier” state.

One can imagine how little the United States has learned from its unilateral invasion of Iraq and its deleterious implications for regional stability and for its own economy, the U.S. officials are still parroting the line in their public statements: “All options regarding Iran are on the table.”  That is a not-so-cryptic threat about the option of taking military actions against that country. 

The Atlantic magazine, in its September 2010 issue, has a “screaming” headline on its cover page: “Israel is getting ready to Bomb Iran.” The latest issue of Foreign Affairs has an article entitled, “Legitimizing Israel’s bomb.”  The authors foolishly (or may be naively) argue that Israel should get its nuclear weapons out of the closet.  Why should Israel do that?  It is having its cake and eating it too: it is a nuclear state, yet it pretends not to be one and no one seems to be bothered about it.  The byline of that essay asks: “Has nuclear ambiguity outlived its shelf life?” The conventional thinking in the West has gotten so used to discussing the unmentioned nuclear weapons of Israel in a conceptual vacuum, as if they have no relevance to the thinking of Iranian leaders in their own attempt to develop nuclear weapons.

The motivation underlying Iran’s nuclear program is a highly rational one.  It is based on deterring the United States and Israel from using the military options aimed at bringing about regime change, as the United States did against Iraq in 2003.  Given the frequently uttered Israeli threats to deprive Iran of its nuclear option, leaders in Tehran envision having nuclear weapons of their own as an ultimate deterrence. 

At the same time, Iran also would like to end the double-standards that the United States exercises by giving a wink-and-a-nod to Israel’s growing nuclear arsenal, while denying that very same right to Iran.  India and Pakistan caused a major dent in that regime of supporting double-standards, when they brought their respective nuclear weapons programs out of the basement in 1998.  India is the only country that is enjoying the fruits of that audacious decision.  Today it is America’s strategic partner.  Pakistan has not been able to achieve that status.  However, it has been persistent about expressing its own aspirations of persuading the United States to grant a similar strategic partnership sometimes in the future.  

The greatest enemy of the nuclear weapons-related double standards is the fact that the nuclear genie is out of the bottle.  The knowledge of how to make a bomb is no longer a Western monopoly.  North Korea has emerged as the latest gatecrasher into the nuclear club.  Iran is likely to be next regardless of what Israel threatens to do.  That fact seems to bother and annoy Washington and Jerusalem most.

When Iran witnesses a nuclear India being rewarded by the United States with cooperation in nuclear technology and becoming a recipient of the cutting-edge technology and weapons from Nuclear Supplier Group as a “reward” for acquiring nuclear weapons, it concludes that becoming a nuclear power might not be a bad thing, if not now, then, to be sure, sometime in the not-too-distant future. 

Iran has been motivated in the direction of continuing its nuclear research program because of the fact that the United States, even under Obama, has not stopped threatening it with endless sanction regimes, while also winking at Israel into periodically threatening Iran that it would attack its nuclear facilities.   

What is also driving the lone superpower and the Jewish state together on the issue of Iran is that the latter is the last confrontational state of the Middle East, now that Saddam Hussein and his regime have entered the dustbin of history.  Syria never was much of a challenge to Israel or the U.S, since its military power does not even pose a minimal threat to nuclear-armed Israel.  Iran, on the contrary, remains a state that has not accepted America’s dominance in the Middle East.  At the same time, it has remained highly proactive in expanding its own sphere of influence in the region, in direct competition with the United States.  Iran’s inventory and knowledge of ballistic missiles is also increasing, while it is proceeding ahead with its nuclear research program. 

Iran’s leaders have always pooh-poohed America’s pretensions that any type of a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian conflict would emerge.  In that capacity, Iran enjoys considerable sympathy inside the Arab world.  To the embarrassment of a number of leading Arab states, Iran has emerged as the major supporter of Hamas’ ostensibly permanent defiance of Israel, while the Arab rulers are still jockeying either for gaining or securing a favorite spot on America’s list of “friends” in the Middle East.

At the same time, Iran seeks an anti-Taliban nexus with Russia and India, states that are scared out of their wits about the potential of the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Afghanistan offers Iran a great potential of escalating its clout, because Russia and India remain wary of the readiness of the United States to withdraw from that country by July 2011.  The Obama administration’s and President Hamid Karzai’s willingness of having a dialogue with Taliban sends palpable shudders through Tehran, Moscow, and New Delhi for different reasons.  Iran is worried about the acutely anti-Shia posture of the Taliban; India is determined not to allow Pakistan an upper-hand in Afghanistan under a potential Taliban’s return to power; while Russia is also fearful of the promotion of regional Jihads under a Taliban rule.  Thus, Iran, Russia, and India are very much interested in developing the modalities of their own options of dealing with the post-American Afghanistan.

Iran has been enjoying a lot of support in the Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon, where the United States has also lately demonstrated some sway.  The U.S. influence is likely to sustain only if Lebanon does not undergo another round war with Israel.  However, if there is another war in Lebanon, one can pretty much guarantee further escalation in the clout of Hezbollah and Iran.  Most important, Iran remains the major supporter in the Muslim world of the defiance of Hamas toward Israel.  It dismisses the latter’s overtures toward negotiations with Palestinians as mere pretensions of conducting peace talks with politically impotent (thus) a diffident Mahmoud Abbas, President of PLA, while continuing with its policy of building additional Jewish settlements on the occupied territories. 

As much as Iran has emerged as a major player in the Middle East for the past thirty years or so, the worst threat to its security—which remains its Achilles’ heel—might be coming from within since June of 2009, when the regime was allegedly involved in election fraud that lead to the “victory” of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  As the rulers of Iran appear confused and even divided about dealing with the protest movement, as Iran remains cutoff from global trade stemming from the U.S.-sponsored sanctions, its regime is likely to become more chauvinistic and even more repressive, thereby escalating the chances of further upheaval and even regime change. 

However, in the context of the power game that is being played in the Middle East in general, Iran remains powerful only if it can survive—or better yet, reaches a rapprochement with—the growing domestic dissent, which can be exploited by the intelligence agencies of the West, as was done in 1953.  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s sustained diatribe about the “fictitious” nature of the holocaust is not at all helpful to Iran.  Indeed it has created considerable resentment in the West toward that country.  Under such circumstances, it has been easier for the EU to show its antipathy toward the Islamic Republic by remaining in the forefront of opposition to Iran’s recalcitrance to abandon its nuclear research program.

The U.N. imposed economic sanctions of June 2010 was a major jolt to Iran’s expectations that China and Russia would be shielding its interests in the world body (UNSC).  In order to undermine the Western-backed sanctions, Iran worked up an agreement with Turkey and Brazil, whereby it was to let Turkey as the storage point of its enriched uranium stockpile.  However, that agreement was rejected by Washington as Iran’s “stalling tactic.”  When it became clear that neither Beijing nor Moscow would return on its side, Iran agreed to restart its negotiations with the EU on the nuclear issue. What is still not clear is whether Iran would agree to send the stockpile of enriched uranium to a country that is acceptable to the U.S.

Washington is also taking full advantage of the fact that China and Russia are supporting the economic sanctions on Iran.  The United States and the EU have hardened their previous negotiating stance by insisting on higher proportion of Iranian uranium be sent abroad.  Iran on its part is, quite deftly, insisting on including Israeli nuclear weapons to be included in the negotiations with the EU.  Such a measure would give Iran an excuse for backing out of the talks if that issue is not included in the agenda.

Iran is not in an enviable position in its dealings with the West.  Under Barack Obama, the United States has drastically altered its approach toward Russia and China.  A selected use of multilateralism by Washington and the abandoning of the shrilled rhetoric of George W. Bush of remaining as the most powerful nation of the world, the Obama administration has made it easier for the United States to seek a rapprochement with Beijing and Moscow.  Unfortunately for Iran, it does not enjoy a very high spot on the strategic agendas of China and Russia in comparison to their desire to seek common grounds with the United States.

Still, given the fact that strategic ties between Washington and Beijing, on the one hand, and between Washington and Moscow on the other, are likely to experience their usual upward and downward swings, Iran expects to exploit them to its advantage in the future.  All in all, if Iran can improve its regime stability from within, its chances of remaining a highly influential actor of the Middle East remain bright.

One may argue that the preceding reality is not important because, as Secretary of State, she is bound to promote Obama’s agenda. But the fact of the matter is that a successful Secretary of State has to share the agenda and worldview of his/her president before entering into office. That was certainly true in the case of Henry Kissinger. He did not like President Richard M. Nixon; however, regarding the dynamics and modalities of America’s foreign policy, both of them were of the same mind. That fact was largely responsible for the emergence of Kissinger as one of the most successful Secretaries of State of America.

James Baker was a personal friend of President George H. W. Bush. As Secretary of State, he was successful, but he certainly was not in the same league as Kissinger as an effective Secretary of State. Dean Acheson was a stranger to President Truman, but is considered as one of the highly successful Secretaries of State.

One reason why Acheson and Kissinger are regarded as highly successful Secretaries of State is because both of them were promoting foreign policy agendas that could be purely depicted as belonging to their respective presidents. Truman was not particularly well versed in the foreign policy issues of his day, but he had a lot of regard for the capabilities of his Secretary of State.

In the case of Richard Nixon, it is hard to see which part of his foreign policy did not belong purely to Nixon and which issues were purely Kissingerian in nature. In other words, as a unique coincidence of history, both Nixon as a professional politician and Kissinger as one of the premier strategic thinkers of his age, came together to promote the same foreign policy agenda in which the United States was to use the “China card” against the highly contentious Soviet Union. These two American officials developed a highly nuanced foreign policy for their country in which they were to pursue detente in a compartmentalized fashion. The Soviet Union was to learn that the United States was eager to use the China card in order to extract diplomatic concessions from the Communist superpower, whenever it suited its purpose. One can argue that the Soviet Union, on its own part, became equally Machiavellian in terms of supporting and opposing the United States on different issues as they suited its own intricate foreign policy objectives worldwide.

In the process, détente, as a chief approach to America’s dealings with the Soviet Union, came into severe conflict with the neoconservatives of the 1970s. They could not quite fathom the complicated system of “rewards” and “punishments” both superpowers were pursuing. In retrospect, the foreign policy of the Nixon-Kissinger era is still regarded as highly sophisticated and multidimensional in nature, much in the manner of the foreign policy that Acheson promoted and pursued for Truman right after the conclusion of World War II. In that era, the United States presided over the making of the post-WWII global order and emerged as the most durable superpower.

President Barack Obama is coming into office at a similarly remarkable time. That reality is becoming increasingly familiar when one considers the fact that the global economic meltdown is very much in progress. The age-old notion of deregulation of the capitalist economy has come under intense scrutiny. Now, the question is how much regulation of national and global economy is warranted. Another question is whether presiding over of the global economy should be limited to the so-called Group of Eight (G-8) nations, or should it be expanded to include the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations.

There is no doubt that a new global economic dialogue will take place, starting with the initiation of the Obama Presidency. The chief question from the U.S. side is how much power the United States is or ought to be sharing with the G-20 countries. Another question is, as the G-20 increase their role in running the global economy, whether at least some of them should be included as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. There is little doubt that the old Perm-5 (U.S., China, Russia, U.K., and France) are not likely to expand their ranks, because a considerable amount of power—largely the power to use the veto in the Security Council—goes with being a permanent member.

Hillary Clinton will have little problem in promoting this aspect of Obama’s agenda, especially if President Obama were to remain careful about not being overly generous regarding sharing power with other members of the G-20.

But if he were to become an overly “out of the box” thinker in terms of allowing the deflation of America’s power globally, then there is likely to be tension between him and Hillary.

Obama’s chief problem in having Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State will come in dealing with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and especially regarding the PLO-Israeli conflict.

Regarding Iraq, Obama will be forced to slow the pace of the withdrawal of American troops. He has already altered his rhetoric regarding how fast he wishes to get out of Iraq as President. Still, there is likely to be tension between the two on that issue.

Regarding Iran, even though both of them have already found common ground in Obama’s elaboration that he will let the dialogue with Iranian officials start at a lower level before escalating the level of engagement and widening its scope at a later stage, one has to watch closely how warm Hillary will remain on that issue. One reason for concern is that, as a presidential candidate, she sounded very similar to a typical Bush neoconservative in terms of her harsh rhetoric regarding Iran.

Regarding U.S. dealings with Syria, there is not much reason for concern, for Syria seems to have defused further complications by negotiating with Israel through the use of the good offices of Turkey. The United States will wait and see whether or if major breakthroughs will emerge in those negotiations.

It is in the PLO-Israeli negotiations that Obama and Hillary Clinton are likely to see things differently. After all, Hillary, as a Senator from New York, has been a loud proponent of the Israeli hardline. Whether she will bring about palpable changes in her rhetoric or approach on that issue as Secretary of State will have a lot to do with her future ambitions regarding the presidency. At this point, it is quite premature to state that she has abandoned her ambitions to run for presidency in 2012. Much will depend on how successful a president Barack Obama turns out to be at the end of his first term.

Given these potential complexities, it is hard not to ask why Obama has decided to choose Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State. While it is noble to emulate Abraham Lincoln in selecting your adversaries to serve you and to promote your agenda, from the viewpoint of realpolitik, one has to wonder why the president-elect has decided to be so magnanimous regarding a highly ambitious person like Hillary Clinton. Why is he giving her such a highly visible platform to remain as a potential challenge to him? Maybe, for Barack Obama, the Lincolnian example is hard to overlook or not to emulate. Maybe it is the highly competitive nature of Obama, or, in the final analysis, his self-assured personality that compels him to take chances. In any event, it’s his choice, and one hopes that he will not come to regret it.