President Barack Obama decided to show his “outrage,” since some so-called pundits were upset that he was not showing the kind of passion that George W. Bush had shown after the 9/11 attacks. But, Bush’s record in his so-called “war on terrorism” has been a miserable failure. During his regime, the United States became an occupier of two Muslim countries. That might be one reason why the lone superpower under Obama is facing such an uphill battle in dealing with “violent extremism.” If Obama were to follow Bush’s example, then the United States is likely to face future quagmires and inertias.

Another dim-witted statement that was uttered by one of the “pundits” is when he wondered out loud why Muslims are not condemning what the young Nigerian tried to do. Statements of that nature imply that all Muslims, until every one of them yells at the top of his/her lungs condemning such action over and over again, are condoning terrorism. At no time in the history of human kind was such a reckless notion deemed worthy of air time.

What happened to America’s dealing with terrorism is that, under a new president, another country (Afghanistan) became the focus of it, as if by “winning” in that country the current administration would defeat terrorism once and for all. What the United States is not considering is that there cannot be any victory against the terrorist forces unless it develops comprehensive anti-terrorism policies. Firing cruise missiles or using UAVs to shoot a group of terrorists here and there, or sending Special Forces to take out a few terrorists is not the solution. Actions of that nature only intensify feelings of hatred and revenge against U.S. personnel all over the world. If the United States’ invasion of Iraq taught anything to America, it is that the use of military power (“hard” power) alone is no guarantee of victory.

As President Obama is busy developing some sort of blueprint (I will not call it a strategy, because there is no such thing up to this time), Pakistan and Afghanistan look increasingly precarious places. In both those countries, Islamist forces are on the offensive. Iran, totally unrelated to the latest episode of terrorism, is getting increasingly unstable. The Iranophobes in America are eagerly waiting for the Islamic regime to fall, hoping that the next government will be pro-Western. No one is considering that the alternative to the Islamic Republic might be chaos, which might have its own deleterious spillover effects in Iraq.

Across the Persian Gulf, Yemen is boiling over as another failed state. Northern Yemen and areas of Saudi Arabia contiguous to it have become the new battleground between forces of those two countries and al-Qaida, with the United States increasing its pressure on both of those countries to let loose their hard power on them. America’s answer to problems of al-Qaida is: kill, kill, kill, never mind what happens to Yemen or Saudi Arabia in the process. Farther East to the Arabian Peninsula is the Horn of Africa, which contains Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eretria. Somalia is already the poster child candidate for a failed state, while Ethiopia and Eretria are right behind it.

The question of the hour—indeed, of the decade—is what should be done about all these countries that are steadily becoming havens for al-Qaida. Does the United States have enough cruise missiles to shoot at all of them, ensuring the eradication of all supporters of al-Qaida? Does it have enough drones to fly them on a 7/24 basis on all the aforementioned countries?

In the last presidential election, there was no debate about how to win against the terrorists worldwide. Terrorism as an issue had already fallen way down on the list of American voters’ concerns during that presidential campaign. Candidate Obama made his electoral fortune by banging the drum of the failed policies of Bush, and then insisting that he would go after al-Qaida and would do everything to eradicate it in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Who could have argued against that without having his/her patriotism questioned? What bears repeating here is that the 2008 presidential election campaign was totally devoid of any debate regarding how to be victorious over global terrorist forces because, by then, the 9/11 attacks were fading in American memories.

That fading process would have continued if not for the fact that Obama remained true to his promise and started the use of hard power in Afghanistan and Pakistan, assuming that he would win where his predecessor had failed.

The widening popularity of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula and on the Horn of Africa, and its sustaining capacity in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, should intensify the feeling in the U.S. that the need of the hour is to develop comprehensive anti-terrorism policies, and not to solely rely on killing (counterterrorism emphasis) and hope that such a measure would also eradicate terrorism. But right now, examining the public debate, one gets the feeling that the American government is in the process of reinventing the wheel. There is the usual blame game that various agencies are still not cooperating; or the process of terrorist monitoring has become so cumbersome that it does not work even when a young man’s father reports to the American embassy that his son might have joined the ranks of the terrorists, yet that young man is allowed to travel to the United States.

Watching the process of recrimination, looking for fall guys, the blame game that is currently in progress in Washington, one wonders whether the lone superpower would ever become invulnerable to the actions of those who attach no value to life, neither of their own nor of others.
If there is a fall guy inside the United States in this whole process of countering terrorism, it is the cumbersomeness related to securing America that has become the chief culprit of making America unsafe. The strength of the terrorists stems from the fact that they operate on the basis of simplicity: one person or a few persons specialize in or invent new ways of creating death and mayhem. All they have to do is to find just one or more loopholes in the cumbersome security processes. At least in incidents of this nature, the culprit is the incompetence of the intricate bureaucracies, which promise to become even more intricate and, in all likelihood, more incompetent in the coming months.

The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission of creating an intelligence czar was a wise one. Instead, Congress diluted most of the recommendations of that Commission by playing politics. Today, we have eight or more intelligence agencies. All of them are busy fighting budget and turf battles and performing the redundant tasks of collecting intelligence. Those types of redundancies are also contributing further to the aforementioned cumbersomeness. As the co-Chairs of the 9/11 Commission observed in their OpEd of January 11, 2010, “The DNI [Director of National Intelligence] has been hobbled by disputes over its size, mission and authority, but forcing information-sharing and enabling the NCTC’s [National Counterterrorism Center] best analysts to do their work should not be subject to dispute.”

What America needs is an anti-terrorism strategy that is geared toward homeland security, but a strategy that also deals with causes of global terrorism that is focused on Africa, the Middle East, and South, Central, and Southeast Asia. Of these regions, Africa—the Horn and the trans-Sahel region, North and West Africa—is where terrorism is likely to run rampant during the next decade. South Asia and the Middle East will remain hotbeds of terrorism from now until at least the middle of the next decade. Central Asia appears calm; however, we know so little about that region because countries of that area are governed by autocrats who want absolutely no outside scrutiny of their tyrannical rule. So, it is a safe bet that one or more countries of Central Asia is likely to experience internal turbulence or even violent regime change. In all likelihood, such change would not result because of terrorist groups, but such groups are most likely to take every advantage of the resultant political turbulence.

If the prognostications of increased transnational turbulence are correct, then it behooves the United States to have trans-regional strategies to counter such events. Merely appointing “czars” and “special envoys” is not enough. However, considering how unprepared the United States has shown itself to be about dealing with terrorism last December, one has little reason to remain optimistic.

History repeated itself in a similar fashion when the U.S. went back to Pakistan in 2001, that time with a symbolic bazooka in its hand, and told its dictator General Pervez Musharraf to cooperate in America’s invasion of Afghanistan or his country would be bombed back into the stone age.  Musharraf joined the fight and got $10 billion worth of assistance from Washington. 

But Pakistan of the post-9/11 era was a hellish place for America.  People of that country remembered only too well that country’s “deceptions” of the past and they did not want their government to lift a finger to help the Americans.  Besides, in 2001, the United States went to Afghanistan for the explicit purpose of defeating the same type of people (Islamists) that it zealously nurtured and trained in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union.  Since then, Pakistan served as a visible base of support for the Islamists.

If Pakistan had been a democracy in 2001, the U.S would not have so cavalierly threatened to bomb it back into the Stone Age.  However, it knew how to deal with dictators who love to play tough guy in dealing with their citizens but are softer than melted cheese in cooperating with regional or global hegemons.

But this time, Pakistan has a gift for the United States.  That gift is wrapped in a lot of blood and gore; it contains threats of rising regional turbulence that can spillover into Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as the South of Pakistan into India. 

During the first presidential debate, John McCain called Pakistan a “failed state” before Musharraf came to power.  Barack Obama did not pause to explain how his frequently mentioned option of launching attacks on Pakistan is superior to what George W. Bush did in Iraq.  If the use of power is the solution, then Iraq should have been a haven from the American perspective.  As it happens, it is barely a quiet place with a highly uncertain future.  How can a bad option for Iraq becomes a good option for Pakistan?  But Obama is not in a reflective mode, and the media is in no mood to probe Obama on this issue.

This time, Pakistan’s gift (or revenge stemming from America’s policy of use and abandon) to the U.S. is coming in the form of a guaranteed failure of all short-range options and quick fixes, like the palpable (short-term) positive consequences emanating from the application of the Surge option in Iraq. 

This time, the issues in Pakistan are how to reverse the tide of radical Islamism without appearing to be doing America’s bidding.  Musharraf must have known that he was a doomed man the day he decided to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Lal Masjid (mosque) massacre of July 13, 2007, was the clincher.  Some say Musharraf had to use excessive force to satisfy the Americans.  But that may be only partially true.  By the time that event exploded, Musharraf was driven largely by his greed to stay in power, no matter the cost.  He knew that the only way he could to ride out the storm of protest (even though, as it turned out, it was wishful thinking) was to make sure that America remained on his side.  America, on the contrary, decided to cut its losses by forcing him to doff his uniform.  That was the day his rule was tacitly over.

A derisive adage in Pakistan describes the power of Allah, America, and the Army inside that country.  The manner in which Musharraf was dispatched to his retirement does not bode too well for the power of the Army, which is also increasingly coming under attack from the side of the Islamists.  In addition, the Army might end up using force to discourage America’s use of power inside their borders.  Unless the United States and the Pakistani Army reach a new modus vivendi, America’s power in Pakistan will become a myth or fairytale. 

If Pakistan remains a democracy, it will have to find its own niche away from the U.S.  Pakistan’s new President, Asif Ali Zardari, does not appear to hold much promise in terms of his ability to cultivate his image as an independent in the eyes of his constituents.  He might turn out to be a short-lived president. 

Even if democracy is ousted from Pakistan, once again, the next strongman will have to think hard and long before he decides to become America’s “stooge.”  This time, if Pakistan comes out intact from the current tumult and chaos, it might have to concern itself only about pleasing Allah and its own citizens, no one else.  Perhaps not even its Army.

The end of history will be the end of human civilization.  Ideas of all sorts—even the noble ones like liberal democracy, and the pious ones, like all religious beliefs—only underscore the twists and turns of history, its ups and downs, or even its evolution.  However, world historians and strategic thinkers, out of their respective idiosyncrasies or cultural hubris, regard an idea, an ism, or a religion so important that the beginning and the end of the world is interpreted through their upsurges and failures.  The reality is that the success of an idea is just that, its temporary success until another idea comes along  to challenge it.

The end of the Soviet Union did not guarantee the endless triumph of liberal democracy–a Western idea.  To be sure, in terms of human participation and the will of the governed, it was (and remains to be) an idea superior to the non-democratic ones.  However, non-democratic systems prevail in Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.  More important, they are not likely to disappear anytime soon.

Even when democracy emerged as a “victorious” system over the communist totalitarian system at the end of the Cold War, there was no chance that the country that was the worldwide champion of that system—the United States—would have an easy time promoting it. 

The Bush administration did promote democracy in the Middle East in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq, at a time when the United States was desperately searching for a cause to rationalize the invasion of Iraq, especially when it failed to find weapons of mass destruction.  But that strategy (which was more of a convenient tactic than a strategy) was abandoned in the aftermath of the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing.  That dark event led to the “Sunni cleansing” by the Shia militia.  The U.S. occupation officials of Iraq correctly concluded that they had to adopt a strategy promoting heavy participation of Sunni groups in the emerging power structure of Iraq.  At that time, it also became crucial to gain the political support of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq, who were quite concerned not only about the deteriorating political situation in Iraq, but also about the rising tide of clout and influence of Iran in Iraq.  The U.S. and Sunni Arab states had to fall back on the old-style symbiotic politics of the Cold War years, which became highly relevant especially from the U.S. point of view.  Consequently, the preference for democracy was traded in by Washington for the conventional politics of supporting autocratic regimes.  In other words, the conventional politics of giving preference to pragmatism over the principle of promoting democracy reemerged as a driving force. 

As the political situation seems to be improving in Iraq, while it is deteriorating in Afghanistan, the great power relations are becoming important, but not to the extent that is claimed by Robert Kagan.  Kagan is also wrong in suggesting that China and Russia have not become more pragmatic.  But he is right in arguing that the autocratic rulers of those countries “believe in the virtues of a strong central government and disdain the weaknesses of the democratic system.”  In this sense, the great power relations are likely to follow a different path from now on than they did in the past.

The quest for superpowerdom is driving China and Russia.  China has adopted the market-style capitalistic system as its blueprint for emerging as a world-class economic power.  However, it has remained a firm practitioner of totalitarian politics.  The Communist Party of China is least interested in loosening its control of political power, even when the world was visiting China to watch the Olympic Games.  For the rulers of the PRC, their management of the Olympic Games was to become further “proof” of the “superiority” of China’s management system.  It also complements their perception of governance, which is all about management.  For them, a system should be judged on its pragmatic ability to handle large and complex issues and, most important, for its adaptability.  They don’t wish to be bothered by the nuisances related to democracy or the will of the people.  They have invariably preferred stability and have never understood the concept of legitimacy, which is at the heart of democratic governance.

Russia is similarly driven by its aspirations to become a superpower.  Its current preoccupation with de-democratizing itself stems from the fact that it envisages—no matter how wrongly—its post-Soviet romance with democracy as a reason for its loss of superpowerdom.  Its invasion of Georgia is another example—a crude one, but an example nonetheless—of its resolve to shape events to even the dynamics of the balance of power in its immediate neighborhood.

It is possible, as Kagan argues, that China and Russia will return to a liberal democracy someday.  But, if both countries emerge as superpowers in the next decade or so by remaining totalitarian or semi-totalitarian, what other reasons would they have to become a democracy, unless pressured by internal demands?  However, if they can suppress such demands for liberalizing their systems now, why should they reconsider them in the future? 

Where do the Islamists fit into this debate?  Their role in Iraq might have faced a setback for now.  But there is no reason to believe that they have accepted defeat and will fade away in that country.  In Afghanistan, however, the tide of the battle is very much in favor of the Islamists for now.  Any serious victory over them has to include wiping out their power in Pakistan.  However, knowing that reality does not enable either Pakistan or the United States—the chief partisan for stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan—to develop a strategy aimed at acquiring a convincing victory over them.  In addition, the rest of the Muslim countries must develop their own respective strategies to fight the Islamists within their borders, co-opt them, reintegrate them, or eradicate them.

These are all twists and turns of history, not its end or its return.  The only constant is the struggle on the part of some countries to rise to the top of the hierarchy of nations, while those at the top strive to stay there by best utilizing the technological and intellectual strides at a given time, and then enabling their institutions and their forces to adapt accordingly.  In this realm, the United States has done quite well.  Now, it seems China promises to do even better.  But that is just an expectation.  It has not yet become an inexorable reality.  In the meantime, history continues to march on.