From the point of view of their potentials for bringing about balance of power-related changes in the Middle East, Sunni monarchies and dictatorships are archaic and outmoded.  Throughout the post-colonial era of the Twentieth Century, all they wanted to do was to preside over obscurantist and backward-looking societies where their authority would never be challenged.  They also made sure that the Sunni religious establishment “wheel” was amply greased so that it would permanently support their rule by issuing favorable religious rulings when needed.

The Arab Development Reports—written for the UN by Arab scholars—are full of candid explanations as to why the Arab world remains so close to the bottom rung in terms of Internet use, scientific education, overall literacy, and gender equality.

The monarchies and dictatorships’ ruling style was favored by the colonial powers of Europe and by the United States, when it emerged as the major Western power in the Arab region during the post-colonial era.  No one was going to challenge the United States’ strategic dominance in any significant way.  Saddam Hussein attempted to do just that.  But he could never raise himself to the status of an Arab hero who was committed to the uplifting of the Arab masses.  As long as he ruled Iraq, he was no more than a tyrant.  As such, he indulged in any amount of blood-letting to keep himself in power.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran brought forth a promise of change when it ousted the rotten monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlevi.  But then the Islamic Republic itself became part of struggle for which the Middle East is notorious.  Except this time, that struggle also involved the Mullahs’ ventures to maintain their rule.  Still, Iran did bring about a number of changes, one the most significant ones was its politicization of the under-privileged Shias of Lebanon.  The emergence of Hezbollah was very much part of that aspect of Iran’s involvement in that country. 

However, it is the U.S. invasion of Iraq that opened new vistas of opportunities for Iran, not just inside that country but on to the rest of the Middle East.  An important point that should be kept in mind is that the U.S. propaganda machine has also helped Iran by unwittingly overplaying its clout beyond its real scope.  Needless to say, such U.S. publicity suits the rulers of that country just fine.

The Sunni Arab countries—most significantly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan—are watching with a mixture of fascination and dismay as Iran has emerged as a major player inside Iraq since 2003.  Even when the Surge strategy implemented by General David Petraeus has deescalated violence and its related instability in Iraq, Iran is just standing around, it seems, waiting to see what the next major U.S. move is likely to be. 

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When President Obama entered the White House, the prospect of having a serious dialogue with Iran became part of his agenda.  Iran is now enjoying the kind of attention no Arab state has ever experienced.

Iran’s nuclear program is what is most troubling to the United States and the Sunni Arabs.  Even on this point, the U.S propaganda machine is doing a good job of exaggerating Arab fears.  Realistically speaking, Iran has no quarrels with the Arabs to use its nuclear weapons against them after acquiring it.  By the same token, a nuclear Iran’s best option is never even to threaten Israel with its use.  But these types of rational arguments are presented in the uppermost echelons of policymakers and behind closed doors.  No amount of cavalier attitude may be publicly expressed regarding Iran on this matter.   Any discussion that lowers the level of fear of Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is not part of conventional wisdom in the United States.

After the recent nuclear test conducted by North Korea, the Obama administration’s level of patience regarding Iran’s ostensible delaying tactics will be getting short.  The most important maneuver on the part of Iran is to see if it can successfully continue its nuclear program without forcing the United States to give it some sort of deadline.  It may not be important for Iran that it emerges as a nuclear power in the immediate future, as long as its scientists acquire the critical knowledge of manufacturing nuclear weapons, learn to miniaturize them, and master the coupling of their miniaturized nuclear tips to the long-range ballistic missiles.  Its leaders may realize that the time for developing nuclear weapons is not appropriate.  But the question is when would be the appropriate time for Iran.  Not in the foreseeable future. 

Alternatively, Iran might bite the bullet and declare one day that it has already developed nuclear weapons.  Then it will be up to the United States to figure out the next move.

If Iran were to become a nuclear power and still escape any attacks from the United States and Israel, then the Middle Eastern power hierarchy will experience considerable changes.  One has only to imagine what the status of Iran is likely to be vis-à-vis the United States.  The example of India is very much in front of Iran.  In 1998, India exploded its nuclear weapons and became a nuclear power.  By 2008, it signed a nuclear deal with the lone superpower without even signing the NPT and has gained access to cutting civilian and military technology.  That may not be a bad example for Iran to follow.  Such a potential might be one very crucial reason why Arab monarchs and dictators are worried about Iran.

dispatch reads:  “Tony Blair makes his first trip to the Gaza Strip.”  In the growing global economic meltdown, the world has forgotten the suffering of the Palestinians who became victims of Israel’s “war” against Hamas.  How can there be a war between the most well equipped military of the Middle East and a state which does not even have an armed force of any credibility.  But this is the era of asymmetric war, and Hamas did launch rockets or missiles on Israel.  Those terror weapons did not cause much damage, but they provided a “justification” for Israel to let loose its military wrath on the civilian Palestinians.

In his book, Road to Lebanon, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times talked about Hama Rules established by the butcher of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, father of the current dictator, Bishara Assad.  According to those rules, if his authority were to be challenged by Islamist forces, he would completely destroy their villages, without any regard to civilian casualties.  He wanted to instill ultimate fear of destruction in the hearts and minds of the Islamists.  They understood that message, and Syria has remained just another “republic of fear” in the Middle East.  The other such republics are Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.  The message to all potential Islamists or those who challenge the political status quo in those states is that the brutal arm of the state will fall on them with utmost use of violence, and they will be eradicated.  That is how republics of fear maintain fear and, thereby, their continued rule.

Israel is also operating on the basis of a similar rule.  It tells the Palestinians within the occupied territory and the Hezbollah of Lebanon that if they challenge the Jewish state, it will be forced to “reestablish” its deterrence.  That phrase is merely a euphemism for using disproportionate military power to bring about enormous destruction of civilian infrastructure and human lives to sow so much fear in the hearts and minds of the Palestinians and the Lebanese that they will think twice about challenging Israel.  In this sense, Israel has remained another “republic of fear” for the Palestinians.

However, the Palestinians have not been impressed or fearful of what Israel’s American-supplied weapons will do to them.  In the information age, they understand how powerful the images of destruction and mayhem really are.  Those images continue to underscore the limits of using military power to deprive them of freedom and dignity.  The United States learned that lesson in Iraq the hard way.  Its proud campaign of “shock and awe” could not break the freedom loving spirit of the Iraqis.  Consequently, Washington worked diligently to pave the way for its departure from Iraq.  However, the Palestinians are not likely to encounter similar positive results aimed at ending the Israeli occupation of their land.  So, they periodically challenge the Jewish state, get killed, and have their properties destroyed as a result.  But in the process, they are also forcing the world to get its head out of the sand and face the urgency of bringing an end to the occupation of their homeland.  In the meantime, the Palestinians misery continues to grow.

When Barack Obama became President, there ensued a round of hoopla stemming from the appointment of Special Envoys to the Middle East and to Pakistan-Afghanistan.  George Mitchell became a special envoy for the Middle East, while Richard Holbrooke was named as a special representative for Pakistan-Afghanistan.  The high hope was that, by giving high visibility to conflicts afflicting those regions, the United States would be able to find solutions.  At least at first blush, no one can be critical of that approach.  However, what is lost in the period of high hopes following Obama’s election to the White House is that a lot of conventional thinking regarding the Middle East must also be discarded.

First, and foremost, it should be clearly understood is that the United States will not succeed unless it adopts a fresh approach toward Hamas.   The chief requirement of that approach is that Hamas should be dealt with directly by Special Envoy George Mitchell in his quest for common ground.  Isolating Hamas by depicting it as a “terrorist” organization will not do.  That was the simple-mindedness of the Bush era.  In the post-9/11 era, there were few entities in the entire world of Islam that the United States did not declare as “terrorists.”  After adopting such a wrong-headed blanket approach, one wonders why the lone superpower was perplexed as to why the Islamist groups were so persuasive in making an argument within the Islamic countries that their religion was under attack.  

In addition, there are two other obstacles in the way of the United States.  The first one is what emerges as the new government in Israel.  Considering the fact that the Likud and the Kadima parties failed to gain impressive majority votes in their own right, the coalition government—no matter who becomes Prime Minister—will only preside over an impasse on the Palestinian conflict for the foreseeable future.  There is nothing that Mitchell is likely to do or say to persuade the Israeli leaders to be daring or forthcoming in terms of offering major concessions to the Palestinians, when they have no such mandates from their voters.  

Then there also are ample divisions among the Palestinians.  Who really speaks for them?  Certainly not the Fatah Party, nor Mahmud Abbas who has a reputation among his people of being a sycophant of the Americans and the Israelis.  Hamas is too confrontational and Abbas is too diffident.   Under these circumstances, the issue of who speaks for the Palestinians remains unresolved.  Even though Hamas is elected by the Palestinians, there is that nagging question whether their representation should undergo a new endorsement through another round of elections.

So the real prospect of resolution of the Palestinian issue faces a very dim future.  In the meantime, special envoys called Tony Blair or George Mitchell periodically surface to make news without creating any real hope for realistic breakthroughs in negotiations between the warring Palestinians and Israelis.  The Israeli voters have established that they are not in favor of any major concessions, and concessions to whom?  Hamas, which has fired missiles over their homeland?  Certainly not Abbas, who has flimsy legitimacy—if any at all—among the Palestinians.  In the meantime, Israeli leaders might feel smug that they have established their deterrence, and Palestinians will think twice before launching more missiles toward Israel.   The new republic of fear is as much on shaky grounds as the ones led by Arab dictators.

Regardless of whether you are among those who are baffled about the economic problems that continue to ail the U.S. with no end in sight, or among those who are cheering the noisy fall of the mightiest among nations, here is one of the most cogent explanations that Nathan Gardels provides in the Fall 2008 issue of the New Perspectives Quarterly about the grim situation that the lone uberpower faces.  He writes:

In the space of a few short months, we have morphed from the citadel of free-market capitalism and freewheeling consumerism — from a land of high-flying hedge funds, Hummers and homes that doubled as ATMs — to a system in which the banks, insurance companies, mortgage industry and auto manufacturers are quasi-socialized

The tax-and-spend epithet that defined America’s partisan politics for decades has been replaced overnight with a bipartisan mantra calling for a nearly trillion-dollar fiscal stimulus. No sooner had Milton Friedman been laid to rest (he died in 2006) than John Maynard Keynes was resurrected. Amazingly, even the historical aversion to state-guided industrial policy in the United States has yielded to urgent demands for political oversight of private enterprise, starting with the Big Three automakers in Detroit.

The year 2008 is thus likely to go down in American history as an even more pivotal one than 2001, when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred, because the life of the average American is going to be shaped far more by the consequences. We’re not talking about the inconvenience of lining up to go through metal detectors at the airport.

Notwithstanding these gloomy, albeit realist, annotations, there is no single power over the global horizon that is willing to or capable of replacing the uberpower.  However, the need for creating new approaches aimed at averting America’s decline has never before more urgent and imminent than now.

NOT RELEVANT NATO

The NATO is popular and unpopular, and relevant and irrelevant at the same time.  How can it be?  The chief reason is that at the conclusion of the first decade of the 21st Century, NATO members seem to treat it like a social club where they want to be seen, but do not want to pay the membership dues in blood.  That is right.  That is the price of membership that the European members must pay.  The United States wants to continue its occupation of Afghanistan, but under the flags of NATO.  It wishes to Europeanize an American-preferred war, which promises to become more intense and bloodier under the presidency of Barack Obama than it has been under George W. Bush.

Obama’s biggest shock is awaiting him in Afghanistan.  He has stated that he will focus on seeking international cooperation in solving global problems.  However, as a recent Pew Research Center report notes, “he will have to navigate a world that has grown highly critical of the United States.”

The Islamist forces do not care about their loss of life in their battle in Afghanistan—indeed, they appear eager to die.  But the Europeans do care.  After all, Europe is a region where war is supposed to have become a thing of the past as a means of settling disputes.  But for the Islamist forces, conflict is the only way to defeat the West out of Afghanistan, as they did the communist superpower in the 1980s.

In view of these widely stark perspectives on settling a conflict, NATO is facing, from within, mounting pressure related to its relevance.  One option for its members is to get out of Afghanistan; another is to buy into the U.S. seriousness and commitment to winning in that country.  However, winning means by shedding the blood of European soldiers, while the public opinion in various countries of that region is least gung-ho on winning in Afghanistan at any cost.  More to the point, the same Pew Center report states, “Opposition to key elements of American foreign policy is widespread in Western Europe, and positive views of the U.S. have declined steeply among many of America’s longtime European allies.”

Stay tuned. 

NO HE CAN’T

Despite his often-repeated mantra of “Yes we can,” President Barack Obama is bound to face the reality of “No he can’t” in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  The asymmetric war launched by Hamas is not promising for that organization, since Israel is determined to make Hamas the object of its resolve to reestablish its invincibility.  That invincibility was seriously shattered in its war against the Hezbollah in July 2006.  But pacifying Gaza is not out of the question, especially when Egypt is doing Israel’s bidding by closing its borders.

In comes President Obama next week.  He has already established his partisanship by observing free minority report , “If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I’m going to do everything in my power to stop that. And I would expect Israelis to do the same thing.” 

Granted, he made that statement as a presidential candidate who was vying for Jewish votes in the United States.  It will be interesting to see how he wiggles out of that position.  As Obama acquires experience in foreign policy, he will realize that making such observations without having an historical understanding of who is tormentor and who is tormentee will shatter his credibility as an honest broker, if he continues that practice as President.  Then, it will not be long before the Arab and the Muslim side will envision little difference between him and his immediate predecessor.  The time is fast approaching for Obama to spell out the specifics of “Yes we can” regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

LET’S BAN THE LeT, ONCE AND FOR ALL!

It appears that an arrested “fighter,” Zarrar Shah, has confessed to Pakistani authorities that Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), indeed, was involved in the Mumbai massacre in November.  

The first step for Pakistan is to ban the LeT, and not allow it to resurface by adopting another name.  That also means the end of an era when Pakistan used shady and murderous entities in the Indian-administered Kashmir.

The second measure should be to put the LeT’s leaders on trial and give them the stiffest possible sentence under the law.  The extradiction of any of them to India is out of the question, for legal as well as for political reasons.  Only the United States can make such demands from Pakistan and make it stick.  So, it behooves India to let the Paksitani legal process work this issue. 

Finally, if Pakistan were to go through the charade of trying the LeT and then put them under house arrest, then it ought to be brought to the international scrutiny.  The punishment for terrorizing India has to be the threat of labelling Pakistan a rogue nation.

The U.S. turned Iraq into hell between 2005 and 2006; Pakistan is steadily edging toward becoming a hellish place in the post-9/11 era; and Afghanistan is heading in that direction.  In the Horn of Africa, a similar situation prevails.

In the post-9/11 era, the militarily powerful nations have taken it upon themselves to set the “rules of engagement” for wars or war-like violence in Muslim lands, while the extremists are letting loose violence and mayhem from their side.  Iraq had its killing fields between 2005 and 2007, and Afghanistan’s most “fertile” killing fields started in the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union invaded it with a view to incorporating it into the Soviet empire.  Those killing fields continue to multiply in the first decade of the 21^st Century.  Lebanon’s killing fields come alive periodically, and—in view of its highly explosive internal dynamics—that country seems at the precipice of witnessing them on a regular basis.  Gaza’s killing fields are getting bloodier by the hour.  

The chief victims of this bloody phenomenon are the ordinary people, whose main aspirations is are to have productive careers, raise families, and live happily.  But happiness is increasingly becoming a rare commodity.

Here is the essence of the problem in many Muslim countries:  The U.S. has decided to wage violence in the name of that awful phrase “global war on terrorism,” which is as meaningless as the “war on poverty.”  Terrorism, like poverty, has been around forever, and no use of military power alone will eradicate it from the face of the earth.  Awful concepts like “regime change,” “preemptive war,” and the “war of choice” were applied to Muslim countries.  George W. Bush’s warning, “either you are with us or with the terrorists,” was also largely aimed at Muslim countries. 

The United States encountered something called the “Iraqi quagmire,” and almost lost its war in that country until the Sunni Muslims came to its rescue.  The same group (Sons of Iraq) is still crucial for the durability of peace and continued success of America’s “surge” strategy.  A strategy, which was aimed at clearing the hostile territory, by holding it, stationing security forces, and by rebuilding civilian authority and economic development.  But that is just one precondition; the other being a systematic inclusion of Sunni Muslims in the governance of Iraq.  Iraq remains a work in progress.  It is likely to return to its instability of 2005-2007, if the Sunnis do not become an important part of its ruling circles.

Israel has adopted the same approach—letting loose its military fury—in the name of establishing its “credible deterrence” among Arab nations, especially since it was humiliated by the Hezbollah in the “war” of July-August 2006.  Purely on a force-on-force basis, Israel did not lose that war.  Its mistake was that it established very precise goals of eradicating Hezbollah and having its own captive soldiers released.  When those objectives were not achieved and Israel stopped bombing Southern Lebanon, both the Western and the Arab media declared it the “loser” of that war.  To Israel’s bitter resentment, the Hezbollah not only survived, but became an inordinately popular organization in the Arab streets, as well as in Lebanon.  As such, it also challenged the governing authority of the U.S.-backed government of Premier Fouad Siniora.  Siniora has remained a weak head of the government in Lebanon primarily, if not solely, because Washington supports him.  Consequently, the legitimacy of the government in Lebanon remains shaky, at best. 

It has been a long-established fact that no outside power can institute its credibility inside a country through the use of military force or through occupation alone.  That is a universal principle. 

Syria learned that lesson at the end of many years of occupying Lebanon.  The U.S. has also learned that bitter reality after remaining an occupying power in Iraq for the past eight years.  It is likely to face the same fate in Afghanistan.  Israel refuses to learn that lesson as it invades Gaza and remains an occupying power of Palestine.  The gloomiest fact of that occupation is that the mounting toll of Palestinians will create new generations of even more enduring—and even more radical-minded—resistance to Israel than Hezbollah and Hamas have thus far demonstrated.

Unlike the historical accord between the U.S. military and the Sons of Iraq, no basis of rapprochement has been established between Israel and the Palestinians.  The Oslo Peace Accords of the early 1990s are long dead and buried.  Israel does not want to trade land for peace, and the Palestinians are much too divided to offer the Jewish state a great deal of confidence that they are ready to live in peace with their Jewish counterparts. 

Israel played a crucial role, if not in the creation of Hamas, then in definitely enhancing the presence and clout of that organization in the occupied territory many years ago.  As an Israeli historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Zeev Sternell, stated, “Israel thought that it was a smart ploy to push the Islamists against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).”  Today, Hamas is the governing authority in Gaza.  Ironically, Israel’s stated objective of waging a war against Gaza is to weaken, if not eliminate, Hamas. 

However, no matter how badly the military conflict damages Hamas, it is likely to emerge as the most popular organization within the occupied Palestine as well as in the rest of the Muslim world.  According to a news dispatch from Egypt, “As the war in Gaza burned though its 14^th day, Arab governments have felt their legitimacy challenged with an uncommon virulence.”  It adds, “With each passing day, and each Palestinian death, the popularity of Hamas and other radical movements has ratcheted higher on the Arab street, while the standing of Arab leaders has suffered.”

The frustrations of the Arab masses stem from a reason that is larger than the occupation of Palestine, even though the mounting suffering of the Palestinians is also adding further fuel to those frustrations.  The chief reason for the Arab frustrations is the presence of authoritarian rule, which lingers on like an eternal curse over their existence.  From their point of view, their collective suffering will not end unless the United States stops supporting the status quo in their countries.  From the U.S. side, that authoritarian rule-based status quo is preferred over the alternative–the return of Islamist rule.  Two examples continue to haunt the U.S. decisionmakers–the Islamist-dominated rule in Iraq and the successful emergence of Hamas as the ruling entity after the elections of January 2006.  The Arab autocrats in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia suffer from the same fear.  The emergence of Hamas as the governing body over Palestine did not end their internal turbulence. 

The plight of the Palestinians was worsened when, after a bitter fight between Hamas and Fatah in June 2007, the latter took over the West bank, while Hamas maintained its political control of Gaza.  However, Hamas was unable to make a breakthrough regarding reaching a peace an agreement with Israel. 

Egypt did bring about a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in June 2008.  That agreement ended early last November.  The fact that Hamas was describing that agreement as tahdiya (a period of calm, which is temporary), as opposed to hudna (truce, which is concrete and lasting) underscored the fact that it was only a tactical maneuver.  The leaders of Hamas were adamant about describing on Al-Jazeera a tahdiya as “a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the framework of the resistance [meaning all forms of struggle].” The Israelis were not willing to fall for that ploy.  That so-called tahdiya ended early last November.  The escalating violence between the two sides since then has led to the Israeli military invasion of Gaza.

The systematic destruction of the already feeble institutional infrastructures and mounting human misery has already transformed Gaza into a hellish place.  Even though Hamas challenged Israel, and even though Hamas is also largely responsible for the breakdown of the tahdiya, the fact that Israel has been wreaking major havoc and is responsible for mounting civilian deaths in Gaza, Hamas’ popularity is most likely to escalate.  

In a perverse way, similar conditions prevail in Afghanistan.  The Western occupation forces are attempting to strengthen the authority of the government of President Hamid Karzai, whom most Pushtoon regard as a puppet of the United States.  The legitimacy of the Karzai government is a shrinking commodity.  Historically speaking, the occupiers of Afghanistan—from Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union—have faced nothing but bloody battles and resulting defeat.  The Taliban—who are primarily Pushtoon—know that fact only too well.  They also know that history is on their side, as long as they do not let up on the use of violence.  The United States cannot afford to lose in Afghanistan, and the Taliban refuse to seek a rapprochement with the Karzai government.  In the process, Afghanistan has become a hellish place.

No single actor is more responsible in Pakistan’s emergence as a highly unstable country than Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Huq.  The former started the process of Islamization of that country, and the latter took it to the extreme.  The practice of using an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam, which was intensified under Zia’s rule, was continued under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, but with a different twist. 

Zia was forthright about his commitment to the extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam and used it unabashedly to maintain himself in power.  Musharraf, on the contrary, was duplicitous and cunning.  He presented the face of moderation toward the American interlocutor, while sustaining his alliance with the Islamists inside his country, especially in Baluchistan and in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The extremist Islamist forces had a clear sense that Musharraf was creating a façade of suppressing or containing them.  They understood that game and played along until they decided to take on the Army, after the massacre at the Lal Masjid (red mosque) on July 13, 2007.  That bloody event marked the beginning of the end of the Musharraf regime.  But when he was forced out of office and democracy returned to Pakistan, it was a feeble government while extremist forces were very much on the offensive.

The continued escalated pace of violence—which resulted in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, and an assassination attempt on the life of Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani on September 3, 2008—numerous suicide attacks and the resultant deaths of civilians as well as military personnel, leave little doubt about the march of Pakistan toward further instability.

As the United States gets ready to enlarge the presence of its troops in Afghanistan, the biggest question is whether the Surge strategy can be successfully implemented in Afghanistan.  Even if one were to be optimistic about such prospects, it should be kept in mind that stability and security of Afghanistan has been intrinsically linked to the security and stability of Pakistan since the 1980s.  The United States has known that fact.  But, under the administration of President Barack Obama, it might not remember, at its own peril.

In summarizing the overall situation in many Muslim countries, what is needed in Gaza, for starters, is a reinstatement of indirect negotiations between the parties, with Egypt serving, once again, as an intermediary.  After that, the only alternative for the Obama administration will be to plunge itself into endless rounds of negotiations, first with Hamas and Fatah, and then by bringing all Arab and Israeli contenders to the negotiating table. 

Even under the heap of mounting bitterness, the Palestinians know that the United States is the only actor that can exercise its influence on Israel.  This is not about putting pressure on the Jewish state.  Israelis know better than anyone else that there is no way they can resolve the conflict with the Palestinians by resorting to military force alone.   However, there is no denial of the significant role of an intermediary.  And only the U.S. can play that role, largely because Israel trusts the U.S., and also because it is a major recipient of U.S. military and economic assistance.  Besides, the Obama administration does not carry the same baggage of high partisanship that the Bush administration demonstrated toward Israel.

In South Asia, there is an urgent need for the application of a new “surge” strategy.  Such a strategy must treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as two sides of the same coin and it should be multi-dimensional.  Its features include massive economic assistance, revision of educational curricula, building of civilian infrastructure, implementation of civil-military relations that assign supremacy of civilian authority, eradication of the opium trade culture, and elimination of the proliferation of small arms from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

The chief tactic to escalate the feeling of security in the Pakistani ruling circles (of which the Pakistan Army is the most important part) is to ensure that India has minimal diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.  Any heightened Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan—which is the current reality on the ground—will motivate Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan, fearing collusion between Afghanistan and India, whose purpose it is to destabilize Pakistan.  A general suspicion is that Pakistan’s highly secretive intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), sponsored the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Afghanistan in July 2008. 

The most unfortunate part of the current reality is that both Pakistan and Afghanistan have become fertile places for the mushrooming of extremism.  The deteriorating quality of life in those countries—as is also the case in occupied Palestine—is definitely adding further momentum for the growth of that phenomenon.  No simple solution that comprises only the use of military force will work.  In the pre-surge days, Iraq was the primary example of that fact.  It was only through the multidimensional application of the surge strategy that Iraq is making steady progress toward political stability.  That reality becomes a powerful argument for the implementation of the aforementioned multidimensional strategy in Afghanistan.

There is some reason to be optimistic, however, that the United States will develop a sophisticated understanding of the significance of Pakistan in the coming days.  According to a recent New York Times dispatch, the outgoing Bush administration has handed over to the Obama transition team a lengthy report on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That report concluded, “that in the end, the United States has far more at stake in preventing Pakistan’s collapse than it does in stabilizing Afghanistan or Iraq.”

As a young man, I vaguely remember Ahmad Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, along with Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Josip Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as leaders of the non-aligned movement (NAM), championing the independence and solidarity of Afro-Asian countries.  In Third-World countries, the NAM was a big deal.  Countries forming the NAM characterized themselves as a “moral force,” refusing to align themselves either with the United States or with the Soviet Union. 

When Sukarno was ousted in 1965 and General Mohammad Suharto came to power, Indonesia became an inward looking country.  Suharto did not have the charisma of Sukarno.  He was a military man who had to get a lot of on-the-job training to rule a country of the complexity of Indonesia.  Besides, Suharto was accused of coming to power through the covert actions of the then declining hegemon, the U.K., and one of the superpowers, the United States.  In that capacity, he was seen as the “stooge” of the West.  Indonesia was thus denied the major role it might have played if its political order were not shaped by those countries to fulfill the Anglo-American requirements of winning the Cold War. 

In the early-to-mid 1990s, Indonesia emerged as one of the countries showing promise of economic progress.  Then it became one of the victims of the economic crisis of 1997-1998.  The promise of progress of Suharto’s “new era” turned into a pipedream.  But the Indonesians still came out on top by using that economic calamity to return to democracy, which was introduced in that country through an admirable demonstration of popular will.  Suharto was ousted and democracy marched in with promises of worldwide support so crucial for Indonesia’s future.

The Indonesians that I met during my visit belong to two groups.  The first one depicts Suharto as a dictator and a person responsible for holding back the introduction of democracy.  But they also regard him as a president who allowed a controlled political interaction and tug-and-pull among various parties and pressure groups in his country.  He was not a maverick, but his regime, wittingly or unwittingly, laid the ground for a time when Indonesia would become a democracy.  The second group—arguably a minority—regards Suharto as a great leader, whose aspirations for the role of Indonesia was interrupted as a result of the economic crisis of 1997, which also brought the regime change in that country.

In my estimation, Indonesia is a natural place for the continuation of democracy.  It is a laid-back culture.  People, as a matter of general practice, are polite toward each other.  They almost invariably smile when they speak to each other, even to strangers.  The plural nature of its polity makes it essential that democracy should thrive there.  There are, to be sure, angry groups and voices of extremes in Indonesia.  However, their very presence underscores the fact that it is a very complex country, and a place where a variety of human contradictions coexist.  It is also a country that defies simplistic categorizations, explanations, and descriptions.

I went to Indonesia for political and cultural education. I wanted to develop a reasonable sense of what the country is all about.  I wanted to meet its political, military, and academic leaders to ask them probing questions on a variety of issues of “high politics” of that country.

Indonesia is one of the largest countries in East Asia.  Yet I heard virtually nothing about the potentials or promise of its emergence as the next rising power of Asia from its citizens.  Sitting in Honolulu, Hawaii, I regularly scan the political horizons of East Asia via the Internet, and capture the essence of almost all major events affecting most countries.  However, most of the press coverage on Indonesia I found dealt with topics related to the Jemah Islamiyya (JI).  I did not find adequate coverage of other substantive issues.

But Indonesia is much too large and enormously complex to have been reduced by the international media as a place where a terrorist organization still exists.  I wanted to know why the world is not hearing from Indonesia about its aspirations to become the third rising power of Asia.  It has the physical size, it has a very large population, and it has an important strategic location stemming from its proximity to the Strait of Malacca.  Both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have long recognized that country’s significance.  Yet, I did not encounter any discussion inside that country on that topic.

During the days of the Suharto dictatorship, the Indonesian economy was doing quite well, before it was hammered by the economic crisis of 1997.  The economic turbulence made the Indonesians angry enough to throw the dictator out and bring democracy to their country.  It is possible that the evolution of democratic leadership will take some time before a visionary leader emerges in that country. 

Indonesia, in my estimation, needs a Deng Xiaoping, who would not only give that country a blueprint for modernization, but would motivate its citizens to strive for it.  I recognize that the spectacular success of the Deng Xiaoping template is largely the result of the fact that the PRC is a communist system, where mobilization of the economy is done from the top down and through autocratic means.  I am also aware that the very democratic characteristic of Indonesia forces that country to look for a different path. 

In my quest for explanations regarding Indonesia, I was looking for a leader who would challenge the Indonesians to aspire for modernization, for fast-paced economic development, and for regional leadership.  I was looking for a leader in that country who would inspire the Indonesians to think big as Deng did, or as Nehru did, when he talked about India’s “tryst with destiny.”  Leaders inspire a nation.  In a democracy, the legislature plays a crucial role in transforming that inspiration and that vision into specific public policies and programs.

I found no major debates inside that country about Indonesia’s big dream or mega-aspirations.  Indonesians are not cynical about thinking big.  In these uncertain times, perhaps they are too focused on daily survival at the expense of everything else.  Perhaps they think that the time for dreaming big dreams has not yet arrived.  But leaders are responsible for dreaming big visions and sharing them with their people.  In autocratic societies, those dreams are shared through a process of propaganda and regimented mobilization.  No one believes that a developmental model that pushes Indonesia toward mobilization from the top is feasible.  In democracies, leaders attempt to persuade their constituents to believe in their vision. 

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, depicted as a cautious man, might be doing just that.  Perhaps he is too cautious to indulge in thinking big ideas.  I do not know much about the type of people that are assembled around him to plan the future modalities of Indonesia’s growth.  Since there are no voluble conversations about Indonesia’s “tryst with destiny,” it is reasonable to deduce that the President’s advisors are like him.  As technocrats, they are overly cautious and are driven by a steely sense of realism about what is feasible and achievable for their country in the near future.

While I noticed this lack of proactivism, or zeal, at the top leadership level, I was very impressed with the evolution of civil society in Indonesia, which is a vital requirement for the sustenance and permanence of democracy. 

The young Indonesians are highly curious and interested in what is transpiring in their region and the world.  I gave a lecture at a Christian university.  The topic of discussion was how China’s military modernization will affect Asia, especially Southeast Asia.  The average age of my audience was between 18-20 years. 

They were very curious about China, especially its ties with their country. 

I was equally impressed when I spoke at a gathering of the mass organization, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) or Islamic Students Association.  This is described as a moderate Islamic party and an entity that is a strong advocate of modernizing Indonesia.  Once again, the average age of the attendees was between 18-20 years.  They were quite inquisitive about how Indonesia is seen by the United States and by the world of Islam at large.  They wanted to know why Americans refer to Islam as a religion that “endorses” terrorism.  They were very interested about the prospects of visiting the U.S. for higher education.  I was told that the HMI was one of the most vibrant Islamic entities of Indonesia.  It had produced several luminaries, including Dr. Fuad Bawazier, an American-educated economist who was Finance Minister in Suharto’s cabinet.  It should be noted, however, that his detractors call him “a crony of the Suharto family.”

My advice to the young members of the HMI was that they should continue to pursue religious moderation and work hard to push their country to become a highly productive member of the globalized world.  At one point, I cannot remember exactly why, but I asked them how many of those youngsters regard Jemah Islamiyya as a terrorist group.  I wanted a show of hands. 

To my surprise (and I might add, to my dismay), no one raised a hand.  The environment in the room became palpably awkward.  One young man raised his hand to ask me how I define terrorism.  As much as I did not want to fall into the definitional trap, I defined terrorism as an act that is aimed at perpetrating violence in order to publicize a cause without any regard to the consequences.  The same young man smiled nervously and told me that there was no evidence of the JI’s perpetration of violence in his country.  When I heard that type of response, I knew I had reached an impasse and needed to move on to another topic.

Other than few awkward moments, my interaction with those youngsters was highly positive.  Since I do not know what type of pressure they are under on the issue of the JI, and since I have no way of judging the exact reason why no one wanted to be seen by others as a person agreeing to the proposition that JI is a terrorist organization, I am neither going to become pessimistic about my audience, nor am I willing to pass any harsh judgment.  Besides, it is very easy for a visitor to ask even awkward questions and leave.  But the honest respondent has to live in the society and face the consequences of being honest.

Islam not only is an important religion in Indonesia, but it also makes the observant very proud of their faith.  They remain both on the defensive and annoyed about the fact that their religion is under attack.  They have too many stories of bigotry and chauvinism to narrate with visitors to prove their point.  During my meeting with fifteen professors from three universities in Bandung, one young academician told me how racist Australians had been toward him during his two-year stay in that country.  One immigration officer at an Australian airport kept calling him Mohammad, which was his middle name.  He also asked him whether he was a terrorist.  I have never been to Australia.  Thus, I have no unhappy anecdotes to share along those lines.  However, hearing similar stories with a number of Muslim acquaintances that have lived in Australia, I know some Australians have a problem on this issue.

Indonesia is undergoing a revolution in the realm of modern education.  A number of its universities are given high marks by outside assessors for ceaselessly incorporating qualitative changes in their standards of excellence.  In a meeting with the Rector of the University of Indonesia, I had the pleasant experience of getting acquainted with his ambitious plans in the realm of escalating the pace of research in the hard sciences, as well as in the social sciences,, in the coming years.

The Indonesian press is vibrant and free.  Reading English newspapers in Indonesia, I had to remind myself that I was visiting a Muslim country (since in most Muslim countries absence of freedom of the press is a sine qua non of daily life).  There was front-page coverage of prostitutes in Jakarta demanding rights to practice their trade, and protection from harassment or abuse.  I am sure, followers of various religions had definite views on the subject.  However, the fact that the topic was given front-page coverage spoke volumes about the freedom of the press in that country.

Indonesia is an unassuming giant that is in the process of transforming itself.  Unlike China and India, that transformation is not coming along with a bang.  However, it is, indeed, in the making.  If its economy is not jolted in the coming years by any unanticipated calamity (as it was during the economic crisis of 1997-1998), it promises to become the third rising power of Asia within the next two decades.  It does need an Indonesian version of Deng Xiaoping to offer it a list of modernizations.  It does need a Nehru-like leader to give it a clarion call of a “tryst with destiny.”

President Yudhoyono is performing a very important task of solidifying the democratic framework and nourishing democratic egalitarianism.  In the process, he is likely to slip and falter.  But that is how democracies evolve: through a process of trial and error.  Throughout that process, the commitment to democracy should not be allowed to break or to be interrupted.  In that fashion, Indonesia is likely to reach the promise of greatness that it and its people deserve.

When my trip came to an end, I had more questions than I had answers.  My next trip to Indonesia should be more interesting, in the sense that I can assess how correct I was in arriving at a number of conclusions during this one.  When I left that country, I wished I had had more time to see those whom I could not, and visit more places.  But such a feeling also becomes a good reason to revisit Indonesia, for which I have a special place in my heart.  As my plane was speeding down the runway, I gave one last good look to its fertile ground.  Until next time, au revoir, Indonesia!