The worst victim of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not the “shock and awe” created by its armed forces in ousting Saddam Hussein’s regime.  The real shocking development was witnessed when the United States became a “pitiful and helpless giant” (to quote Senator William Fulbright’s famous observation that he used in the context of the Vietnam war) between 2004 and 2008, because of the chaos and mayhem perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents and the global Islamist forces, who made Iraq their favorite battleground for the “infidel’s” invading forces.  The second shocking development was the rising tsunami of Iran’s influence in Iraq, emanating from the creation of a Shia-dominated democracy after the ouster of Saddam’s regime.

 George W. Bush’s notion of making Iraq a part of Pax-Americana in the Middle East entered the quicksand of Iraq.  That country’s Sunni neighbors – Saudi Arabia and Jordan – had no clue how to counter Iran’s influence at a time when even the Sunni minority of Iraq was equally clueless about how to keep themselves from becoming completely marginalized inside their own country.  King Abdullah of Jordan and President Husni Mubarak of Egypt famously (or infamously) expressed the darkest fears of the Sunni Arab leadership when they talked about the new “Shia crescent” that they perceived as expanding its influence across the Arab world.  Mubarak even went to the extent of appallingly questioning the loyalty of Iraqi Shias, when he wondered out loud whether they were more loyal to Iran than to their own countries.

 What perplexed the Sunni leaders was that, while Iraq was getting deeply immersed in chaos, the Bush administration was also making a lot of noise about spreading democracy all across the Middle East.  Before the realities of the limitations of the United States’ actions in Iraq became fully apparent to Bush, he remained the foremost representative of America’s hubris related to its vision of creating pax-Americana in the Middle East.

 The Arab fear about Iran is a mixture of the latter’s rising clout, not only in Iraq, but also in Lebanon and in the Hamas-governed Gaza strip.  The roots of this fear are deep and stretch across a timeline that underscores the emergence of Iran as a Shia state under the Safavid dynasty since the 15^th Century.  They also are related to the success of Shia Islam in establishing an Islamic government in Iran that also replaced a monarchy, which was staunchly pro-American.  In this capacity, the Iranian revolution caused considerable loss of sleep in the Arab capitals of the Persian/Arabian Gulf region.  Arab monarchs could not foresee a future when they – like the Shah of Iran when he was ousted from power – would be desperately seeking asylum inside their region or in the European capitals. 

Add that fear to the Arab anxieties about Iran’s rising influence in post-Saddam Iraq.  That was also a variable that even the “best and the brightest” of the CIA or the U.S. State Department’s strategic planning section failed to include in their strategic analyses.  But when Iran’s nuclear research program became a highly visible source of contention between Tehran and Washington, and when Iran continued to abandon that program, Arab leaders started to worry about the long-term implications of a “nuclear” Iran. 

Even without nuclear weapons, Iran remains a formidable military power vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors.  If it were to be armed with nuclear weapons, the gap in the power differentials between Iran and any or all Arab states combined would never be filled, no matter how much they spend their precious capital in purchasing Western conventional military hardware.  However, if Iran’s nuclear capabilities were to be destroyed by the Americans or the Israelis, the Arab states would not have to worry about never being able to surpass Iran militarily.  They could condemn such actions but take a collective sigh of relief.  This is the real context of King Abdullah’s urging to General Petraeus and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to “crush the head of the snake [meaning Iran]” by attacking its nuclear plants.

In the wake of the disclosures of those and other comments on Iran, it will be interesting to see what kind of “kabuki dance” Arab leaders will perform while they attempt to explain away to leaders in Tehran why they wanted the United States to take military action against Iran.  It might not be an exaggeration to state that the basis of the Arab-Iran antagonism might have only deepened as a result of the WikiLeaks disclosures.  That may still be good news for those in the Obama administration and in Jerusalem who are predisposed toward taking military action against Iran.

Iran refuses to close down its nuclear research program; and, despite all its assertions that it is not interested in making nuclear weapons, Washington believes that that is precisely the direction Iran is heading.

Iran also has a very active ballistic missile program. And the United States is afraid that it is just a matter of time before Iran will not only put all the systems together to build a bomb, but it will also be able to integrate its nuclear weapons with its delivery system.

There is also much substance to the United States’ suggestion that Iran might have already acquired a bomb-making capability and might be waiting on an appropriate time for its “breakout” announcement — a term used, in the parlance of nuclear proliferation, to describe a surprise announcement of a country whereby it renounces the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and uses it capabilities to build a small nuclear weapon.

The most striking aspect of the Obama administration is that, in the past several weeks, while it was involved in issuing its nuclear posture review and signing a new nuclear arms reduction treaty and then holding a “summit” on the issue of “loose nukes,” it never interrupted its focus on Iran.

Russia, while signing the nuclear arms reduction treaty, falsely created an impression that it was willing to side with the United States in imposing sanctions on Iran. A more correct interpretation of Russia’s attitude toward Iran is that it still wants to discuss the option of negotiating with that country, and is not at all interested in imposing the kind of harsh sanctions that the pro-Israeli elements in the United States would love to see implemented.

The same thing is also true for China. In fact, after the loose nukes summit, China has made it clear that it is not as much in the corner of the United States as the American media made it out to be immediately prior to, and in the aftermath of, that summit.

The presence of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in the thick of policy discussions on Iran becomes important when one considers his long experience in the realm of national security, and the fact that he is very much in the forefront of developing a comprehensive strategy.

However, the role of Admiral Mike Mullen remains a source of concern when one considers the fact that one of his top “informal” advisers on the Middle East is a woman by the name of Dr. Lani Kass, a holder of Israeli and American citizenship. One is befuddled by the fact that a holder of dual citizenship is given top Department of Defense clearance, while Israel’s use of such persons as spies against us is a known fact. Dubbed as “Dr. Strangelove made in Israel,” an essay written by a former CIA agent, Philip Giraldi, describes Kass as rabidly anti-Iran and an equally staunch Islamophobe.

As reported by Giraldi, Kass told her U.S. Air Force audience that, “the long war against the Islamists will end ‘when they learn to love their children more than they hate us,’ a comment originally attributed to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.” On another occasion she said, “radical Muslims hate the western world because Europe took their dominant political position away and they want it back.” This is a diatribe that Bernard Lewis has been peddling to the Western audience in the name of his “expert analysis.”

She is also on record as being more audacious than she was in the afore-cited quotes. This time, she disposed of the nuance between Muslims and radical Muslims and included all Muslims in her fictional “expertise” on the world of Islam. Giraldi notes, “In her speech she explained that Muslims hate western culture and want to dominate the world, adding that because radical Islam has a ‘culture of death’ all those who do not submit to Islam must die, an assertion so absurd that one suspects her political analysis derives from the Free Republic website.” Not surprisingly, no one in her audience questioned the veracity of that comment or demanded any evidence.
Regarding Iran, Kass is totally sold on the use of military option. She is reported to have said, “We can defeat Iran, but are Americans willing to pay the price?” In other words, she is very much gung ho on going to war against Iran. Her comments remind one of two other women who were way ahead of even the Bush administration in their fictional belief that, between 2001 and 2003, Iraq was fully engaged in making weapons of mass destruction: Judith Miller of the New York Times and Laurie Mylroie, who coauthored a book on Iraq. A detailed narrative of the roles of these two women is provided in Michael Isikoff and David Corn’s book, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War.
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The question that is uppermost in my mind is why has Admiral Mullen decided to rely on such a highly partisan source for advice on the Middle East. Don’t we already have enough of a horrible image on being extremely one-sided when it comes to the strategic affairs of that region? More to the point, why is Admiral Mullen not getting his cue from the White House, which seems bent on pursuing policy options to take into consideration, first and foremost, American interests?

If America’s miserable record of going to war against Iraq on imaginary evidence, the cherry picking of intelligence, and in some instances even deliberately relying on highly deceptive sources (see the above-cited source), the only option that stands out in dealing with Iran is to avoid the military option at all costs. The only viable option is to negotiate, negotiate, or negotiate with that country.

Undoubtedly, implementation of the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine will be done widely, as the contagion of instability continues to spread from South Asia to its east in Central Asia and to its west in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, and the trans-Sahel region. The ghosts of Vietnam—about not giving COIN its fair due—are very much “alive.” Besides, the successful implementation of that doctrine in Iraq remains a powerful reason why it will (and should) also be implemented elsewhere. Besides, there is no other credible alternative for now.

There is a section in the draft document on “building regional capability.” The obvious focus is on Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. But it totally misses the differences in building capabilities in those three countries. The primary focus should be on massive nation-building, which will be different for each of them. In Pakistan, democracy has emerged from within, while in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been enforced by the American occupying forces. Despite enforcement by outsiders, democracy seems to be emerging as a successful form of government in Iraq. So, governments in Pakistan and Iraq play a crucial role in managing any external aid that flows from abroad to rebuild their respective governing capabilities, and for the evolution of a civil society therein.

But in Afghanistan, a number of member nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will play a lead role in nation-building. In the meantime, the most troubling aspect in Afghanistan is that the Karzai government has become the proverbial albatross around the neck of the Obama administration. The gravest mistake made by the United States was its failure to throw out the results of Karzai’s highly fraudulent reelection campaign and to organize an entirely new election.

The emphasis on building regional capabilities of the QDR 2010 draft is also a reminder of the Nixon administration’s “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War of the late 1960s and early 1970s. That concept was also implemented in the Middle East. Consequently, the United States learned to rely on the regime of Mohammad Reza of Iran as the gendarme of ensuring America’s dominance in the Persian Gulf region. What is different now is that there is no regime in West Asia or South Asia willing to go to that extent to defend America’s interests. In fact, all friendly regimes—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—are increasingly coming under heavy attack by forces of instability determined to impose their own version of radical Islamic order in those countries.

A continuing emphasis of the new QDR is discussed under the section “Enhance Language, Regional and Cultural Ability.” These are also issues on which the United States remains a hapless giant, not only in the Middle East, but also elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific. Michael Schauer’s book, Imperial Hubris, establishes the fact that the United States built a large body of knowledge on Afghanistan during its proxy war to defeat the Soviet Union in the 1980s. However, while dismantling the Taliban regime in 2001, no one made use of that knowledge. Whatever happened to that body of knowledge? Why are we not able to use it to fight the Taliban-al-Qaida nexus of today?

One glaring omission in the 2010 QDR draft is, while discussing the language capabilities in the cultural education of Pakistan and Afghanistan, it neglects to mention Urdu—the predominant and the official language of Pakistan; it only lists Pushtu and Dari—the two dominant languages of Afghanistan.

Under the section, “Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations,” the draft document mentions the U.S. challenge to forestall the fall of weak states, but it wrongly attributes the reasons for their weakness and impending fall to “humanitarian disasters.” That is akin to stating that someone’s bad cold is a result of their upset stomach. The real reasons for the impending fall of the regimes in Yemen, Afghanistan, and others are: the absence of good governance and the presence of chronic kleptocratic, highly inept, nepotistic, and, in some instances, obscurantist rule.

There is no doubt that fighting extremism and asymmetric war will preoccupy America’s powerful military well toward the end of the next decade. However, if one is looking for evidence that the United States is on top of its endeavors to tackle extremism, instability, poverty, and other reasons for the rapid spread of political instability from Asia to Africa, the draft QDR 2010 document is not very assuring. Listing the problems, but only coming up with another catalog of military platforms or operational or tactical approaches to respond to the rising tide of political instability, is not the solution. Perhaps, that is not the intent of the QDR. If true, then one might have to wait for the National Security Strategy of President Barack Obama to see whether the United States has developed a road map and applicable strategies for its long and arduous journey to stabilize the weak, weakening, or failed states.

If one watched the debates at the recently concluded World Economic Forum 2010, one was left with the definite feeling that the shift of global power is unremittingly becoming a potent trend. China’s emergence as the next superpower is already happening, more in the realm of economics and less in that of the military, for now. But that could also change within a matter of a decade or so. With an annual economic growth of 9 percent per annum, the Chinese economy is making the West envious of that phenomenon. The spillover effect of China’s economic growth is emerging in the form of its growing clout in Africa and South America, where the Chinese development model has become a new trend worth emulating, while the West is claiming “sour grapes,” by accusing China of using “checkbook diplomacy.” The African nations are also becoming increasingly envious of “China’s rise,” and are trying to figure out which aspects of China’s development they can incorporate in the not too distant future.

The European nations are also befuddled and even depressed as a result of a mounting sense of their irrelevance in the global arena. One recent example of that irrelevance was accentuated by the fact that President Barack Obama refused to attend the next U.S.-EU summit in Spain. His was reportedly unimpressed with the results of last year’s meeting held in Prague.

China’s reaction to the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan was rather harsh, in the sense that it threatened to impose sanctions on American companies involved in selling weapons platforms to Taiwan. Military contacts between Beijing and Washington are expected to come to a standstill.

At one level, China is only trying to emulate the United States when it habitually imposes economic sanctions on any country doing business with Iran. Yet, at another level, China’s threatened reaction is likely to trigger a trade war at a time when the protectionist forces inside the United States are chomping at the bit to come up with punitive measures in response to the traditionally nagging issues being discussed under the general rubric of “China’s unfair trade practices.”
An important question is why is China overacting to the U.S. weapons sale to Taiwan? After all, Beijing knew that was a leftover from the days of the Bush administration. China would have had a better reason for being annoyed, if the Obama administration had sold Taiwan the controversial F-16 C/D aircraft, which it recently requested.

The answer is that China may be feeling its oats as a rising power. After pronouncing that the chief purpose of its emergence (“rise” or “development”) is peaceful, the Chinese adopted a cooperative posture toward the lone superpower in finding solutions to the global economic meltdown in 2009.

It is possible that, after establishing an impressive record of cooperation with the lone superpower, China, as a quid pro quo, wanted the United States to show it special consideration by not selling arms to Taiwan. Such calculation, if true, ignores how serious the U.S. Congress remains in supporting a fledgling but nevertheless vibrant democracy in Taiwan. Besides, manifesting a change of mind about selling weapons to Taiwan, or even reluctance toward that option, would be harmful for the United States at a time when East Asia is undergoing palpable realignments among states in that area. So, at least from the U.S. side, not selling arms to Taiwan, or postponing it, would have been quite harmful.

Even though the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan remains an important source of U.S.-China discord, there is no doubt that it is likely to get over its annoyance on that issue. However, it is also likely to adopt its own version of quid pro quo by refusing to cooperate with Washington’s propensity for tightening the screws of economic sanctions on Iran, something that is also quite important to the Obama administration. In addition, Washington should not expect any major Chinese overtures about pressuring North Korea to be forthcoming in future negotiations on the nuclear weapons issue with the U.S.
In the final analysis, issues of “low politics” (as defined in this essay) are likely to intensify the U.S.-China rivalry in the coming months. No favors should go unrewarded; no exercise in realpolitik should go unreciprocated. That is the thinking of China’s up and coming mandarins, who are quickly learning the behavior of the superpower of the future!

The mounting protest against the Islamic Republic in Iran is in the process of becoming a social movement. Sidney Tarrow, a specialist on the subject, defines a social movement as collective challenges (to elites and authorities) by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities. He specifically distinguishes social movements from political parties and interest groups; and that is an important distinction. Social movements in the context of this essay are not known for bringing about incremental political changes in the existing political system. More often than not, they result in radical changes leading to regime change. If the Iranian government is facing a rising tide of social movement, then that can be the best news for the United States, which has always despised the Islamic Republic for humiliating it through the “Iranian hostage crisis” in 1979. The ties between these two countries have remained tense since then. Iran, under the Ayatollahs, has consistently and virulently opposed the U.S. hegemony of its region. It has viewed that strategic affair as threatening to its stability and, indeed, to its very survival. The most recent cause of conflict between the two antagonistic countries is Iran’s nuclear research program. A regime change brought about through a social movement might also be the best news for Israel, who wishes to maintain its own nuclear monopoly, which has remained an ignored reality. However, that reality has created an ostensibly permanent military asymmetry between the states of that region and Israel. The Arab states have remained silently resentful of it. Iran, on the contrary, has decided to challenge it by staring its own nuclear research program.

It takes awhile for social movements to build momentum. However, once that momentum is built, there is no stopping them. Their strength stems from the fact that the disparate groups who have nothing in common but opposition to the existing regime, pitch in to build the strength of such movements. However, once they achieve their aim by overthrowing the existing regime, they turn against each other, thereby creating the aforementioned violence, instability, and mayhem. Political changes brought about as a result of a social movement are of a radical nature. As such, they result in a period of instability, which may last from a few months to a few years.

The Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 was the outcome of a social movement, which as a general principle, was opposed to monarchy. Ayatollah Khomeini became a leading voice of that revolution, especially during the last two-to-three years of the Shah’s rule. As that movement was developing, there was certainty that the revolution would result in the establishment of an Islamic government. When the revolution swept through Iran, the monarchy was thrown into the dustbin of history. But it was only fortuitously that the Islamic forces gained an upper hand in that social movement. That is also another idiosyncratic effect of a social movement: the ultimate outcome might not have been a planned or an anticipated one.

Since the regime of Mohammad Reza was acutely pro-Western and was accused of neglecting the Islamic heritage of Iran, the religious forces, as a vanguard of the social movement, decided to transform the country into an Islamic Republic. There is no conclusive evidence that emergence of a theocratic regime was what the majority of those who shed their blood in Iran really wanted. However, once the Islamic Republic emerged, it was hoped that some sort of moderation would eventually surface, whereby Iran would emerge as a country where there would be a reasonable balance between the forces of moderation, modernization, and Islamic identity. Alternatively, it was hoped that, once the dust of the revolutionary turbulence settled, Iran would become a democracy. There was every reason to believe that democracy—even some sort of Islamic democracy—would come to Iran. The Shia clergy, unlike their Sunni counterparts, always maintained a social distance with the powers-that-be of Iran. In that capacity, they sustained their role as an anti-regime force. The powerful tradition of quietism– whereby the religious establishment was not supposed to be part of the governance, only its silent critics—was the intellectual and theological basis for that. However, when the principle of the Vilayat-e-Faqih (rule of the cleric) took roots in Iran, all hopes of moderation and democracy dissipated.

The leaders of Islamic Republic never opted for moderation. The notion of the Vilayat-e-Faqih was more suited to the personality of the late Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, who never really manifested moderation in his thinking. Still, the notion of Vilayat itself was revolutionary for three additional reasons. First, it rejected the conventional notion of quietism among the Shia clerics. That very fact created a permanent schism within the ranks of the grand Ayatollahs or Iran and Iraq. Second, given the revolutionary aura of Khomeini, his successors were not going to enjoy the kind of legitimacy that he himself enjoyed. The chief strength of Khomeini was that he provided a kind of charismatic leadership whose basis was both religious and revolutionary. Even a grand Ayatollah or a marja-e-taqleed—which is the highest religious title assigned to a Shia cleric—could not have been as well-versed in leading a revolutionary movement as Khomeini proved himself to be when he entered triumphantly in the streets of Tehran in 1979.

His successor, Ali Khameini, was not only a religious lightweight, when compared to Khomeini, but he could never prove himself to be a deft political leader of any substance. That very fact necessitated that he disallow the forces of moderation and reform to gain an upper-hand. The hardline Islamic rule became the order of the day and the Islamic revolution continued to lose its legitimacy. Third, as the Iranian population grew younger, the revolution itself continued to grow older, archaic and outdated, not just in the fact that its leaders had gotten old, but also because their thinking about governance in an increasingly globalized world had also became similarly obsolete. In that capacity, the only way that the leaders of the Iranian government knew to respond was through increased control, and by brutally trampling on the aspirations of the young Iranian to be governed by a legitimate government. That need, while it is being suppressed by the paramilitary Basij and the Revolutionary Guards, is evolving steadily into a social movement, which promises not only to overthrow the hardline rulers of Iran, but it also threatens the very continuance of the Islamic form of government in that country. As the protest movement is being suppressed, the brutality of the suppression itself is very much a reminder of the days of the Mohammad Reza’s rule. What is even more remarkable is that Khameini and his ilk are demonstrating a collective sense of dementia. They had forgotten how the quickly the powerful the regime of Mohammad Reza collapsed under the mounting pressure of the forces of the Islamic revolution.

The Iranian social movement is operating in an era when the flow of information is unstoppable. Even the communist rulers of China are finding out the hard way that the “great firewall” of China cannot stop the spread of information and the yearning of the masses to be free sooner or later. If anything, the worldwide coverage given to the brutality committed against the forces of freedom in Iran is only further rejuvenating those forces. YouTube website and Twitter messages are working in full force, spreading the potent images of the craving for freedom. Millions of people all over the world saw the murder of Nida Soltan, a young Iranian female, at the hand of a security person. No other evidence was damning enough to make a case of what the Iranian protestors are facing in that country. Her face has become as powerful a symbol of the Iranian social movement just as the image of the lone hooded prisoner became an emblem of the brutal face of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

There appears to be a contest between the tyrannical forces of the regime to brutalize the protestors and the resolve of the latter to absorb pain, yet come back with even more force to overthrow the regime, while spreading the pictures of brutality to all corners of the world. The information revolution was in the days of its infancy helped the explosion related to the Khomeini revolution in the 1970s, when his sermons and calls for overthrowing “America’s Shah” was heard by everyone who yearned for freedom even in the remote regions of Iran. Now the shoe is on the other foot as when the same information revolution in its primacy is transmitting pictures of the brutality of Islamic regime via cell phones and YouTube to far off corners of the world.

How secure is the regime?

The uppermost question now is how secure is the Islamic regime in Iran. While its downfall does not seem imminent, even that indication should not be a source of comfort for the Supreme Leader Khameini and his ilk. The upcoming month of February might be of significant import for the government as well as for the protestors. The government forces are likely to use it to do their utmost to reestablish the legitimacy of the Revolution, as they did by orchestrating pro-government demonstration during Ashura observance. The protestors are likely to use the February occasion to make a case that the Revolution was hijacked by the Khameini, Ahmadinejad and their paramilitary thugs, who are solely concerned about regime survival and without any regard to the Iranian populace.

The language of the protest movement—the constant chants of “death to dictators” and even damaging the posters bearing the image of Khomeini—is already becoming dangerously anti-Islamic Republic in nature. Still, its chief weakness stems from the fact that it has not yet found an alternate leader. There is no other Khomeini to lead the masses. The late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri was perceived as such a force. However, even while alive, he was too old and frail to lead another revolutionary movement. Mir Hussein Moussavi has been too tainted for his past ties with the Islamic Republic. Besides, he has not shown the kind of risk-taking that made Khomeini such an ominous force in the eyes of the pro-monarchy forces as far back as in the early 1960s. Besides, Moussavi, like the former president Ali Khatami, wants continuity of the Islamic Republic, but with a change in leadership. The social movement might no longer be willing to be satisfied with that kind of a change.

However, the Iranian political milieu is much too fertile to allow a leadership gap for too long. Another leader of the charisma of Khomeini, but one who is armed with radically different ideas, has to emerge soon enough. Otherwise, the social movement will lose its revolutionary spirit. That is how social movements—i.e., those who carry the flames of revolutionary change—operate.

Is there a foreign hand in the internal turbulence in Iran?

As much as the Middle East is famous for its conspiracy theories, one has to wonder whether the United States or other foreign powers are indeed involved in the current protest movement. If history teaches us anything about America’s involvement in that country, one cannot cavalierly or categorically dismiss the possibility of America’s non-involvement in fomenting Iran’s social movement. After all, the democratically elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq was overthrown by a combined operation carried out by the CIA and the British spy service in 1953.

Extrapolating that tradition to contemporary politics, the United States has a lot of reasons to see the demise of the Iranian government. Iran is the only remaining “confrontational” country of the Middle East. In that capacity, it has constantly challenged the strategic dominance of the United States and its proxy, Israel. It has never accepted the proposition that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved peacefully. Iran has backed up its confrontational stance against the U.S. and Israel by regularly supporting the Hamas position of “no negotiations.” In Lebanon, Iran has played a crucial role in thwarting the hegemonic designs of the Menachem Begin-Ariel Sharon axis in the 1980s by creating the Hezbollah as a paramilitary force. That party played a crucial role in the Israeli decision to finally pull out of Lebanon in 2000. That very same Hezbollah has enjoyed a new prestige in the Arab world by challenging Israel in July-August war of 2006 and surviving the intense Israeli air campaign that was aimed at destroying it. Consequently, the political clout of Hezbollah and Iran skyrocketed in the Middle East.

Iran has also played a crucial role in destabilizing Iraq between 2004 and 2008 in order to make sure that the U.S. forces do not decide to stay in that country permanently. Even as Iraq is experiencing political stability in 2010, Iran’s clout in Iraq has remained high, something that is the least welcomed reality for the U.S. occupation authorities.

In addition, by refusing to give up its nuclear research program, the Iranian government has given all the reasons for the United States to think that it aims to develop nuclear weapons. While insisting that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons, Iran has manifested an attitude of least flexibility. However, neither U.S. nor Israel believes the Iranian assurances.

The United States, on its part, has also maintained a sustained posture of confrontation and vitriolic rhetoric of condemnation of Iran. As far back as during the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan administration blatantly sided with the regime of Saddam Hussein. The operating rationale for such an approach was Iraq was perceived as a “lesser of the two evils.” Thus, it was the policy of the U.S. government to do all it could to ensure the defeat of Iran in that war, hoping that such a defeat would bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. When that did not happen, the United States remained a leading force of imposing economic sanctions on Iran hoping, once again, that the long-term effects of those sanctions would lead to regime change.

In view of the preceding, it is very hard to accept that the U.S. government may be a totally uninterested or an uninvolved party in the current Iranian political instability. Viewing strictly as an option, it behooves Washington that the current Iranian government is overthrown. That would remove a major thorn from the side of the lone superpower. It would also resolve the issue of Iranian commitment to nuclear research program without a military action. More to the point, Washington can live with the instability stemming in Iran stemming from the overthrow of the government through the apparent activities of a social movement than through a military action taken by a foreign power. The clandestine involvement of the U.S. or any other government can be talked about, but, as long as it cannot be proven, it is not likely to harm the U.S. interests in the Middle East, or so calculate the powers-that-be in Washington.

A potential overthrowing of the Islamic government in Iran provides no guarantee that the succeeding government will be pro-American. America’s prestige in the Middle East has remained all time low in the aftermath of its invasion and occupation of Iraq. Even the most pro-American governments of the Persian Gulf prefer not to show their support of the lone superpower either volubly or frequently. It is bad for the regime stability to be seen as a staunch supporter of the United States in the Persian Gulf region at a time when even the Saudi government is beginning to feel the rising flames ignited by the pro-al-Qaida forces in the neighboring Yemen. The speculations regarding a potential Iranian involvement in Yemen (in support of the Shia forces that are fighting the Saudis) abound. If that is true, then Iran might have found another way to sustain an upper hand over the alleged or potential American shenanigans related to support the social movement to bring about regime change in that country.

What happens if the regime falls?

The best answer to this question can be provided by examining the geographical environment of Iran. Pakistan, Afghanistan—Iran two neighbors—are already places where the Islamist forces are confronting the existing governments and the United States. Consequently, these neighbors of Iran are experiencing different degrees of instability. Two of these—Afghanistan to the East of Iran and Iraq to its West—are also occupied by the United States. That very fact continues to fuel the activities of al-Qaida and its cohorts. Across the Persian Gulf Iran is the Arabian Peninsula where al-Qaida is gathering strength in Yemen. The Islamist insurgency has already spilled over in neighboring Saudi Arabia, where Saudi Arabia, where its forces have intensified the conflict by conducting a number of bombing raids in northern Yemen, areas that is contiguous to Saudi Arabia. The southern part of Yemen is facing the secessionist forces.

Across the Gulf of Aden is the highly unstable Horn of Africa, where Somalia has emerged as the “poster child” of a failed state. Two western neighbors of Somalia, Ethiopia and Eretria, are well on their way of becoming failed states.

Given this gloomy, but a realistic description of Iran’s immediate geographical environment, the last thing the international community wishes to see is the downfall of Iranian government. However, the Middle East is famous (or infamous) for surprising the predictions and expectations of even those who reside in the region. So, one should not be surprised if the government in Iran falls. If that were to happen, the only winner will be al-Qaida and its supporters who have an established record of demonstrating their effectiveness for violence and mayhem under political turbulence and chaos.

What can the regime do to survive?

An obvious answer to this question is that the regime should think about compromising with Moussavi. However, that compromise can only be meaningful if the results of the June 2009 elections are nullified. No one expects that to happen. Besides, Iran is also known for one more brutal tradition: if an existing regime starts to offer concessions to the forces of change, that measure is seen by the opposition as a sign of weakness and a perfect opportunity to ratchet up violence and turbulence with a view to ousting the regime. That was precisely what happened to the regime of Mohammad Reza in the last few months it was in power. Given that reality, the Ali Khameini is not likely to offer any concessions along the lines suggested above. Another option for it to sit tight and show some willingness for reform on its own and hope that such a measure would not create a tsunami for regime change. In fact, Iran seems to have already adopted that option.

In the meantime, the United States and its Western allies would continue to increase pressure on Iran by slapping harsh economic sanctions. Iran’s best hope is that Russia and/or China would come to its rescue. That is a possibility; however, those two countries are also busy studying the situation and calculating how far they should go in supporting Iran’s intransigence related to the conflict with the United States involving its nuclear research program.

By conducting a fraudulent election, the current government in Iran has dealt a very severe blow to its own already shaky legitimacy. If it were to plummet—even with alleged support for the social movement from abroad—it, first and foremost, should blame itself. After all, it has been doing everything to make itself vulnerable to foreign shenanigans and plots for its overthrow.

1. Sidney Tarrow,

Power in Movement: Social Movement, Collective Action, and Politics

, (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
2. James A. Bill,

The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988)
3. Vali Nasr,

The Shia Revival:
How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future

The real test of President Barack Obama’s dealing with China and Russia will be whether he can persuade them to support U.S. pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons aspirations. Obama is reported to have lobbied China on that issue during his recent visit. He also broached the topic with Russia in the recent past for the same purpose, but with little success. Iran denies wanting to join the nuclear club, but Washington has no faith in those denials.

By the same token, the United States has to think long and hard about taking military action again Iran while it is about to increase its troop deployment in Afghanistan. At the present time, American forces can become easy targets of Iranian asymmetric-war-related activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, at a time when the political tide in Afghanistan is already heavily favoring the Taliban, and when internal violence in Iraq appears to be escalating.  For a predominantly Shia country, Iran has shown remarkable pragmatism in cooperating with intensely anti-American Sunni Islamist groups in the past to make matters worse for American forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under these circumstances, a potentially effective option for the U.S. is to heavily lobby China and Russia to support U.N. sanctions on Iran. However, in this regard, both of those countries have major strategic agendas of their own related to Iran. First, Iran is a major source of energy supplies for China. Second, it serves as a major source of hard currency for Russian nuclear technology and other military weapons at a time when Russia’s economy remains heavily reliant on income from energy sources. Third, Iran looms large in both Chinese and Russian maneuvers for the evolution of a multipolar global order. As a state that has never accepted America’s dominant role in the Middle East, and as a country that retains major clout in Iraq and Lebanon and high popularity in Gaza for its support of Hamas, Iran has been indirectly promoting the Sino-Russian agenda of challenging America’s dominance in the Arab world and multipolarity.

At least for now, the Obama administration has scored a victory when it received the backing of Beijing and Moscow for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution that censured Iran and ordered it to halt construction of a secret uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom. China’s support for this resolution was the result of Iran’s backtracking on a deal with the five-plus-one countries (Perm-5 of the UNSC plus Germany) for removing most of its nuclear fuel stocks abroad for the import of material needed for its medical research reactor.

The vote also came at a time when the American President, during his recent trip, was more than forthcoming in assuring China that the lone superpower has no intention of containing China. On the contrary, Obama stated that his administration is fully focused on engaging it. The overall tone of the global coverage of President Obama’s trip to China had all the ingredients to boost the self-confidence of the Chinese leadership that their country has indeed arrived on the global platform as the next candidate for superpowerdom.

Under these circumstances, China has no intention of ruining its moment of glory by refusing to cooperate with the United States just to please Iran. The most understated fact of Sino-Iranian relations is that Iran needs China more than the other way around. As much as China is in need of foreign energy sources, it also knows that, given the international sanction-ridden environment, Iran is quite eager to sell its oil and gas to China. Iran has also become an observer in the Sino-Russian-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is steadily acquiring a heightened global visibility. So, China can afford to play the seesaw version of first siding with Iran, then with the United States, and then calculating the ebb-and-flow of events before decding its next move.

The support of the aforementioned IAEA resolution by the dual-headed leadership in Russia—between President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin—was somewhat surprising, because, while Medvedev appears flexible in dealing with the United States, Putin is not. The latter is more resolute in asserting Russia’s role as a wannabe superpower. In a recent speech during the United Russia Party’s 11^th Congress, Medvedev criticized its “conservative” stance on a number of issues faced by Russia, and accentuated the urgent need for political modernization. He also stated that the United Russia “needs to step up and reform itself and put a halt to ‘administrative excesses’ within.” Those comments were given global coverage because Putin is the Chairman of that party. At least for now, there have been reports of evident friction between Medvedev and Putin.

It is hard to conclude whether Russia’s support of the IAEA resolution was an outcome of the split between Medvedev and Putin (who is known for his strong support of providing assistance to Iran as an integral aspect of his policy of Russia’s assertiveness), or whether that country is merely signaling Iran to be more forthcoming on the nuclear issue toward Perm-5-plus-one countries.

Iran’s behavior regarding the nuclear issue has become even more complicated as a result of its June 2009 presidential election, which has raised serious questions about the current nature of domestic support for that issue.

It is a well-known fact that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not the “decider” on that issue, the Supreme Leader Ali Khameini is. But why is it that the Iranian representative was authorized to negotiate with the representatives of the Perm-5 plus one, and then Iran decided to backtrack on the deal that he made at the conclusion of those negotiations? The Janus-faced foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has always been a confusing variable for Western diplomats. It has become even more confusing as Iran is facing rising domestic tensions and the usual slogans of “death to America” are increasingly interspersed with slogans of “death to dictators” (the latter being Khameini and Ahmadinejad).  The Iranian leadership may very well be afraid to offer concessions to the Perm-5-plus-one countries that might be misconstrued, both inside and outside of Iran, as a sign of its wobbliness.

To add further perplexity to an already confused situation, the world is told that Iranian authorities confiscated the Nobel medal from its Nobel Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, one of the very faces of Iran that are recognized as reasons for hope and moderation in that country. Her husband was reportedly arrested and severely beaten by Iranian authorities. Iran has denied the report about the medal, but not about Ebadi’s husband.

As Iran is steadily heading on the road to even more confusion and chaos, President Obama’s task of negotiating with that country is becoming progressively more difficult. His strategy of developing a great power consensus on denuclearizing Iran emerges as a highly thoughtful and potentially most constructive one. However, what is not clear at this point is how far China and Russia are willing to go to cooperate with the United States regarding Iran, which remains a major actor in the strategic maneuvers of both Beijing and Moscow in the evolution of a multipolar global power arrangement.

What seems to be happening in East Asia—as elsewhere—is that the United States is trying to find a niche for multilateralism as a modus operandi for solving global economic problems, which are affecting the United States more than they are the PRC.  The latter, being a controlled economy, can manipulate its fiscal and monetary policies without much debate or tug-and-pull, which are idiosyncratic of American democracy and its system of separation of powers.  Another reality is that, despite America’s exhortations for an active leadership role in the management of global economy, the PRC has been very reluctant to be forthcoming.

It is not that the current leadership of China is still so hung up in following the 1989 advice of the late Deng Xiaoping who said “hide the brightness and nourish obscurity” (Taoguang Yanghui).  Rather, they have not decided how forthcoming they ought to be in “nourishing obscurity.”  The least discussed aspect of China’s current policy posture is that, in its spectacular rise, it has become a very conservative power.  That conservatism is also nurtured by the fear of Chinese leaders of the potential destructive aspects of their people’s wrath if their economic development falters or flops.  So, it opts for pursuing economic policies whose success has been proven.  In addition, China seems to be apprehensive that its assertive posture in economic affairs might be misinterpreted as a harbinger of its brazenness in military issues.  It should be remembered that China, unlike any other country in recent history, has to be constantly on the defensive about the purpose of its rise, by insisting that it will be of a peaceful nature.  

One area where China has been quite proactive, indeed assertive, is in finding energy reserves and in acquiring equity oil by offering lucrative contracts to the owners of energy reserves.  That policy has been a source of constant criticism from Western countries, many of which have notorious records of their own in coddling up to the dictators of the Middle East to ensure guaranteed access to oil. 

The goal of finding assured access to energy sources is one of the vital interests of China.  At the same time, finding solutions to economic problems, though that is quite important, they will not become vital to China as long as the United States remains willing and able to play a dominant role in attempting to solve them.  So, the argument that China might be acting as a “free-loader” on economic issues is not at all wrong-headed.

The question, then, is whether the United States is being irrational in expecting China’s leading role in world affairs.  What Washington might not have considered at this point is whether it really wishes China to become a co-equal in resolving global economic issues, because the Chinese are quite busy calculating why they should bear the burden of leadership, when, in the final analysis, the United States might steal most of the limelight once these problems lose their current obduracy and attendant urgency.  In thinking along these lines, the Chinese are not being petty, they are only being coy.

There have also been suggestions that President Obama has an ambitious strategic agenda of extracting cooperation from China.  That includes putting pressure on Pakistan to be more resolute in defeating the Pakistani Taliban; and on Iran to close down its nuclear program, which Washington suspects of leading to that country’s emergence as the next nuclear power.

Obama’s best bet is to concentrate on seeking China’s cooperation on global economic matters.  That is the only area where the deft Chinese leadership sees much benefit in cooperating with the U.S. at this point.  Their ties with Pakistan are inextricably linked with their rivalry with India.  The United States has not even begun to comprehend the intricacies related to that issue.  Iran is an important partner of China in the realm of energy supplies and an important customer of its military weapons.  No amount of U.S. persuasion is likely to bring those ties to an end.

In the final analysis, Washington is well-advised to understand that China’s regional and global ties are becoming almost as cumbersome as its own.  That very reality enhances the element of selectivity, which the leaders in Beijing will increasingly use in dealing with the United States in the days ahead.

I read Roy’s first two books when they first came out.  While reading The Failure of Political Islam, I felt then, as I do now, that Roy’s conclusion about the alleged failure of that movement was premature.  Movements—especially ideological or religious-based ones—have a long duration and a variety of phases through which they pass over a long period of time before a somewhat meaningful—but still premature—judgment can be passed regarding their success or failure.  Social scientists, to the contrary, are like judges in an Olympic competition–too much in a hurry to measure the performance of the participants in order to declare winners and losers.  One of the most interesting studies of the phases of a movement is Crane Brinton’s, The Anatomy of Revolution.[1]  An interesting approach for the study of Roy’s thesis on political Islam is to examine it through an application of Brinton’s framework.

The title of Roy’s book, Globalized Islam, as Professor Hroub also notes, “contradicts…[Olivier’s] own failure thesis” of his previous book.  How can a failed movement become globalized and still be depicted as “failed”?  My own explanation is similar to the one that Hroub touches on, but is elaborately discussed in the Islamist literature under the rubric of fighting the “far enemy” (i.e., the “infidel-in-chief,” meaning the United States) versus the “near enemies” (Arab and Muslim governments) among many Islamist groups.  That debate was settled temporarily between 1999 and 2001.  As a result of which the audacious decision of attacking the lone superpower on its own homeland was taken.  As one tracks the “global” rhetoric of today’s “Jihadists,” one gets the sense that they are driven by the goals of fighting the U.S. as well as destabilizing the “near enemies.”

I lean toward the proposition that al-Qaida and other pan-Islamist groups were shocked about the scope and intensity of the U.S. response, which was also accompanied by George W. Bush’s ominous caveat that was especially aimed at the Arab leaders:  “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”

In the aftermath of America’s global war on terrorism (GWOT), in order to survive, al-Qaida was forced to transform itself into a movement.  There also ensued the decision of regional and sub-regional Islamist groups to develop their own campaigns of terror in agreement with Mus’ab al-Suri’s operational slogan: Nizam la Tanzim.  That, in my estimation, is the beginning of the making of global Jihad.[2]

To argue that there is such a thing called globalized Islam is belaboring the obvious.  “Islamic internationalism” is an old idea.  In today’s parlance, that very idea is repackaged as “globalized Islam.”  The notion of nationalism and citizenship has always been alien to Islam.  The global promotion of that idea, especially starting in the 1990s, was easy because it was very much in harmony with the theological concept that states: “Islam is a religion of all ages.”  The global reach of the Internet has turned out to be a perfect tool for the globalization of a notion that was intrinsically global to start with.

Political Islam’s temporary failure—temporary because, as I stated earlier, it is a premature judgment on the part of Roy—stems from two very important variables.  The first one—as only touched upon by Professor Hroub but not fully developed—is that it has failed to offer nuanced and comprehensive solutions to what ails Muslim polities.  Answers to that question are hard to develop even in a whole book.  Even Bernard Lewis, after asking the right question in his book, What Went Wrong?, desolately failed to provide  persuasive answers.[3]

Secondly, because all Muslim polities are non-democratic, there was no chance of Islamists capturing power through an election.  Even in countries where limited electoral practices existed, elections are characterized by the odious practices of ballot-stuffing by the cronies of the regimes in order to ensure that there should be no transfer of power.  We have recently witnessed this phenomenon in the elections of Iran and Afghanistan.

Islamists have long known that merely shouting, “Islam is the solution!” is never enough.  They needed to develop comprehensive programs of political and economic development.  Muslim theologists failed to become experts in contemporary economics, global trade, international politics, or other contemporary disciplines, largely because they rejected them as “failed” and “godless” disciplines, without offering alternatives.  Even now, I am unaware of any theologist who has offered alternatives.   All countries that explicitly call themselves “Islamic”—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Sudan, or Iran, for instance—are failed and corrupt polities and are characterized by backward economies.  When a Muslim youngster looks for an “Islamic solution” to problems that ail his/her society, he/she finds an immense vacuum.  So, the failure of those states to emerge as stable polities or strong economies becomes a credible indicator that other Islamist groups would also fail, if or when they capture political power.

But, what are the chances of the Islamists capturing power in any country in the coming years?  With the exception of Hamas, I would say none.  Even Hamas, by remaining intransigent about changing its stance regarding Israel, has condemned itself to failure.  The United States, the EU, and other countries, by denying economic assistance to Palestine, have been serving as leading players in ensuring that Hamas does not succeed as a political entity. 

Most importantly, an unspoken aspect of the Western actors’ systematic attempts to ensure that Hamas fails is also related to their fear that, if Hamas succeeds in stabilizing Palestine, other Islamist groups will be encouraged to capture power and then hang on long enough to become victorious.  However, when Hamas’ rule comes to end in Palestine, that development will not necessarily persuade other Islamist groups to stop their endeavors to capture political power in their own countries.  

I was once of the view that, perhaps, the Islamists should be given a chance to come to power through elections, and be allowed to fail.  However, after watching the performance of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, I have changed my mind.  In the absence of comprehensive programs to stabilize their polities and to strengthen their economies, their chances of success are none. 

A few words about the Islamic Republic of Iran:  that country could have been an example of the success of an Islamic government; Iran has had a reasonable amount of democracy and ample oil and gas reserves to introduce ambitious programs of modernization;  and the Iranian leaders encountered serious problems from the United States in the 1980s, when the US sided with Iraq in the bloody war between the two neighbors. 

Undoubtedly, the United States wanted Iraq to do America’s dirty work by getting rid of the Ayatollahs through that war.  However, both Washington and Baghdad failed miserably in fulfilling their objective of terminating the Islamic government in Iran.  From Iran’s point of view, it was correct to state that their revolution was not given a chance to succeed. 

The Iranian fraudulent election of last June does not bode well for the Islamic Republic.  Iran seems to be steadily edging toward chaos for which the hardline Islamists of that country are substantially responsible.

What does the continuing saga of the Islamic Republic say about the future of political Islam in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world of Islam?[4]  It has not found its niche as a movement, largely because it has not yet developed a comprehensive framework for governance.  However, the concept of eternity that is related to Islam as a religion is one reason why the Islamists (or political Islamists) will continue to try and fail, but will not stop until they have a successful recipe for governance.  When will they succeed?  An answer to that question is not within the realm of Social Science.

The United States, as a quid pro quo, would like Russia’s consent for imposing harsh sanctions against Iran in the wake of its non-compliance with the IAEA’s demands for inspections and increased transparency.  There is no clear picture yet that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would go along with the U.S. expectations about Russia’s foregoing the use of the veto if the United States pushes a harsh sanction through the U.N. Security Council.  Russia also has the twin leadership of Medvedev and Premier Vladimir Putin.  The latter is almost gleeful about making things harder for the U.S. by not agreeing to have any strict sanctions on Iran for non-compliance.

Then there is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), another actor that maintains strong ties with Iran, and a country that has also been— besides Russia—helping Iran in nuclear and missile technology.  There is no indication that China would agree to American proposals of making it hard for Iran’s non-compliance even if Russia were to support that measure.

Why did the United States, the U.K., and France decide to raise the decibel level of their criticism of Iran at this point?  The first reason is because of the latest U.S. intelligence disclosure that Iran is secretly developing uranium enrichment facilities at Qom, in addition to the previously known facility at Natanz.  It is also understood that the new facility will be used to develop weapons-grade uranium.  Iran publicly admitted the existence of the facility near Qom, but only after finding out that the United States had known about it and was about to publicize it. 

Secondly, the Perm-5 of the U.N. plus Germany are about to start negotiations with Iran.  By dramatizing Iran’s alleged intentions to develop nuclear weapons, especially when the Russian and Chinese leaders were also present during the G-20 summit, the Western leaders choreographed their statements—along with somber faces while making their respective announcements—to escalate pressure on Iran and its two major supporters—Russia and China.

In response, China remained unfazed and neutral, while Medvedev sounded only a bit obliging, when he asked Iran to be forthcoming in the upcoming rounds of negotiations.

The most important missing variable in this convoluted narrative is that there has not been a change of posturing between the United States and Iran, even after the election of Obama.  Only the U.S. rhetoric regarding Iran has mellowed a bit.  Another important development is that, due to allegations of fraud in the recently-held presidential election in Iran, the United States felt obligated to issue statements critical of Iran—though they were mild in rhetoric compared to the ones used by Obama’s predecessor regarding Iran.

Consequently, as much as the Iranian government has been facing internal protests related to the election, it found no reason to be cooperative with the United States.  The best thing going for Iran is that the United States and the U.K. had a shameful history of destabilizing an elected government in Iran in 1953. 

So every time the United States criticizes Iran for not conducting fair elections, the hardliners blow off that disparagement merely as the 21^st Century version of meddling in Iran’s internal affairs.

All of this antagonism on both sides—Iran as well as the West—minimizes the chances of a significant breakthrough when Iran sits down at the negotiating table with the representatives of the Perm-5+1.  Such a reality suits Iran just fine, because it is not really interested in giving up its nuclear program.

Under these circumstances, the United States might be faced with giving a serious look at the military option.  The hardliners in Iran would welcome it.  If the U.S. or Israel were to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, both Afghanistan and Iraq would turn into hellish places for Western troops.  Iran would do all it could to promote such a scenario.  Iran knows well how unpopular “Obama’s war” in Afghanistan really is inside the United States.  The more pressure the lone superpower comes under with the prospects of increased violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the more welcome news that would be for Iran’s current rulers.

As President Obama acquires more experience in the White House, he will realize that there are no easy options for the United States when dealing with the Middle East, only more bloody or less bloody ones.