Iran refuses to close down its nuclear research program; and, despite all its assertions that it is not interested in making nuclear weapons, Washington believes that that is precisely the direction Iran is heading.

Iran also has a very active ballistic missile program. And the United States is afraid that it is just a matter of time before Iran will not only put all the systems together to build a bomb, but it will also be able to integrate its nuclear weapons with its delivery system.

There is also much substance to the United States’ suggestion that Iran might have already acquired a bomb-making capability and might be waiting on an appropriate time for its “breakout” announcement — a term used, in the parlance of nuclear proliferation, to describe a surprise announcement of a country whereby it renounces the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and uses it capabilities to build a small nuclear weapon.

The most striking aspect of the Obama administration is that, in the past several weeks, while it was involved in issuing its nuclear posture review and signing a new nuclear arms reduction treaty and then holding a “summit” on the issue of “loose nukes,” it never interrupted its focus on Iran.

Russia, while signing the nuclear arms reduction treaty, falsely created an impression that it was willing to side with the United States in imposing sanctions on Iran. A more correct interpretation of Russia’s attitude toward Iran is that it still wants to discuss the option of negotiating with that country, and is not at all interested in imposing the kind of harsh sanctions that the pro-Israeli elements in the United States would love to see implemented.

The same thing is also true for China. In fact, after the loose nukes summit, China has made it clear that it is not as much in the corner of the United States as the American media made it out to be immediately prior to, and in the aftermath of, that summit.

The presence of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in the thick of policy discussions on Iran becomes important when one considers his long experience in the realm of national security, and the fact that he is very much in the forefront of developing a comprehensive strategy.

However, the role of Admiral Mike Mullen remains a source of concern when one considers the fact that one of his top “informal” advisers on the Middle East is a woman by the name of Dr. Lani Kass, a holder of Israeli and American citizenship. One is befuddled by the fact that a holder of dual citizenship is given top Department of Defense clearance, while Israel’s use of such persons as spies against us is a known fact. Dubbed as “Dr. Strangelove made in Israel,” an essay written by a former CIA agent, Philip Giraldi, describes Kass as rabidly anti-Iran and an equally staunch Islamophobe.

As reported by Giraldi, Kass told her U.S. Air Force audience that, “the long war against the Islamists will end ‘when they learn to love their children more than they hate us,’ a comment originally attributed to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.” On another occasion she said, “radical Muslims hate the western world because Europe took their dominant political position away and they want it back.” This is a diatribe that Bernard Lewis has been peddling to the Western audience in the name of his “expert analysis.”

She is also on record as being more audacious than she was in the afore-cited quotes. This time, she disposed of the nuance between Muslims and radical Muslims and included all Muslims in her fictional “expertise” on the world of Islam. Giraldi notes, “In her speech she explained that Muslims hate western culture and want to dominate the world, adding that because radical Islam has a ‘culture of death’ all those who do not submit to Islam must die, an assertion so absurd that one suspects her political analysis derives from the Free Republic website.” Not surprisingly, no one in her audience questioned the veracity of that comment or demanded any evidence.
Regarding Iran, Kass is totally sold on the use of military option. She is reported to have said, “We can defeat Iran, but are Americans willing to pay the price?” In other words, she is very much gung ho on going to war against Iran. Her comments remind one of two other women who were way ahead of even the Bush administration in their fictional belief that, between 2001 and 2003, Iraq was fully engaged in making weapons of mass destruction: Judith Miller of the New York Times and Laurie Mylroie, who coauthored a book on Iraq. A detailed narrative of the roles of these two women is provided in Michael Isikoff and David Corn’s book, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War.
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The question that is uppermost in my mind is why has Admiral Mullen decided to rely on such a highly partisan source for advice on the Middle East. Don’t we already have enough of a horrible image on being extremely one-sided when it comes to the strategic affairs of that region? More to the point, why is Admiral Mullen not getting his cue from the White House, which seems bent on pursuing policy options to take into consideration, first and foremost, American interests?

If America’s miserable record of going to war against Iraq on imaginary evidence, the cherry picking of intelligence, and in some instances even deliberately relying on highly deceptive sources (see the above-cited source), the only option that stands out in dealing with Iran is to avoid the military option at all costs. The only viable option is to negotiate, negotiate, or negotiate with that country.

The real test of President Barack Obama’s dealing with China and Russia will be whether he can persuade them to support U.S. pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons aspirations. Obama is reported to have lobbied China on that issue during his recent visit. He also broached the topic with Russia in the recent past for the same purpose, but with little success. Iran denies wanting to join the nuclear club, but Washington has no faith in those denials.

By the same token, the United States has to think long and hard about taking military action again Iran while it is about to increase its troop deployment in Afghanistan. At the present time, American forces can become easy targets of Iranian asymmetric-war-related activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, at a time when the political tide in Afghanistan is already heavily favoring the Taliban, and when internal violence in Iraq appears to be escalating.  For a predominantly Shia country, Iran has shown remarkable pragmatism in cooperating with intensely anti-American Sunni Islamist groups in the past to make matters worse for American forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Under these circumstances, a potentially effective option for the U.S. is to heavily lobby China and Russia to support U.N. sanctions on Iran. However, in this regard, both of those countries have major strategic agendas of their own related to Iran. First, Iran is a major source of energy supplies for China. Second, it serves as a major source of hard currency for Russian nuclear technology and other military weapons at a time when Russia’s economy remains heavily reliant on income from energy sources. Third, Iran looms large in both Chinese and Russian maneuvers for the evolution of a multipolar global order. As a state that has never accepted America’s dominant role in the Middle East, and as a country that retains major clout in Iraq and Lebanon and high popularity in Gaza for its support of Hamas, Iran has been indirectly promoting the Sino-Russian agenda of challenging America’s dominance in the Arab world and multipolarity.

At least for now, the Obama administration has scored a victory when it received the backing of Beijing and Moscow for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution that censured Iran and ordered it to halt construction of a secret uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom. China’s support for this resolution was the result of Iran’s backtracking on a deal with the five-plus-one countries (Perm-5 of the UNSC plus Germany) for removing most of its nuclear fuel stocks abroad for the import of material needed for its medical research reactor.

The vote also came at a time when the American President, during his recent trip, was more than forthcoming in assuring China that the lone superpower has no intention of containing China. On the contrary, Obama stated that his administration is fully focused on engaging it. The overall tone of the global coverage of President Obama’s trip to China had all the ingredients to boost the self-confidence of the Chinese leadership that their country has indeed arrived on the global platform as the next candidate for superpowerdom.

Under these circumstances, China has no intention of ruining its moment of glory by refusing to cooperate with the United States just to please Iran. The most understated fact of Sino-Iranian relations is that Iran needs China more than the other way around. As much as China is in need of foreign energy sources, it also knows that, given the international sanction-ridden environment, Iran is quite eager to sell its oil and gas to China. Iran has also become an observer in the Sino-Russian-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is steadily acquiring a heightened global visibility. So, China can afford to play the seesaw version of first siding with Iran, then with the United States, and then calculating the ebb-and-flow of events before decding its next move.

The support of the aforementioned IAEA resolution by the dual-headed leadership in Russia—between President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin—was somewhat surprising, because, while Medvedev appears flexible in dealing with the United States, Putin is not. The latter is more resolute in asserting Russia’s role as a wannabe superpower. In a recent speech during the United Russia Party’s 11^th Congress, Medvedev criticized its “conservative” stance on a number of issues faced by Russia, and accentuated the urgent need for political modernization. He also stated that the United Russia “needs to step up and reform itself and put a halt to ‘administrative excesses’ within.” Those comments were given global coverage because Putin is the Chairman of that party. At least for now, there have been reports of evident friction between Medvedev and Putin.

It is hard to conclude whether Russia’s support of the IAEA resolution was an outcome of the split between Medvedev and Putin (who is known for his strong support of providing assistance to Iran as an integral aspect of his policy of Russia’s assertiveness), or whether that country is merely signaling Iran to be more forthcoming on the nuclear issue toward Perm-5-plus-one countries.

Iran’s behavior regarding the nuclear issue has become even more complicated as a result of its June 2009 presidential election, which has raised serious questions about the current nature of domestic support for that issue.

It is a well-known fact that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not the “decider” on that issue, the Supreme Leader Ali Khameini is. But why is it that the Iranian representative was authorized to negotiate with the representatives of the Perm-5 plus one, and then Iran decided to backtrack on the deal that he made at the conclusion of those negotiations? The Janus-faced foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has always been a confusing variable for Western diplomats. It has become even more confusing as Iran is facing rising domestic tensions and the usual slogans of “death to America” are increasingly interspersed with slogans of “death to dictators” (the latter being Khameini and Ahmadinejad).  The Iranian leadership may very well be afraid to offer concessions to the Perm-5-plus-one countries that might be misconstrued, both inside and outside of Iran, as a sign of its wobbliness.

To add further perplexity to an already confused situation, the world is told that Iranian authorities confiscated the Nobel medal from its Nobel Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, one of the very faces of Iran that are recognized as reasons for hope and moderation in that country. Her husband was reportedly arrested and severely beaten by Iranian authorities. Iran has denied the report about the medal, but not about Ebadi’s husband.

As Iran is steadily heading on the road to even more confusion and chaos, President Obama’s task of negotiating with that country is becoming progressively more difficult. His strategy of developing a great power consensus on denuclearizing Iran emerges as a highly thoughtful and potentially most constructive one. However, what is not clear at this point is how far China and Russia are willing to go to cooperate with the United States regarding Iran, which remains a major actor in the strategic maneuvers of both Beijing and Moscow in the evolution of a multipolar global power arrangement.

The United States, as a quid pro quo, would like Russia’s consent for imposing harsh sanctions against Iran in the wake of its non-compliance with the IAEA’s demands for inspections and increased transparency.  There is no clear picture yet that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would go along with the U.S. expectations about Russia’s foregoing the use of the veto if the United States pushes a harsh sanction through the U.N. Security Council.  Russia also has the twin leadership of Medvedev and Premier Vladimir Putin.  The latter is almost gleeful about making things harder for the U.S. by not agreeing to have any strict sanctions on Iran for non-compliance.

Then there is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), another actor that maintains strong ties with Iran, and a country that has also been— besides Russia—helping Iran in nuclear and missile technology.  There is no indication that China would agree to American proposals of making it hard for Iran’s non-compliance even if Russia were to support that measure.

Why did the United States, the U.K., and France decide to raise the decibel level of their criticism of Iran at this point?  The first reason is because of the latest U.S. intelligence disclosure that Iran is secretly developing uranium enrichment facilities at Qom, in addition to the previously known facility at Natanz.  It is also understood that the new facility will be used to develop weapons-grade uranium.  Iran publicly admitted the existence of the facility near Qom, but only after finding out that the United States had known about it and was about to publicize it. 

Secondly, the Perm-5 of the U.N. plus Germany are about to start negotiations with Iran.  By dramatizing Iran’s alleged intentions to develop nuclear weapons, especially when the Russian and Chinese leaders were also present during the G-20 summit, the Western leaders choreographed their statements—along with somber faces while making their respective announcements—to escalate pressure on Iran and its two major supporters—Russia and China.

In response, China remained unfazed and neutral, while Medvedev sounded only a bit obliging, when he asked Iran to be forthcoming in the upcoming rounds of negotiations.

The most important missing variable in this convoluted narrative is that there has not been a change of posturing between the United States and Iran, even after the election of Obama.  Only the U.S. rhetoric regarding Iran has mellowed a bit.  Another important development is that, due to allegations of fraud in the recently-held presidential election in Iran, the United States felt obligated to issue statements critical of Iran—though they were mild in rhetoric compared to the ones used by Obama’s predecessor regarding Iran.

Consequently, as much as the Iranian government has been facing internal protests related to the election, it found no reason to be cooperative with the United States.  The best thing going for Iran is that the United States and the U.K. had a shameful history of destabilizing an elected government in Iran in 1953. 

So every time the United States criticizes Iran for not conducting fair elections, the hardliners blow off that disparagement merely as the 21^st Century version of meddling in Iran’s internal affairs.

All of this antagonism on both sides—Iran as well as the West—minimizes the chances of a significant breakthrough when Iran sits down at the negotiating table with the representatives of the Perm-5+1.  Such a reality suits Iran just fine, because it is not really interested in giving up its nuclear program.

Under these circumstances, the United States might be faced with giving a serious look at the military option.  The hardliners in Iran would welcome it.  If the U.S. or Israel were to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, both Afghanistan and Iraq would turn into hellish places for Western troops.  Iran would do all it could to promote such a scenario.  Iran knows well how unpopular “Obama’s war” in Afghanistan really is inside the United States.  The more pressure the lone superpower comes under with the prospects of increased violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the more welcome news that would be for Iran’s current rulers.

As President Obama acquires more experience in the White House, he will realize that there are no easy options for the United States when dealing with the Middle East, only more bloody or less bloody ones.

The administration of President Barack H. Obama has started the highly intricate process of developing its own strategy with a bang in different regions of the world.  Here are the ingredients of that strategy: multilateralism, looking for a fresh start—which promises to be substantially different from the preceding administration—search for common ground involving Russia, invitation of negotiations with America’s traditional adversaries like Iran and North Korea, and at least the initial hope that approaches toward Palestine, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are likely to be radically different than the one the Bush administration pursued unsuccessfully.  This is a huge agenda.  But Obama’s administration has the enormous characteristic of freshness, metaphorically as well as substantively, in the sense that it is not carrying any baggage that had so infamously bogged down George W. Bush in an ostensibly endless inertia.

President Obama has insisted in talking to everyone, especially to America’s traditional adversaries.  Talking is better than not talking, he uncomplicatedly observed during the presidential campaign.  America’s strict observance of this principle promises to open a lot of doors.  It will also lower the feeling of fear and paranoia on the part of Iran and North Korea, who were simplistically and wrongly depicted by the Bush administration as members of an imaginary “axis of evil.”

Multilateralism has served America’s interest in its entire post-World War II history.  The United States led the Herculean task of rebuilding global economic institutions and regimes like the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.  America had the required economic prowess while other global actors—the Soviet Union, the U.K. and France—were simply exhausted with their economies devastated by the ravages of war.  But it was the frame of mind and global vision of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt more than America’s economic power that enabled the United States to become the leader of the so-called “free world,” a position it has never really relinquished, even today.

America’s leadership position was seriously—and hopefully not permanently—damaged in the post-9/11 era, when unilateralism and the hubris of the Bush administration acted like termites,  voraciously eating up most of the goodwill that the United states had created all over the world.

Obama is off to a good start.  He already has spoken to the world of Islam, stating that America will deal with it respectfully and on the basis of pragmatism; he has invited Iran to unclench its fist and initiate an era of negotiations on the basis of mutual respect; and he has appointed George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as special envoys for Middle East and South Asia, respectively.  He has sent his Vice President, Joe Biden, to talk to the Europeans and to the Russians. 

Cumulatively speaking, this is a radical departure from the Bush administration.   Now, an intricate series of negotiations must start.  What the Obama administration must keep in mind is the fact that although it is approaching a number of actors with an open mind and unclenched fist, it may not get an immediate enthusiastic response or positive results.

In the case of Russia, the United States is faced with a country that has decided to become significant by taking the wrong route of unilateralism and hubris, which were hallmarks of the Communist superpower.  Russia cannot assert itself in that manner toward its neighbors, who have the bitter experience of being the captives of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) throughout the Cold War years, and then wonder why they so eagerly seek the shield of NATO.  Russia’s neighbors are watching warily, and with dismay, the incessant de-democratization of that country.   They do not know what to make of Russia’s energy-related assertiveness, which has taken the form of neo-mercantilism.  They watched in horror Russia’s clear over-reaction to the stupid decision of Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia to confront it militarily.

While Vice President Joe Biden is suggesting that the United States wants to “press the reset button” of ties with Moscow, Russia was busy working up a deal with Kyrgyzstan, whereby its President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, invited the United States to get out of the Manas air base, a development that will complicate America’s logistical problems of keeping the supply lines open to its forces in Afghanistan.  However, the stateship of Russia also works like an aircraft carrier: it changes its direction rather slowly.  Thus, it will be awhile before positive responses to the U.S. overtures might emerge.  While it does not pay to be overly pessimistic about Russia’s response, one does not have to hold ones breath for a long time to envisage such a development.  The signals regarding Russia’s willingness to cooperate, or not, will come soon enough.

The U.S.-Iran ties have mammoth complications of their own.  The first hurdle is the bad blood related to America’s support for Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from 1953 through 1978.  That era has the same legacy of shame and bitterness for Iran as China’s memories related to the “decades of humiliations” at the hands of the West and Japan.  At the same time, the United States has not forgotten the ignominy it had suffered during the “hostage crisis” of the late 1970s.  That crisis also played a dominant role in making Jimmy Carter a one-term President. 

The second hurdle is America’s Iran-Libya Sanction Legislation, which Iran envisions (quite correctly) as aimed at bringing about “regime change.”  All such legislation has to be categorically nullified before any serious negotiations take place between Washington and Tehran.  The United States has to accept the legitimacy of the Iranian government if it wishes to give real meaning to negotiating with it from the position of “mutual respect.”

The third hurdle is Iran’s nuclear research program, which the United States regards as aimed at developing nuclear weapons.  While it is hard to categorize America’s concerns as baseless, one must also fully understand Iran’s security concerns.  Iran has the same sense of insecurity that drove India to seek nuclear weapons.  At least India had the tacit support of, and some semblance of security guarantees from, the FSU while it was around.  Iran had no such support or guarantees from any major power.  What country would come to its assistance if the United States were to decide to bring about regime change in Iran?  What great power came to Iraq’s rescue when Iraq was similarly threatened by the Bush administration?  Could Iraq have gone through the bloody process of regime change if it had had nuclear weapons?  These questions are uppermost in the minds of the Ayatollahs, who are cavalierly and regularly demonized in America’s press and academic journals.

The negotiations between the United States and Iran have to seriously address Iran’s security concerns.  Given the nature of hostile attitudes that have prevailed between the two actors, it is hard to imagine a scenario when the lone superpower can believably guarantee Iran’s security and foreswear all actions aimed at regime change.  Even some European countries’ attempts to give verbal security guarantees to Iran will not do.  Thus, the nuclear issue remains a very obdurate problem between the two.  The Obama administration must summon all its creativity to resolve this aspect of U.S.-Iran conflict before any semblance of “normalcy” is restored between the two.

If one were to believe North Korea, it is already a nuclear power.  It has had a legacy of confronting a number of U.S. presidents who have threatened it with the use of nuclear weapons.  About the only realistic possibility under which Pyongyang might unravel its nuclear weapons is if it is protected under the nuclear umbrella of the People’s Republic of China.  That angle has not been pursued either by the U.S., the Chinese, or the North Koreans, at least in their unclassified diplomatic meetings.  In the absence of a nuclear umbrella, it is well-nigh impossible to imagine a circumstance under which Kim Jong Il would give up his nuclear weapons.   It might not be a bad idea for the Obama administration to consider pursuing that angle in future negotiations with the North Koreans and the Chinese.

The Palestinian-Israeli issue is a hostage to the upcoming Israeli elections.  If Benjamin Netanyahu is elected, then all bets are off about any resolution that is acceptable to the Likud and Hamas.  These two parties are equally fundamentalist and bull-headed about pursuing their respective version of the solution.  George Mitchell is likely to forget how complicated the Irish conflict was while he will tries to find common ground between the inflexible positions of Hamas and Likud.  On this issue, the U.S. strategy is likely to face frequent impasses. 

Regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan, the challenge for the Obama administration is no less daunting than the preceding issues.  Those two countries are places where al-Qaida has emerged as a major force.  The question is how to deal with the rising tide of religious extremism and problems of failing and weak governments.  President Obama wrongly considers that the immediate solution is in increasing the number of troops, since that approach supposedly helped lower the spiral of violence in stabilizing Iraq.  The fact is that it is much more complicated than that.  It was the fortuitous confluence of the decision of the “Sons of Iraq” to cooperate with the U.S. military against al-Qaida, along with the U.S. military’s decision not only to strengthen its number, but also to implement the “clear, hold, and build” strategy that helped stabilize Iraq.  The question is whether the Obama administration has correctly understood what actually transpired in Iraq, or is it merely repeating the process of raising the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan as a panacea for stabilizing that country.  The burden of evidence thus far is that it has not understood the intricacies of Afghanistan and is about to commit itself with the wrong-minded approach of using the military tool of America’s national power to resolve an enormously complicated situation.

Pakistan is a larger challenge than Afghanistan, in the sense that it not only negatively affects the stability of Afghanistan but also similarly affects the internal stability of India.  The Mumbai terrorist attacks have proven that fact.  The most ignored—and an extremely important—fact of South Asia is that neither India nor Afghanistan will be stable or peaceful places as long as highly visible measures are taken to soothe the security-related concerns of Pakistan involving India.  An important aspect of that concern is the lowering of India’s presence in Afghanistan, which Pakistan (rightly or wrongly) perceives as foreboding to its own security.  The Bush administration ignored that fact; and the Obama administration will ignore it at the risk of damaging its own interests in South Asia.

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President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have emphasized America’s resolve to use pragmatism, cordiality, realism, and firmness in its foreign policy toward the troubled regions of the world and about soothing the security-related concerns of America’s friends and especially its competitors and adversaries.  The coming months will be crucial to test their authenticity of purpose.

From the point of view of their potentials for bringing about balance of power-related changes in the Middle East, Sunni monarchies and dictatorships are archaic and outmoded.  Throughout the post-colonial era of the Twentieth Century, all they wanted to do was to preside over obscurantist and backward-looking societies where their authority would never be challenged.  They also made sure that the Sunni religious establishment “wheel” was amply greased so that it would permanently support their rule by issuing favorable religious rulings when needed.

The Arab Development Reports—written for the UN by Arab scholars—are full of candid explanations as to why the Arab world remains so close to the bottom rung in terms of Internet use, scientific education, overall literacy, and gender equality.

The monarchies and dictatorships’ ruling style was favored by the colonial powers of Europe and by the United States, when it emerged as the major Western power in the Arab region during the post-colonial era.  No one was going to challenge the United States’ strategic dominance in any significant way.  Saddam Hussein attempted to do just that.  But he could never raise himself to the status of an Arab hero who was committed to the uplifting of the Arab masses.  As long as he ruled Iraq, he was no more than a tyrant.  As such, he indulged in any amount of blood-letting to keep himself in power.

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran brought forth a promise of change when it ousted the rotten monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlevi.  But then the Islamic Republic itself became part of struggle for which the Middle East is notorious.  Except this time, that struggle also involved the Mullahs’ ventures to maintain their rule.  Still, Iran did bring about a number of changes, one the most significant ones was its politicization of the under-privileged Shias of Lebanon.  The emergence of Hezbollah was very much part of that aspect of Iran’s involvement in that country. 

However, it is the U.S. invasion of Iraq that opened new vistas of opportunities for Iran, not just inside that country but on to the rest of the Middle East.  An important point that should be kept in mind is that the U.S. propaganda machine has also helped Iran by unwittingly overplaying its clout beyond its real scope.  Needless to say, such U.S. publicity suits the rulers of that country just fine.

The Sunni Arab countries—most significantly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan—are watching with a mixture of fascination and dismay as Iran has emerged as a major player inside Iraq since 2003.  Even when the Surge strategy implemented by General David Petraeus has deescalated violence and its related instability in Iraq, Iran is just standing around, it seems, waiting to see what the next major U.S. move is likely to be. 

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When President Obama entered the White House, the prospect of having a serious dialogue with Iran became part of his agenda.  Iran is now enjoying the kind of attention no Arab state has ever experienced.

Iran’s nuclear program is what is most troubling to the United States and the Sunni Arabs.  Even on this point, the U.S propaganda machine is doing a good job of exaggerating Arab fears.  Realistically speaking, Iran has no quarrels with the Arabs to use its nuclear weapons against them after acquiring it.  By the same token, a nuclear Iran’s best option is never even to threaten Israel with its use.  But these types of rational arguments are presented in the uppermost echelons of policymakers and behind closed doors.  No amount of cavalier attitude may be publicly expressed regarding Iran on this matter.   Any discussion that lowers the level of fear of Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is not part of conventional wisdom in the United States.

After the recent nuclear test conducted by North Korea, the Obama administration’s level of patience regarding Iran’s ostensible delaying tactics will be getting short.  The most important maneuver on the part of Iran is to see if it can successfully continue its nuclear program without forcing the United States to give it some sort of deadline.  It may not be important for Iran that it emerges as a nuclear power in the immediate future, as long as its scientists acquire the critical knowledge of manufacturing nuclear weapons, learn to miniaturize them, and master the coupling of their miniaturized nuclear tips to the long-range ballistic missiles.  Its leaders may realize that the time for developing nuclear weapons is not appropriate.  But the question is when would be the appropriate time for Iran.  Not in the foreseeable future. 

Alternatively, Iran might bite the bullet and declare one day that it has already developed nuclear weapons.  Then it will be up to the United States to figure out the next move.

If Iran were to become a nuclear power and still escape any attacks from the United States and Israel, then the Middle Eastern power hierarchy will experience considerable changes.  One has only to imagine what the status of Iran is likely to be vis-à-vis the United States.  The example of India is very much in front of Iran.  In 1998, India exploded its nuclear weapons and became a nuclear power.  By 2008, it signed a nuclear deal with the lone superpower without even signing the NPT and has gained access to cutting civilian and military technology.  That may not be a bad example for Iran to follow.  Such a potential might be one very crucial reason why Arab monarchs and dictators are worried about Iran.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States required not only a military response to the perpetrators, but a detailed and introspective look at its foreign policy.  But no such examination of foreign policy was carried out.  One right question was asked: “Why do they hate us?”  But that question got lost in the search for recrimination only.  The assumption underlying that question was that “they” were wrong in hating us because we did nothing wrong in the world, especially in the Muslim world.  Several wrong answers that America’s civilian leadership gave as a self response to the aforementioned question were that “they hate us because we are free and we love freedom.”  Or, “they hate us because of our way of life.”  Such responses made the Americans feel good about themselves.

However, the trouble with such “feel good” answers is that the leadership remains totally oblivious to the need for taking a hard look at the real policy-related reasons for any disgruntlement or hatred of America abroad.  Consequently, under the administration of George W. Bush, the United States went in a wrong direction in a big way.  The first step taken to punish the terrorists by dismantling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was the right one.  But America took a series of wrong steps for wrong reasons. 

The first was the invasion of Iraq.  At first, the rationale was that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.  But, once those weapons were not found, various other convenient justifications were made on a regular basis.  That action transformed Bush’s warning to the world—“either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”—into an ominous threat to countries that were on America’s list of “bad actors,” “rogue states,” or members of an imaginary “axis of evil.”  The only good thing that came out of that threat was Libya’s abandonment of its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.  However, Kim Jong Il of North Korea and the Iranian leaders took the notion of “regime change” to heart.  Consequently, North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, and Iran may be well on its way to do the same.

America’s image was tarnished immeasurably from its continued occupation of Iraq.  As any occupying force would do, it indulged in prison abuse, humiliation of the proud Iraqis by indulging in all activities that an occupying power deems necessary in the name of “security.”  But those activities made an enemy out of countless citizens of Iraq. 

The United States systematically sent “detainees” from Afghanistan and Iraq to various Arab countries where torture of prisoners is a way of life.  Much worse than that, the United States used torture as a regular tool for extracting information from the prisoners.  And America’s leaders at the highest levels of government approved the use of torture.

The most nettlesome thing that happened to the American hubris was that Iraq became a quagmire from which it was rescued only as a result of cooperation from the “Sons of Iraq.”  That comprised disgruntled Sunni insurgents who were tired of becoming the target of the murderous tactics of al-Qaida in Iraq.  They decided to cooperate with the occupiers and fight al-Qaida.  That development turned out to be a god-sent help to the American military, which was struggling in the Iraqi quagmire.  There was a recommendation from the prestigious Iraq Study Group that the United States cut its losses and get out of Iraq.  It should never be forgotten that what was known as the “surge” strategy inside the United States was a success only because of the timely cooperation from the Sons of Iraq.  

The Iraqi quagmire highlighted the limits of America’s military power.  That reality further emboldened North Korea and Iran.  One also has to recall the dissension caused by America’s invasion and continued occupation of Iraq in Europe, which is traditionally a friendly place for the United States.

Afghanistan, where the United States left the unfinished business of eradicating the presence and influence of al-Qaida, became a nightmare of the Bush administration.  When the worsening security situation made Pakistan a failing state, Washington got a wakeup call.  But the Bush presidency had already become a lameduck one.

Then the United States was hit by the economic meltdown, a reality that further exposed the limitations and growing vulnerability of the lone superpower.  The global chatter grew about the post-American world and its demise as the lone superpower.

The most important aspect of such suggestion is that presidential candidate Barack Obama’s clarion call for the need for change and “yes we can” were given new meaning on the part of the American electorates.  They were not only clamoring for new presidential leadership, but also were growing scared about the escalating personal economic decline related to the subprime mortgage crisis and other crises that hit Wall Street in 2008.

The election of Obama was the resounding call of the American electorates for a fresh start.  It was their resolve to give their new leader the mandate to bring about sweeping changes which would restore America’s global leadership, and, more to the point, transform America’s economic decline into progress and development on a steady basis. 

The inauguration of President Obama’s presidency is national hope—which started with the slogan of “yes we can”—for restoring American leadership, by making a clean break with the exercise of arrogance and hubris in the international arena.  It is the mark of a new era when numerous springs of new policies will start flowing from Washington in domestic and foreign policy.  It is about giving the American pluralism new meaning by empowering minorities, a process that began during the turbulence of the 1960s, but has been in dire need of broadening its scope.  It is about dealing with America’s allies with dignity, and conducting dialogues where the United States listens as well as talks.  It is about dealing with the world of Islam as a true friend, who wishes to see the development of democracy and equality in that part of the world, but not by issuing threats.  It is about the beginning of a new age when America will make a clean break from all failed policies of the past.  This is indeed a tall order, but that is that the only way of rejuvenating the “American spirit” and of restoring America’s global leadership.

The world of the 21^st Century is very different from the one from the preceding century.  The information revolution has entered into an era when it has empowered the East as well as the West.  It is an era when no powerful nation-state will be allowed to dictate its agenda to the weak.  The need for solving the increasingly complex economic problems is bringing together nations from different regions of the world.  It is an era when the economic meltdown has brought the rich and the not-so-rich nations together.  It is an era when Obama’s call of “yes we can” has a global meaning and is a source for hope.  There are no longer just American, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, or Arab problems.  Now, the world is facing truly human problems, which require all the best and brightest to get together and find solutions.  In that sense, Obama’s presidency appears most qualified to be in the lead.  If it succeeds in finding solutions to human problems in a humane and collective fashion, then American leadership will be restored decidedly.  Let us hope that “yes he will.”

So, the question is where is the threat to the U.S. security coming from?  There is no more USSR, no more Cold War, and no more “peer competitors.”  There is only one country that even comes close to being called a peer competitor, save the People’s Republic of China.  Even that country is not interested in militarily challenging the lone superpower.

Nuclear deterrence—the doctrine that stated that only a potential use of nuclear weapons would deter both the US and the USSR against attacking each other during the Cold War years—is not relevant anymore.  The USSR has imploded and its chief successor, Russia, is not a threat of any significance to the United States.  Under these circumstances, the lone superpower is using nuclear deterrence merely as a symbol of its awesome power.  There is no country left that could challenge it by using conventional power.  And the use of nuclear power against the United States by any nation-state will surely result in massive retaliation, which no nation-state wishes to experience.

However, for countries like North Korea and Iran, the concept of nuclear deterrence carries the same meaning as it did to deter the two superpowers during the Cold War years.  Both Pyongyang and Tehran feel that if they acquire it by developing nuclear weapons of their own, their regime survival is guaranteed.  They have seen what the United States did to Iraq under Saddam Hussein, knowing full well that it had no nuclear weapons.

Consequently, Pyongyang has already become a country with nuclear weapons.  A general understanding is that it possesses somewhere between 6-10 nuclear weapons.  Thus, the United States has proven the truth underlying the doctrine of nuclear deterrence: a nuclear-armed nation-state is not likely to be attacked even by the lone superpower.

Iran, on the contrary, falls into a different category.  It has not yet developed nuclear weapons of its own, but seems to be heading in that direction, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding.  Iran seems to be operating on the same unstated premise that its regime survival will only be guaranteed if it acquires nuclear weapons.

For Iran, the fear of American intention to bring about regime change is not the result of any paranoia.  It had experienced it in 1953, when the United States and the U.K. cooperated to overthrow a constitutionally elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq.  When the presidential election of June 2009 came under global scrutiny and controversy, the top leaders of Iran reacted harshly to protestors.  The fact that the CIA and British Intelligence spent a lot of money organizing street protests in 1953–which became the chief source of overthrowing the government of Dr. Mosaddeq–was very much on the minds of the current Iranian rulers when they ruthlessly put down protestors in the streets of urban Iran.  

Even though in 2009, Iran is a power of considerably higher significance than it was in 1953, its military power is totally insignificant when compared to the United States.  Moreover, in is made in Washington to take on Iran, at least purely from the perspective of the use of military power, Iran will be a sure loser. 

Iran’s considerable power stems from what its resistance forces can do to any invading forces once the main military operation comes to an end, very much like what happened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime.

In 2009, in the aftermath of the election-related instability, if anything, the rulers of Iran are likely to be even more determined than ever before to develop nuclear weapons.  Despite President Barack H. Obama’s overtures towards Iran, the fear of potential military action by United States against their country looms large among current Iranian rulers.

As they examine the whole spectrum of options at their disposal, the idea of developing nuclear weapons still appears attractive, despite the risks of an Israeli attack or even a U.S. military action.  The only question is not whether Iran would develop its own nuclear weapons, but exactly when it would do it. 

The only way the Iranian regime’s survival is guaranteed is if the regime acquires nuclear deterrence capabilities of its own.  That seems to be the dominant thinking, especially among Iran’s hardliners.  For Iran, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence means creating a “permanent” constraint or an obstacle in the way of the United States’ desire to bring about regime change.

Feith has written a book, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, and is using the opportunity of its promotion to push the neo-con line. He even appeared on Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show , one of the US’s most popular shows that specializes in spoofing daily news.

Even Paul Wolfowitz, former deputy secretary of defense, is making himself available to offer revisionist perspectives on the war in Iraq. The George W Bush administration’s chief neo-con, Vice President Dick Cheney, is likely to present his version of revision at the end of Bush’s presidency.

Rumsfeld is writing his own book explaining his take on the Iraq war, and so is former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Meyers, a staunch defender of the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003.

The purpose of this campaign can be interpreted as a move to develop a new school of revisionist history of the early 21st century in which the neo-cons and hawks will be heroes, rather than the villains. As a report in the Washington Independent said, “They see this fight for historical dominance as the last battle of the war in Iraq.”

These developments are taking place during a presidential campaign in which one of the candidates, Republican Senator John McCain, has emerged as a darling of the neo-cons, while his opponent, Democratic Senator Barack Obama, has staked his candidacy on a much more critical assessment of the Iraq war. Clearly, the post-George W Bush era will mark the return of the neo-cons to the corridors of power if McCain were to win the White House.

The neo-cons’ campaign to establish “uncontested American supremacy” without care for the long-term implications for the lone superpower’s global interests or reputation will start again with gusto.

The chances of a return to power for the neo-cons will improve markedly if Iran is attacked by Israel, with America’s connivance, before the presidential elections in November. The US and Israel, among others, consistently claim that Iran’s nuclear program is aimed at building nuclear weapons, while Tehran says it is solely for civilian purposes.

The “defanging” of Iran may not be discussed openly as an option during the presidential campaign, but it is increasingly envisaged as an important precondition for re-establishing America’s dominance in the Middle East.

That dominance appeared shaky while the insurgency in Iraq was at its peak in 2007. Now, since Iraq – relatively speaking – appears to be calming down, there is a rising hope among neo-cons that America’s clout in that region will rise. Iraq, though, may be experiencing a false sense of calm before the outbreak of another round of chaos.

Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army is a potent force capable of conducting asymmetric war against the US and Iraqi security forces, much as Hezbollah in Lebanon, another Shi’ite group, successfully saw off Israel in the summer of 2006. There are powerful linkages between the Sadrist forces of Iraq and Hezbollah, although it is not clear what operational collaboration and training exists between the two groups.

In the case of al-Qaeda in Iraq, it is very much on the defensive. However, if the Sadrists were to launch an asymmetric war, al-Qaeda and related groups would do their utmost to fully exploit the ensuing turbulence.

Afghanistan boils
In the Pakistani tribal areas and in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is resurgent and has established strong links with the Taliban, which continues to make gains against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Given that militants make good use of sanctuaries in the tribal areas, United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, given Pakistan’s reluctance, will eventually have to expand operations into Pakistan.

One such recent attack severely rattled Islamabad, any more and ties between the US and Pakistan, a key “war on terror” ally, would further deteriorate – something that would be most welcomed by Islamists in Pakistan.

As complex as these issues are, and as obdurate as the linkages between the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq appear, the potentially harmful implications of these variables to America’s strategic presence and interests in South Asia and the Middle East are not even mentioned by McCain and Obama.

Yet in the Middle East and South Asia regions battles are raging between Islamists who are determined to oust US forces and those who support a long-term American presence.

Supporters of the latter include Sunni rulers such as Saudi Arabia, but not the newly elected civilian leaders of Pakistan, who are waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections before deciding how close they want to be to Washington.

The current high sentiment of anti-Americanism in Pakistan is a fact they must weigh heavily. Besides, the leaders have other matters to consider. They have to deal with sections calling for the ouster of President Pervez Musharraf, who has been a staunch backer of the US over the past seven years.

In the Middle East, Sunni rulers are fearful of growing Iranian clout, but there is no suggestion of their support for an attack on Iran. They prefer not to antagonize the Bush administration, so they don’t publicly oppose military action, but they also don’t want to encourage Iran in its confrontation with the US. This deferential attitude of the Sunni rulers will strengthen the hands of the neo-cons, who very much want a military strike on Iran.

Should Obama, who has talked of staging dialogue with Iran, become president he has a chance of quieting the clamor for war, but his voice might not be enough.