The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States required not only a military response to the perpetrators, but a detailed and introspective look at its foreign policy.  But no such examination of foreign policy was carried out.  One right question was asked: “Why do they hate us?”  But that question got lost in the search for recrimination only.  The assumption underlying that question was that “they” were wrong in hating us because we did nothing wrong in the world, especially in the Muslim world.  Several wrong answers that America’s civilian leadership gave as a self response to the aforementioned question were that “they hate us because we are free and we love freedom.”  Or, “they hate us because of our way of life.”  Such responses made the Americans feel good about themselves.

However, the trouble with such “feel good” answers is that the leadership remains totally oblivious to the need for taking a hard look at the real policy-related reasons for any disgruntlement or hatred of America abroad.  Consequently, under the administration of George W. Bush, the United States went in a wrong direction in a big way.  The first step taken to punish the terrorists by dismantling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was the right one.  But America took a series of wrong steps for wrong reasons. 

The first was the invasion of Iraq.  At first, the rationale was that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.  But, once those weapons were not found, various other convenient justifications were made on a regular basis.  That action transformed Bush’s warning to the world—“either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”—into an ominous threat to countries that were on America’s list of “bad actors,” “rogue states,” or members of an imaginary “axis of evil.”  The only good thing that came out of that threat was Libya’s abandonment of its ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.  However, Kim Jong Il of North Korea and the Iranian leaders took the notion of “regime change” to heart.  Consequently, North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, and Iran may be well on its way to do the same.

America’s image was tarnished immeasurably from its continued occupation of Iraq.  As any occupying force would do, it indulged in prison abuse, humiliation of the proud Iraqis by indulging in all activities that an occupying power deems necessary in the name of “security.”  But those activities made an enemy out of countless citizens of Iraq. 

The United States systematically sent “detainees” from Afghanistan and Iraq to various Arab countries where torture of prisoners is a way of life.  Much worse than that, the United States used torture as a regular tool for extracting information from the prisoners.  And America’s leaders at the highest levels of government approved the use of torture.

The most nettlesome thing that happened to the American hubris was that Iraq became a quagmire from which it was rescued only as a result of cooperation from the “Sons of Iraq.”  That comprised disgruntled Sunni insurgents who were tired of becoming the target of the murderous tactics of al-Qaida in Iraq.  They decided to cooperate with the occupiers and fight al-Qaida.  That development turned out to be a god-sent help to the American military, which was struggling in the Iraqi quagmire.  There was a recommendation from the prestigious Iraq Study Group that the United States cut its losses and get out of Iraq.  It should never be forgotten that what was known as the “surge” strategy inside the United States was a success only because of the timely cooperation from the Sons of Iraq.  

The Iraqi quagmire highlighted the limits of America’s military power.  That reality further emboldened North Korea and Iran.  One also has to recall the dissension caused by America’s invasion and continued occupation of Iraq in Europe, which is traditionally a friendly place for the United States.

Afghanistan, where the United States left the unfinished business of eradicating the presence and influence of al-Qaida, became a nightmare of the Bush administration.  When the worsening security situation made Pakistan a failing state, Washington got a wakeup call.  But the Bush presidency had already become a lameduck one.

Then the United States was hit by the economic meltdown, a reality that further exposed the limitations and growing vulnerability of the lone superpower.  The global chatter grew about the post-American world and its demise as the lone superpower.

The most important aspect of such suggestion is that presidential candidate Barack Obama’s clarion call for the need for change and “yes we can” were given new meaning on the part of the American electorates.  They were not only clamoring for new presidential leadership, but also were growing scared about the escalating personal economic decline related to the subprime mortgage crisis and other crises that hit Wall Street in 2008.

The election of Obama was the resounding call of the American electorates for a fresh start.  It was their resolve to give their new leader the mandate to bring about sweeping changes which would restore America’s global leadership, and, more to the point, transform America’s economic decline into progress and development on a steady basis. 

The inauguration of President Obama’s presidency is national hope—which started with the slogan of “yes we can”—for restoring American leadership, by making a clean break with the exercise of arrogance and hubris in the international arena.  It is the mark of a new era when numerous springs of new policies will start flowing from Washington in domestic and foreign policy.  It is about giving the American pluralism new meaning by empowering minorities, a process that began during the turbulence of the 1960s, but has been in dire need of broadening its scope.  It is about dealing with America’s allies with dignity, and conducting dialogues where the United States listens as well as talks.  It is about dealing with the world of Islam as a true friend, who wishes to see the development of democracy and equality in that part of the world, but not by issuing threats.  It is about the beginning of a new age when America will make a clean break from all failed policies of the past.  This is indeed a tall order, but that is that the only way of rejuvenating the “American spirit” and of restoring America’s global leadership.

The world of the 21^st Century is very different from the one from the preceding century.  The information revolution has entered into an era when it has empowered the East as well as the West.  It is an era when no powerful nation-state will be allowed to dictate its agenda to the weak.  The need for solving the increasingly complex economic problems is bringing together nations from different regions of the world.  It is an era when the economic meltdown has brought the rich and the not-so-rich nations together.  It is an era when Obama’s call of “yes we can” has a global meaning and is a source for hope.  There are no longer just American, Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, or Arab problems.  Now, the world is facing truly human problems, which require all the best and brightest to get together and find solutions.  In that sense, Obama’s presidency appears most qualified to be in the lead.  If it succeeds in finding solutions to human problems in a humane and collective fashion, then American leadership will be restored decidedly.  Let us hope that “yes he will.”

The U.S. turned Iraq into hell between 2005 and 2006; Pakistan is steadily edging toward becoming a hellish place in the post-9/11 era; and Afghanistan is heading in that direction.  In the Horn of Africa, a similar situation prevails.

In the post-9/11 era, the militarily powerful nations have taken it upon themselves to set the “rules of engagement” for wars or war-like violence in Muslim lands, while the extremists are letting loose violence and mayhem from their side.  Iraq had its killing fields between 2005 and 2007, and Afghanistan’s most “fertile” killing fields started in the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union invaded it with a view to incorporating it into the Soviet empire.  Those killing fields continue to multiply in the first decade of the 21^st Century.  Lebanon’s killing fields come alive periodically, and—in view of its highly explosive internal dynamics—that country seems at the precipice of witnessing them on a regular basis.  Gaza’s killing fields are getting bloodier by the hour.  

The chief victims of this bloody phenomenon are the ordinary people, whose main aspirations is are to have productive careers, raise families, and live happily.  But happiness is increasingly becoming a rare commodity.

Here is the essence of the problem in many Muslim countries:  The U.S. has decided to wage violence in the name of that awful phrase “global war on terrorism,” which is as meaningless as the “war on poverty.”  Terrorism, like poverty, has been around forever, and no use of military power alone will eradicate it from the face of the earth.  Awful concepts like “regime change,” “preemptive war,” and the “war of choice” were applied to Muslim countries.  George W. Bush’s warning, “either you are with us or with the terrorists,” was also largely aimed at Muslim countries. 

The United States encountered something called the “Iraqi quagmire,” and almost lost its war in that country until the Sunni Muslims came to its rescue.  The same group (Sons of Iraq) is still crucial for the durability of peace and continued success of America’s “surge” strategy.  A strategy, which was aimed at clearing the hostile territory, by holding it, stationing security forces, and by rebuilding civilian authority and economic development.  But that is just one precondition; the other being a systematic inclusion of Sunni Muslims in the governance of Iraq.  Iraq remains a work in progress.  It is likely to return to its instability of 2005-2007, if the Sunnis do not become an important part of its ruling circles.

Israel has adopted the same approach—letting loose its military fury—in the name of establishing its “credible deterrence” among Arab nations, especially since it was humiliated by the Hezbollah in the “war” of July-August 2006.  Purely on a force-on-force basis, Israel did not lose that war.  Its mistake was that it established very precise goals of eradicating Hezbollah and having its own captive soldiers released.  When those objectives were not achieved and Israel stopped bombing Southern Lebanon, both the Western and the Arab media declared it the “loser” of that war.  To Israel’s bitter resentment, the Hezbollah not only survived, but became an inordinately popular organization in the Arab streets, as well as in Lebanon.  As such, it also challenged the governing authority of the U.S.-backed government of Premier Fouad Siniora.  Siniora has remained a weak head of the government in Lebanon primarily, if not solely, because Washington supports him.  Consequently, the legitimacy of the government in Lebanon remains shaky, at best. 

It has been a long-established fact that no outside power can institute its credibility inside a country through the use of military force or through occupation alone.  That is a universal principle. 

Syria learned that lesson at the end of many years of occupying Lebanon.  The U.S. has also learned that bitter reality after remaining an occupying power in Iraq for the past eight years.  It is likely to face the same fate in Afghanistan.  Israel refuses to learn that lesson as it invades Gaza and remains an occupying power of Palestine.  The gloomiest fact of that occupation is that the mounting toll of Palestinians will create new generations of even more enduring—and even more radical-minded—resistance to Israel than Hezbollah and Hamas have thus far demonstrated.

Unlike the historical accord between the U.S. military and the Sons of Iraq, no basis of rapprochement has been established between Israel and the Palestinians.  The Oslo Peace Accords of the early 1990s are long dead and buried.  Israel does not want to trade land for peace, and the Palestinians are much too divided to offer the Jewish state a great deal of confidence that they are ready to live in peace with their Jewish counterparts. 

Israel played a crucial role, if not in the creation of Hamas, then in definitely enhancing the presence and clout of that organization in the occupied territory many years ago.  As an Israeli historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Zeev Sternell, stated, “Israel thought that it was a smart ploy to push the Islamists against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).”  Today, Hamas is the governing authority in Gaza.  Ironically, Israel’s stated objective of waging a war against Gaza is to weaken, if not eliminate, Hamas. 

However, no matter how badly the military conflict damages Hamas, it is likely to emerge as the most popular organization within the occupied Palestine as well as in the rest of the Muslim world.  According to a news dispatch from Egypt, “As the war in Gaza burned though its 14^th day, Arab governments have felt their legitimacy challenged with an uncommon virulence.”  It adds, “With each passing day, and each Palestinian death, the popularity of Hamas and other radical movements has ratcheted higher on the Arab street, while the standing of Arab leaders has suffered.”

The frustrations of the Arab masses stem from a reason that is larger than the occupation of Palestine, even though the mounting suffering of the Palestinians is also adding further fuel to those frustrations.  The chief reason for the Arab frustrations is the presence of authoritarian rule, which lingers on like an eternal curse over their existence.  From their point of view, their collective suffering will not end unless the United States stops supporting the status quo in their countries.  From the U.S. side, that authoritarian rule-based status quo is preferred over the alternative–the return of Islamist rule.  Two examples continue to haunt the U.S. decisionmakers–the Islamist-dominated rule in Iraq and the successful emergence of Hamas as the ruling entity after the elections of January 2006.  The Arab autocrats in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia suffer from the same fear.  The emergence of Hamas as the governing body over Palestine did not end their internal turbulence. 

The plight of the Palestinians was worsened when, after a bitter fight between Hamas and Fatah in June 2007, the latter took over the West bank, while Hamas maintained its political control of Gaza.  However, Hamas was unable to make a breakthrough regarding reaching a peace an agreement with Israel. 

Egypt did bring about a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in June 2008.  That agreement ended early last November.  The fact that Hamas was describing that agreement as tahdiya (a period of calm, which is temporary), as opposed to hudna (truce, which is concrete and lasting) underscored the fact that it was only a tactical maneuver.  The leaders of Hamas were adamant about describing on Al-Jazeera a tahdiya as “a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the framework of the resistance [meaning all forms of struggle].” The Israelis were not willing to fall for that ploy.  That so-called tahdiya ended early last November.  The escalating violence between the two sides since then has led to the Israeli military invasion of Gaza.

The systematic destruction of the already feeble institutional infrastructures and mounting human misery has already transformed Gaza into a hellish place.  Even though Hamas challenged Israel, and even though Hamas is also largely responsible for the breakdown of the tahdiya, the fact that Israel has been wreaking major havoc and is responsible for mounting civilian deaths in Gaza, Hamas’ popularity is most likely to escalate.  

In a perverse way, similar conditions prevail in Afghanistan.  The Western occupation forces are attempting to strengthen the authority of the government of President Hamid Karzai, whom most Pushtoon regard as a puppet of the United States.  The legitimacy of the Karzai government is a shrinking commodity.  Historically speaking, the occupiers of Afghanistan—from Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union—have faced nothing but bloody battles and resulting defeat.  The Taliban—who are primarily Pushtoon—know that fact only too well.  They also know that history is on their side, as long as they do not let up on the use of violence.  The United States cannot afford to lose in Afghanistan, and the Taliban refuse to seek a rapprochement with the Karzai government.  In the process, Afghanistan has become a hellish place.

No single actor is more responsible in Pakistan’s emergence as a highly unstable country than Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Huq.  The former started the process of Islamization of that country, and the latter took it to the extreme.  The practice of using an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam, which was intensified under Zia’s rule, was continued under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, but with a different twist. 

Zia was forthright about his commitment to the extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam and used it unabashedly to maintain himself in power.  Musharraf, on the contrary, was duplicitous and cunning.  He presented the face of moderation toward the American interlocutor, while sustaining his alliance with the Islamists inside his country, especially in Baluchistan and in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The extremist Islamist forces had a clear sense that Musharraf was creating a façade of suppressing or containing them.  They understood that game and played along until they decided to take on the Army, after the massacre at the Lal Masjid (red mosque) on July 13, 2007.  That bloody event marked the beginning of the end of the Musharraf regime.  But when he was forced out of office and democracy returned to Pakistan, it was a feeble government while extremist forces were very much on the offensive.

The continued escalated pace of violence—which resulted in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, and an assassination attempt on the life of Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani on September 3, 2008—numerous suicide attacks and the resultant deaths of civilians as well as military personnel, leave little doubt about the march of Pakistan toward further instability.

As the United States gets ready to enlarge the presence of its troops in Afghanistan, the biggest question is whether the Surge strategy can be successfully implemented in Afghanistan.  Even if one were to be optimistic about such prospects, it should be kept in mind that stability and security of Afghanistan has been intrinsically linked to the security and stability of Pakistan since the 1980s.  The United States has known that fact.  But, under the administration of President Barack Obama, it might not remember, at its own peril.

In summarizing the overall situation in many Muslim countries, what is needed in Gaza, for starters, is a reinstatement of indirect negotiations between the parties, with Egypt serving, once again, as an intermediary.  After that, the only alternative for the Obama administration will be to plunge itself into endless rounds of negotiations, first with Hamas and Fatah, and then by bringing all Arab and Israeli contenders to the negotiating table. 

Even under the heap of mounting bitterness, the Palestinians know that the United States is the only actor that can exercise its influence on Israel.  This is not about putting pressure on the Jewish state.  Israelis know better than anyone else that there is no way they can resolve the conflict with the Palestinians by resorting to military force alone.   However, there is no denial of the significant role of an intermediary.  And only the U.S. can play that role, largely because Israel trusts the U.S., and also because it is a major recipient of U.S. military and economic assistance.  Besides, the Obama administration does not carry the same baggage of high partisanship that the Bush administration demonstrated toward Israel.

In South Asia, there is an urgent need for the application of a new “surge” strategy.  Such a strategy must treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as two sides of the same coin and it should be multi-dimensional.  Its features include massive economic assistance, revision of educational curricula, building of civilian infrastructure, implementation of civil-military relations that assign supremacy of civilian authority, eradication of the opium trade culture, and elimination of the proliferation of small arms from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

The chief tactic to escalate the feeling of security in the Pakistani ruling circles (of which the Pakistan Army is the most important part) is to ensure that India has minimal diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.  Any heightened Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan—which is the current reality on the ground—will motivate Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan, fearing collusion between Afghanistan and India, whose purpose it is to destabilize Pakistan.  A general suspicion is that Pakistan’s highly secretive intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), sponsored the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Afghanistan in July 2008. 

The most unfortunate part of the current reality is that both Pakistan and Afghanistan have become fertile places for the mushrooming of extremism.  The deteriorating quality of life in those countries—as is also the case in occupied Palestine—is definitely adding further momentum for the growth of that phenomenon.  No simple solution that comprises only the use of military force will work.  In the pre-surge days, Iraq was the primary example of that fact.  It was only through the multidimensional application of the surge strategy that Iraq is making steady progress toward political stability.  That reality becomes a powerful argument for the implementation of the aforementioned multidimensional strategy in Afghanistan.

There is some reason to be optimistic, however, that the United States will develop a sophisticated understanding of the significance of Pakistan in the coming days.  According to a recent New York Times dispatch, the outgoing Bush administration has handed over to the Obama transition team a lengthy report on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That report concluded, “that in the end, the United States has far more at stake in preventing Pakistan’s collapse than it does in stabilizing Afghanistan or Iraq.”

America’s so-called war on terror is developing a new focus—the frequent violation of Pakistani sovereignty through the use of UAV attacks and rapid raids by U.S. Special Forces.  This focus will continue, no matter who is sitting in the White House come January.  And the contours of that policy are emerging here in the waning days of George W. Bush’s presidency.

As Iraq appears to be calming down, U.S. national security officials are worried about the worsening of the security situation in Afghanistan.  What especially concerns them is that the arguable success of the Surge strategy in Iraq cannot be duplicated in Afghanistan.  The success of the Surge is not because it is a brilliant strategy.  In fact, there is nothing new about its modalities of “clear, hold, and build.”  Its success became possible entirely because of the decision made by the Sahwa or the “Awakening” movement (aka Sons of Iraq) to abandon a posture of suffering at the hands of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) terrorists without even lifting a finger, and joining the ranks of the U.S. military to fight them.  The U.S. forces were always in search of a way to gain support from some indigenous groups to fight against the AQI, and the Sons-of-Iraq support became the golden opportunity for the U.S. occupation forces–an opportunity that was fully exploited.

The confluence of the Sahwa movement’s decision to cooperate with the U.S. and the implementation of the Surge strategy was a sui generis historical development.  It may not be repeated anywhere else.  It is certainly not applicable in Afghanistan for several reasons.  First, the majority of the Afghan—which means the Pushtoon—envisage the Western forces as “enemies” of Islam and of the Pushtoon. 

Secondly, the Islamic zealotry of Afghanistan is also quite unique in nature and is a matter of historical significance.  They had shown that zeal in their fight against the Soviet military in the 1980s, which were considered as occupiers of Islamic Afghanistan.  Today’s U.S.-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are similarly depicted as foreign occupiers who should be expelled.  The U.S. campaign of public diplomacy has been copious in emphasizing that it is not present as an occupier.  But now we know how miserably that campaign failed. 

Thirdly, as Pakistan was supporting the Mujahideen forces in the 1980s (along with the United States), today’s Pakistan is not so openly supporting the Taliban-al-Qaida nexus, despite the fact that they are fighting Western forces.  The reason underlying this Pakistani policy is highly complicated.  It partially stems from the fact that Pakistan has become a country of a democratically elected government, which is trying to find its bearings.  In the process, it does not really know what is going to work in its dealings with the Islamists of the Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA regions:  negotiations or military action, a combination of the two, and especially when to apply what tactic.  It has negotiated a “peace” agreement, which is regularly being violated.  The position of the Pakistani Army on this issue is far from clear at this point.

What is most important to bear in mind is the fact that, despite all the confusion about how to deal with the Pakistani Taliban and other Islamist groups in that country, the Pakistani government of all stripes is always very clear about India’s presence in Afghanistan, especially when it comes to the proportion that it has now. 

As the chief supporter of the Karzai government, the United States either did not bother to be sensitive about that issue, or has started to see India as so much a part of its strategic partnership in the region that it refuses to even empathize with the security concerns of Pakistan regarding the high Indian presence in Afghanistan.

What choices does Pakistan really have about lowering the Indian presence in Afghanistan?  Conventionally speaking, none.  However, there is that Taliban or   Islamist card that it has at its disposal, with the greatest benefit of using that card being deniability.  There is no suggestion here that Pakistan has used this option.  However, it has already been accused of using it by U.S. sources.

In the post-Musharraf era, the United States has no anchor in Pakistan to rely on.  So, it is very much a possibility that a decision has been made to intensify the use of the UAV and drones to attack and kill high-value targets in the Pakistan-Afghan border region, and even to use the Special Forces.  It is also likely that, at the conclusion of the recent highly publicized meeting between Pakistani and American top military brass on a U.S. naval ship, an understanding has been reached whereby the U.S. has been given a green light to use the drones as well as its Special Forces.  The only caveat might be that the Pakistani civilian leaders, and especially its Army leadership, will express a lot of public outrage every time those options are used.  Through such charades of ranting, Pakistani leaders can create a semblance of being angry with the United States’ violation of their sovereignty.  As long as they don’t take any visible action that would escalate the chances of skirmishes between the Pakistani and U.S. military forces on the Pak-Afghan borders, those ranting will not have any palpable impact.

But even these periodic attacks inside Pakistan are not likely to make a visible deterioration in the military capabilities of the Islamist forces.  That is why there is already a notable agreement between Senators Barack Obama and John McCain about the use of military forces inside Pakistan in the future.  In fact, on that point, Obama underscored a major difference between his approach to fight against terrorism versus that of McCain’s.  However, now both candidates agree on mounting attacks inside Pakistan.

No matter who wins the White House in 2009, the groundwork of attacking the Islamist forces inside Pakistan has already been laid by the Bush administration.  The next President has to develop further contours of that policy.  About the only way this option will be postponed is if the security situation in Iraq worsens in the coming months.

The United States has yet to learn that the so-called global war against terrorism cannot be fought and won purely through the use of military power.  Whatever success it has attained in Iraq in fighting the terrorists was the outcome of a strategy—Surge—that emphasized a combination of politics, economics, and the use of military force.  But, since that strategy appears unworkable in Afghanistan, the next administration will tread the familiar path of using the military to eradicate the terrorists with very little attention to the implementation of its other tools of national power.