The administration of President Barack H. Obama has started the highly intricate process of developing its own strategy with a bang in different regions of the world.  Here are the ingredients of that strategy: multilateralism, looking for a fresh start—which promises to be substantially different from the preceding administration—search for common ground involving Russia, invitation of negotiations with America’s traditional adversaries like Iran and North Korea, and at least the initial hope that approaches toward Palestine, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are likely to be radically different than the one the Bush administration pursued unsuccessfully.  This is a huge agenda.  But Obama’s administration has the enormous characteristic of freshness, metaphorically as well as substantively, in the sense that it is not carrying any baggage that had so infamously bogged down George W. Bush in an ostensibly endless inertia.

President Obama has insisted in talking to everyone, especially to America’s traditional adversaries.  Talking is better than not talking, he uncomplicatedly observed during the presidential campaign.  America’s strict observance of this principle promises to open a lot of doors.  It will also lower the feeling of fear and paranoia on the part of Iran and North Korea, who were simplistically and wrongly depicted by the Bush administration as members of an imaginary “axis of evil.”

Multilateralism has served America’s interest in its entire post-World War II history.  The United States led the Herculean task of rebuilding global economic institutions and regimes like the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.  America had the required economic prowess while other global actors—the Soviet Union, the U.K. and France—were simply exhausted with their economies devastated by the ravages of war.  But it was the frame of mind and global vision of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt more than America’s economic power that enabled the United States to become the leader of the so-called “free world,” a position it has never really relinquished, even today.

America’s leadership position was seriously—and hopefully not permanently—damaged in the post-9/11 era, when unilateralism and the hubris of the Bush administration acted like termites,  voraciously eating up most of the goodwill that the United states had created all over the world.

Obama is off to a good start.  He already has spoken to the world of Islam, stating that America will deal with it respectfully and on the basis of pragmatism; he has invited Iran to unclench its fist and initiate an era of negotiations on the basis of mutual respect; and he has appointed George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as special envoys for Middle East and South Asia, respectively.  He has sent his Vice President, Joe Biden, to talk to the Europeans and to the Russians. 

Cumulatively speaking, this is a radical departure from the Bush administration.   Now, an intricate series of negotiations must start.  What the Obama administration must keep in mind is the fact that although it is approaching a number of actors with an open mind and unclenched fist, it may not get an immediate enthusiastic response or positive results.

In the case of Russia, the United States is faced with a country that has decided to become significant by taking the wrong route of unilateralism and hubris, which were hallmarks of the Communist superpower.  Russia cannot assert itself in that manner toward its neighbors, who have the bitter experience of being the captives of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) throughout the Cold War years, and then wonder why they so eagerly seek the shield of NATO.  Russia’s neighbors are watching warily, and with dismay, the incessant de-democratization of that country.   They do not know what to make of Russia’s energy-related assertiveness, which has taken the form of neo-mercantilism.  They watched in horror Russia’s clear over-reaction to the stupid decision of Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia to confront it militarily.

While Vice President Joe Biden is suggesting that the United States wants to “press the reset button” of ties with Moscow, Russia was busy working up a deal with Kyrgyzstan, whereby its President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, invited the United States to get out of the Manas air base, a development that will complicate America’s logistical problems of keeping the supply lines open to its forces in Afghanistan.  However, the stateship of Russia also works like an aircraft carrier: it changes its direction rather slowly.  Thus, it will be awhile before positive responses to the U.S. overtures might emerge.  While it does not pay to be overly pessimistic about Russia’s response, one does not have to hold ones breath for a long time to envisage such a development.  The signals regarding Russia’s willingness to cooperate, or not, will come soon enough.

The U.S.-Iran ties have mammoth complications of their own.  The first hurdle is the bad blood related to America’s support for Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from 1953 through 1978.  That era has the same legacy of shame and bitterness for Iran as China’s memories related to the “decades of humiliations” at the hands of the West and Japan.  At the same time, the United States has not forgotten the ignominy it had suffered during the “hostage crisis” of the late 1970s.  That crisis also played a dominant role in making Jimmy Carter a one-term President. 

The second hurdle is America’s Iran-Libya Sanction Legislation, which Iran envisions (quite correctly) as aimed at bringing about “regime change.”  All such legislation has to be categorically nullified before any serious negotiations take place between Washington and Tehran.  The United States has to accept the legitimacy of the Iranian government if it wishes to give real meaning to negotiating with it from the position of “mutual respect.”

The third hurdle is Iran’s nuclear research program, which the United States regards as aimed at developing nuclear weapons.  While it is hard to categorize America’s concerns as baseless, one must also fully understand Iran’s security concerns.  Iran has the same sense of insecurity that drove India to seek nuclear weapons.  At least India had the tacit support of, and some semblance of security guarantees from, the FSU while it was around.  Iran had no such support or guarantees from any major power.  What country would come to its assistance if the United States were to decide to bring about regime change in Iran?  What great power came to Iraq’s rescue when Iraq was similarly threatened by the Bush administration?  Could Iraq have gone through the bloody process of regime change if it had had nuclear weapons?  These questions are uppermost in the minds of the Ayatollahs, who are cavalierly and regularly demonized in America’s press and academic journals.

The negotiations between the United States and Iran have to seriously address Iran’s security concerns.  Given the nature of hostile attitudes that have prevailed between the two actors, it is hard to imagine a scenario when the lone superpower can believably guarantee Iran’s security and foreswear all actions aimed at regime change.  Even some European countries’ attempts to give verbal security guarantees to Iran will not do.  Thus, the nuclear issue remains a very obdurate problem between the two.  The Obama administration must summon all its creativity to resolve this aspect of U.S.-Iran conflict before any semblance of “normalcy” is restored between the two.

If one were to believe North Korea, it is already a nuclear power.  It has had a legacy of confronting a number of U.S. presidents who have threatened it with the use of nuclear weapons.  About the only realistic possibility under which Pyongyang might unravel its nuclear weapons is if it is protected under the nuclear umbrella of the People’s Republic of China.  That angle has not been pursued either by the U.S., the Chinese, or the North Koreans, at least in their unclassified diplomatic meetings.  In the absence of a nuclear umbrella, it is well-nigh impossible to imagine a circumstance under which Kim Jong Il would give up his nuclear weapons.   It might not be a bad idea for the Obama administration to consider pursuing that angle in future negotiations with the North Koreans and the Chinese.

The Palestinian-Israeli issue is a hostage to the upcoming Israeli elections.  If Benjamin Netanyahu is elected, then all bets are off about any resolution that is acceptable to the Likud and Hamas.  These two parties are equally fundamentalist and bull-headed about pursuing their respective version of the solution.  George Mitchell is likely to forget how complicated the Irish conflict was while he will tries to find common ground between the inflexible positions of Hamas and Likud.  On this issue, the U.S. strategy is likely to face frequent impasses. 

Regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan, the challenge for the Obama administration is no less daunting than the preceding issues.  Those two countries are places where al-Qaida has emerged as a major force.  The question is how to deal with the rising tide of religious extremism and problems of failing and weak governments.  President Obama wrongly considers that the immediate solution is in increasing the number of troops, since that approach supposedly helped lower the spiral of violence in stabilizing Iraq.  The fact is that it is much more complicated than that.  It was the fortuitous confluence of the decision of the “Sons of Iraq” to cooperate with the U.S. military against al-Qaida, along with the U.S. military’s decision not only to strengthen its number, but also to implement the “clear, hold, and build” strategy that helped stabilize Iraq.  The question is whether the Obama administration has correctly understood what actually transpired in Iraq, or is it merely repeating the process of raising the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan as a panacea for stabilizing that country.  The burden of evidence thus far is that it has not understood the intricacies of Afghanistan and is about to commit itself with the wrong-minded approach of using the military tool of America’s national power to resolve an enormously complicated situation.

Pakistan is a larger challenge than Afghanistan, in the sense that it not only negatively affects the stability of Afghanistan but also similarly affects the internal stability of India.  The Mumbai terrorist attacks have proven that fact.  The most ignored—and an extremely important—fact of South Asia is that neither India nor Afghanistan will be stable or peaceful places as long as highly visible measures are taken to soothe the security-related concerns of Pakistan involving India.  An important aspect of that concern is the lowering of India’s presence in Afghanistan, which Pakistan (rightly or wrongly) perceives as foreboding to its own security.  The Bush administration ignored that fact; and the Obama administration will ignore it at the risk of damaging its own interests in South Asia.

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President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have emphasized America’s resolve to use pragmatism, cordiality, realism, and firmness in its foreign policy toward the troubled regions of the world and about soothing the security-related concerns of America’s friends and especially its competitors and adversaries.  The coming months will be crucial to test their authenticity of purpose.

The U.S. turned Iraq into hell between 2005 and 2006; Pakistan is steadily edging toward becoming a hellish place in the post-9/11 era; and Afghanistan is heading in that direction.  In the Horn of Africa, a similar situation prevails.

In the post-9/11 era, the militarily powerful nations have taken it upon themselves to set the “rules of engagement” for wars or war-like violence in Muslim lands, while the extremists are letting loose violence and mayhem from their side.  Iraq had its killing fields between 2005 and 2007, and Afghanistan’s most “fertile” killing fields started in the late 1970s, when the Soviet Union invaded it with a view to incorporating it into the Soviet empire.  Those killing fields continue to multiply in the first decade of the 21^st Century.  Lebanon’s killing fields come alive periodically, and—in view of its highly explosive internal dynamics—that country seems at the precipice of witnessing them on a regular basis.  Gaza’s killing fields are getting bloodier by the hour.  

The chief victims of this bloody phenomenon are the ordinary people, whose main aspirations is are to have productive careers, raise families, and live happily.  But happiness is increasingly becoming a rare commodity.

Here is the essence of the problem in many Muslim countries:  The U.S. has decided to wage violence in the name of that awful phrase “global war on terrorism,” which is as meaningless as the “war on poverty.”  Terrorism, like poverty, has been around forever, and no use of military power alone will eradicate it from the face of the earth.  Awful concepts like “regime change,” “preemptive war,” and the “war of choice” were applied to Muslim countries.  George W. Bush’s warning, “either you are with us or with the terrorists,” was also largely aimed at Muslim countries. 

The United States encountered something called the “Iraqi quagmire,” and almost lost its war in that country until the Sunni Muslims came to its rescue.  The same group (Sons of Iraq) is still crucial for the durability of peace and continued success of America’s “surge” strategy.  A strategy, which was aimed at clearing the hostile territory, by holding it, stationing security forces, and by rebuilding civilian authority and economic development.  But that is just one precondition; the other being a systematic inclusion of Sunni Muslims in the governance of Iraq.  Iraq remains a work in progress.  It is likely to return to its instability of 2005-2007, if the Sunnis do not become an important part of its ruling circles.

Israel has adopted the same approach—letting loose its military fury—in the name of establishing its “credible deterrence” among Arab nations, especially since it was humiliated by the Hezbollah in the “war” of July-August 2006.  Purely on a force-on-force basis, Israel did not lose that war.  Its mistake was that it established very precise goals of eradicating Hezbollah and having its own captive soldiers released.  When those objectives were not achieved and Israel stopped bombing Southern Lebanon, both the Western and the Arab media declared it the “loser” of that war.  To Israel’s bitter resentment, the Hezbollah not only survived, but became an inordinately popular organization in the Arab streets, as well as in Lebanon.  As such, it also challenged the governing authority of the U.S.-backed government of Premier Fouad Siniora.  Siniora has remained a weak head of the government in Lebanon primarily, if not solely, because Washington supports him.  Consequently, the legitimacy of the government in Lebanon remains shaky, at best. 

It has been a long-established fact that no outside power can institute its credibility inside a country through the use of military force or through occupation alone.  That is a universal principle. 

Syria learned that lesson at the end of many years of occupying Lebanon.  The U.S. has also learned that bitter reality after remaining an occupying power in Iraq for the past eight years.  It is likely to face the same fate in Afghanistan.  Israel refuses to learn that lesson as it invades Gaza and remains an occupying power of Palestine.  The gloomiest fact of that occupation is that the mounting toll of Palestinians will create new generations of even more enduring—and even more radical-minded—resistance to Israel than Hezbollah and Hamas have thus far demonstrated.

Unlike the historical accord between the U.S. military and the Sons of Iraq, no basis of rapprochement has been established between Israel and the Palestinians.  The Oslo Peace Accords of the early 1990s are long dead and buried.  Israel does not want to trade land for peace, and the Palestinians are much too divided to offer the Jewish state a great deal of confidence that they are ready to live in peace with their Jewish counterparts. 

Israel played a crucial role, if not in the creation of Hamas, then in definitely enhancing the presence and clout of that organization in the occupied territory many years ago.  As an Israeli historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Zeev Sternell, stated, “Israel thought that it was a smart ploy to push the Islamists against the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).”  Today, Hamas is the governing authority in Gaza.  Ironically, Israel’s stated objective of waging a war against Gaza is to weaken, if not eliminate, Hamas. 

However, no matter how badly the military conflict damages Hamas, it is likely to emerge as the most popular organization within the occupied Palestine as well as in the rest of the Muslim world.  According to a news dispatch from Egypt, “As the war in Gaza burned though its 14^th day, Arab governments have felt their legitimacy challenged with an uncommon virulence.”  It adds, “With each passing day, and each Palestinian death, the popularity of Hamas and other radical movements has ratcheted higher on the Arab street, while the standing of Arab leaders has suffered.”

The frustrations of the Arab masses stem from a reason that is larger than the occupation of Palestine, even though the mounting suffering of the Palestinians is also adding further fuel to those frustrations.  The chief reason for the Arab frustrations is the presence of authoritarian rule, which lingers on like an eternal curse over their existence.  From their point of view, their collective suffering will not end unless the United States stops supporting the status quo in their countries.  From the U.S. side, that authoritarian rule-based status quo is preferred over the alternative–the return of Islamist rule.  Two examples continue to haunt the U.S. decisionmakers–the Islamist-dominated rule in Iraq and the successful emergence of Hamas as the ruling entity after the elections of January 2006.  The Arab autocrats in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia suffer from the same fear.  The emergence of Hamas as the governing body over Palestine did not end their internal turbulence. 

The plight of the Palestinians was worsened when, after a bitter fight between Hamas and Fatah in June 2007, the latter took over the West bank, while Hamas maintained its political control of Gaza.  However, Hamas was unable to make a breakthrough regarding reaching a peace an agreement with Israel. 

Egypt did bring about a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel in June 2008.  That agreement ended early last November.  The fact that Hamas was describing that agreement as tahdiya (a period of calm, which is temporary), as opposed to hudna (truce, which is concrete and lasting) underscored the fact that it was only a tactical maneuver.  The leaders of Hamas were adamant about describing on Al-Jazeera a tahdiya as “a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the framework of the resistance [meaning all forms of struggle].” The Israelis were not willing to fall for that ploy.  That so-called tahdiya ended early last November.  The escalating violence between the two sides since then has led to the Israeli military invasion of Gaza.

The systematic destruction of the already feeble institutional infrastructures and mounting human misery has already transformed Gaza into a hellish place.  Even though Hamas challenged Israel, and even though Hamas is also largely responsible for the breakdown of the tahdiya, the fact that Israel has been wreaking major havoc and is responsible for mounting civilian deaths in Gaza, Hamas’ popularity is most likely to escalate.  

In a perverse way, similar conditions prevail in Afghanistan.  The Western occupation forces are attempting to strengthen the authority of the government of President Hamid Karzai, whom most Pushtoon regard as a puppet of the United States.  The legitimacy of the Karzai government is a shrinking commodity.  Historically speaking, the occupiers of Afghanistan—from Alexander the Great to the Soviet Union—have faced nothing but bloody battles and resulting defeat.  The Taliban—who are primarily Pushtoon—know that fact only too well.  They also know that history is on their side, as long as they do not let up on the use of violence.  The United States cannot afford to lose in Afghanistan, and the Taliban refuse to seek a rapprochement with the Karzai government.  In the process, Afghanistan has become a hellish place.

No single actor is more responsible in Pakistan’s emergence as a highly unstable country than Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Huq.  The former started the process of Islamization of that country, and the latter took it to the extreme.  The practice of using an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam, which was intensified under Zia’s rule, was continued under the rule of General Pervez Musharraf, but with a different twist. 

Zia was forthright about his commitment to the extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam and used it unabashedly to maintain himself in power.  Musharraf, on the contrary, was duplicitous and cunning.  He presented the face of moderation toward the American interlocutor, while sustaining his alliance with the Islamists inside his country, especially in Baluchistan and in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The extremist Islamist forces had a clear sense that Musharraf was creating a façade of suppressing or containing them.  They understood that game and played along until they decided to take on the Army, after the massacre at the Lal Masjid (red mosque) on July 13, 2007.  That bloody event marked the beginning of the end of the Musharraf regime.  But when he was forced out of office and democracy returned to Pakistan, it was a feeble government while extremist forces were very much on the offensive.

The continued escalated pace of violence—which resulted in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, and an assassination attempt on the life of Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani on September 3, 2008—numerous suicide attacks and the resultant deaths of civilians as well as military personnel, leave little doubt about the march of Pakistan toward further instability.

As the United States gets ready to enlarge the presence of its troops in Afghanistan, the biggest question is whether the Surge strategy can be successfully implemented in Afghanistan.  Even if one were to be optimistic about such prospects, it should be kept in mind that stability and security of Afghanistan has been intrinsically linked to the security and stability of Pakistan since the 1980s.  The United States has known that fact.  But, under the administration of President Barack Obama, it might not remember, at its own peril.

In summarizing the overall situation in many Muslim countries, what is needed in Gaza, for starters, is a reinstatement of indirect negotiations between the parties, with Egypt serving, once again, as an intermediary.  After that, the only alternative for the Obama administration will be to plunge itself into endless rounds of negotiations, first with Hamas and Fatah, and then by bringing all Arab and Israeli contenders to the negotiating table. 

Even under the heap of mounting bitterness, the Palestinians know that the United States is the only actor that can exercise its influence on Israel.  This is not about putting pressure on the Jewish state.  Israelis know better than anyone else that there is no way they can resolve the conflict with the Palestinians by resorting to military force alone.   However, there is no denial of the significant role of an intermediary.  And only the U.S. can play that role, largely because Israel trusts the U.S., and also because it is a major recipient of U.S. military and economic assistance.  Besides, the Obama administration does not carry the same baggage of high partisanship that the Bush administration demonstrated toward Israel.

In South Asia, there is an urgent need for the application of a new “surge” strategy.  Such a strategy must treat Pakistan and Afghanistan as two sides of the same coin and it should be multi-dimensional.  Its features include massive economic assistance, revision of educational curricula, building of civilian infrastructure, implementation of civil-military relations that assign supremacy of civilian authority, eradication of the opium trade culture, and elimination of the proliferation of small arms from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

The chief tactic to escalate the feeling of security in the Pakistani ruling circles (of which the Pakistan Army is the most important part) is to ensure that India has minimal diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.  Any heightened Indian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan—which is the current reality on the ground—will motivate Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan, fearing collusion between Afghanistan and India, whose purpose it is to destabilize Pakistan.  A general suspicion is that Pakistan’s highly secretive intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), sponsored the terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Afghanistan in July 2008. 

The most unfortunate part of the current reality is that both Pakistan and Afghanistan have become fertile places for the mushrooming of extremism.  The deteriorating quality of life in those countries—as is also the case in occupied Palestine—is definitely adding further momentum for the growth of that phenomenon.  No simple solution that comprises only the use of military force will work.  In the pre-surge days, Iraq was the primary example of that fact.  It was only through the multidimensional application of the surge strategy that Iraq is making steady progress toward political stability.  That reality becomes a powerful argument for the implementation of the aforementioned multidimensional strategy in Afghanistan.

There is some reason to be optimistic, however, that the United States will develop a sophisticated understanding of the significance of Pakistan in the coming days.  According to a recent New York Times dispatch, the outgoing Bush administration has handed over to the Obama transition team a lengthy report on Afghanistan and Pakistan.  That report concluded, “that in the end, the United States has far more at stake in preventing Pakistan’s collapse than it does in stabilizing Afghanistan or Iraq.”

The Cold War in its old form disappeared when the Soviet Union imploded.  But the U.S.-Russian competition did not.  The United States continued a strange policy of expanding the NATO membership and bringing that Alliance all the way to the Russian borders, despite strong and continued protestations from Mosow.  It was highly irrational on the part of the United States to think that Russia should only listen to its rhetoric—which went along the lines that “we are no longer adversaries”—and totally ignore its near obsession with the NATO enlargement.

Russia responded in its own way, when that little megalomaniac president of Georgia, Mikheil Saaskashvili, sent troops into the Moscow-backed breakaway province of South Ossetia, hoping to teach them a lesson.  Russia let loose its fury.  That was, to be sure, a disproportionate response, but it underscored that Russia does not wish to be taken for granted.  Even to this day, there is no certainty that American military advisers were not involved in that Georgian action.

Moscow’s antagonism is continuing.  It appears that its current rulers have decided to challenge the incoming president, Barack Obama, by escalating ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile production.  The arsenal includes multiple-warhead ICBMs called the RS-24, which was first test-fired in 2007.  The then Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, made oblique references to the U.S. decision to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and Hungary by stating that those new missiles are “capable of overcoming any existing or future missile defence systems.”

President Obama’s dilemma will be how to respond to Russia.  His best option is to postpone the NATO expansion, not as a symbol of giving in to any Russian blackmail, but as a symbol of empathizing with Russia’s security concerns related to the seemingly endless enlargement of that Alliance.  If its raison detere is no longer to contian Russia, then why is it that NATO appears poised to take the entire Europe under its security umbrella?  Who is NATO’s “enemy” toward the end of the first decade of the 21^st Century?  If the motivation of rubbing Russia’s face into the dirt is no longer driving U.S. foreign policy, then what other objectives are?  If those objectives are as benign as Washington has claimed under the presidency of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, then why is the lone superpower relying on expanding a predominantly military alliance?

These are only some of the questions the Russian leaders are raising.  They deserve serious answers and a series of follow-up actions.  Otherwise, the totally illogical arms race appears set to get into full swing.

YOU HATE YOUR WAY; WE WILL HAVE A SHOE THROWING CONTEST

The Clinton and Bush administrations will be known for either underscoring or creating new hateful sobriquet for Iran.  In the 1990s, it was described as one of the so-called “rogue states.”  Then, in the post-9/11 era, it was referred to as a part of an imaginary “axis of evil.” 

On its part, Iran used a doozy of a characterization for the United States: “the Great Satan.”  A more benign version of that depiction was “tyrannical power,” a phrase that Iranian president Ahmadinejad recently used in his “alternative” Christmas message to the West.

In the aftermath of the shoe throwing incident at President George W.Bush in Iraq, Iran has started a new ‘mini-sport.’  On Christmas eve, a university in Teheran started a shoe-throwing contest at an effigy of Bush.  The news dispatch also contained the following observation: “No details on the prize, nor how the intensity of the shoe throwing will be judged.”

A GLOBAL FATWA CLEARINGHOUSE?

One of the chief differences between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam is that the Sunnis have no hierarchy of Ayatollahs who issue Fatwas (religious decrees) to which their followers adhere.  In Sunni Islam, a qualified religious person (a Mufti) or other equally learned scholar might issue a fatwa; however it is up to individual Muslims to follow or ignore it.  That is one reason why some scholars call a person who indulges in suicide attacks a shaheed (martyr), while others condemn those acts as inherently contradictory to the essence of Islam.

What about the concept of Jihad?  A number of foreign insurgents who were arrested in Iraq reported that they were following Fatwas that depicted their participation against the U.S. occupation as a conduct of Jihad.  There is a similar absence of any agreement among Muslim scholars on this matter.

As one dispatch entitled, “Fatwa Chaos in Sunni Islam,” in Open Source states:  “Fatwa chaos may lead to confusion among Sunni followers over which fatwa, or prescribed course of action, to follow.”

One suggestion that often pops up in Western circles is that some sort of central religious authority is required for interpretations that are followed by Sunni Muslims all over the world.   However, wishing for such a clearinghouse is akin to wishing for a Sunni version of a Pope.  You know that is not going to happen.

One may argue that the preceding reality is not important because, as Secretary of State, she is bound to promote Obama’s agenda. But the fact of the matter is that a successful Secretary of State has to share the agenda and worldview of his/her president before entering into office. That was certainly true in the case of Henry Kissinger. He did not like President Richard M. Nixon; however, regarding the dynamics and modalities of America’s foreign policy, both of them were of the same mind. That fact was largely responsible for the emergence of Kissinger as one of the most successful Secretaries of State of America.

James Baker was a personal friend of President George H. W. Bush. As Secretary of State, he was successful, but he certainly was not in the same league as Kissinger as an effective Secretary of State. Dean Acheson was a stranger to President Truman, but is considered as one of the highly successful Secretaries of State.

One reason why Acheson and Kissinger are regarded as highly successful Secretaries of State is because both of them were promoting foreign policy agendas that could be purely depicted as belonging to their respective presidents. Truman was not particularly well versed in the foreign policy issues of his day, but he had a lot of regard for the capabilities of his Secretary of State.

In the case of Richard Nixon, it is hard to see which part of his foreign policy did not belong purely to Nixon and which issues were purely Kissingerian in nature. In other words, as a unique coincidence of history, both Nixon as a professional politician and Kissinger as one of the premier strategic thinkers of his age, came together to promote the same foreign policy agenda in which the United States was to use the “China card” against the highly contentious Soviet Union. These two American officials developed a highly nuanced foreign policy for their country in which they were to pursue detente in a compartmentalized fashion. The Soviet Union was to learn that the United States was eager to use the China card in order to extract diplomatic concessions from the Communist superpower, whenever it suited its purpose. One can argue that the Soviet Union, on its own part, became equally Machiavellian in terms of supporting and opposing the United States on different issues as they suited its own intricate foreign policy objectives worldwide.

In the process, détente, as a chief approach to America’s dealings with the Soviet Union, came into severe conflict with the neoconservatives of the 1970s. They could not quite fathom the complicated system of “rewards” and “punishments” both superpowers were pursuing. In retrospect, the foreign policy of the Nixon-Kissinger era is still regarded as highly sophisticated and multidimensional in nature, much in the manner of the foreign policy that Acheson promoted and pursued for Truman right after the conclusion of World War II. In that era, the United States presided over the making of the post-WWII global order and emerged as the most durable superpower.

President Barack Obama is coming into office at a similarly remarkable time. That reality is becoming increasingly familiar when one considers the fact that the global economic meltdown is very much in progress. The age-old notion of deregulation of the capitalist economy has come under intense scrutiny. Now, the question is how much regulation of national and global economy is warranted. Another question is whether presiding over of the global economy should be limited to the so-called Group of Eight (G-8) nations, or should it be expanded to include the Group of Twenty (G-20) nations.

There is no doubt that a new global economic dialogue will take place, starting with the initiation of the Obama Presidency. The chief question from the U.S. side is how much power the United States is or ought to be sharing with the G-20 countries. Another question is, as the G-20 increase their role in running the global economy, whether at least some of them should be included as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. There is little doubt that the old Perm-5 (U.S., China, Russia, U.K., and France) are not likely to expand their ranks, because a considerable amount of power—largely the power to use the veto in the Security Council—goes with being a permanent member.

Hillary Clinton will have little problem in promoting this aspect of Obama’s agenda, especially if President Obama were to remain careful about not being overly generous regarding sharing power with other members of the G-20.

But if he were to become an overly “out of the box” thinker in terms of allowing the deflation of America’s power globally, then there is likely to be tension between him and Hillary.

Obama’s chief problem in having Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State will come in dealing with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and especially regarding the PLO-Israeli conflict.

Regarding Iraq, Obama will be forced to slow the pace of the withdrawal of American troops. He has already altered his rhetoric regarding how fast he wishes to get out of Iraq as President. Still, there is likely to be tension between the two on that issue.

Regarding Iran, even though both of them have already found common ground in Obama’s elaboration that he will let the dialogue with Iranian officials start at a lower level before escalating the level of engagement and widening its scope at a later stage, one has to watch closely how warm Hillary will remain on that issue. One reason for concern is that, as a presidential candidate, she sounded very similar to a typical Bush neoconservative in terms of her harsh rhetoric regarding Iran.

Regarding U.S. dealings with Syria, there is not much reason for concern, for Syria seems to have defused further complications by negotiating with Israel through the use of the good offices of Turkey. The United States will wait and see whether or if major breakthroughs will emerge in those negotiations.

It is in the PLO-Israeli negotiations that Obama and Hillary Clinton are likely to see things differently. After all, Hillary, as a Senator from New York, has been a loud proponent of the Israeli hardline. Whether she will bring about palpable changes in her rhetoric or approach on that issue as Secretary of State will have a lot to do with her future ambitions regarding the presidency. At this point, it is quite premature to state that she has abandoned her ambitions to run for presidency in 2012. Much will depend on how successful a president Barack Obama turns out to be at the end of his first term.

Given these potential complexities, it is hard not to ask why Obama has decided to choose Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State. While it is noble to emulate Abraham Lincoln in selecting your adversaries to serve you and to promote your agenda, from the viewpoint of realpolitik, one has to wonder why the president-elect has decided to be so magnanimous regarding a highly ambitious person like Hillary Clinton. Why is he giving her such a highly visible platform to remain as a potential challenge to him? Maybe, for Barack Obama, the Lincolnian example is hard to overlook or not to emulate. Maybe it is the highly competitive nature of Obama, or, in the final analysis, his self-assured personality that compels him to take chances. In any event, it’s his choice, and one hopes that he will not come to regret it.

As a young man, I vaguely remember Ahmad Sukarno, Indonesia’s first President, along with Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Josip Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Chou En-lai of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as leaders of the non-aligned movement (NAM), championing the independence and solidarity of Afro-Asian countries.  In Third-World countries, the NAM was a big deal.  Countries forming the NAM characterized themselves as a “moral force,” refusing to align themselves either with the United States or with the Soviet Union. 

When Sukarno was ousted in 1965 and General Mohammad Suharto came to power, Indonesia became an inward looking country.  Suharto did not have the charisma of Sukarno.  He was a military man who had to get a lot of on-the-job training to rule a country of the complexity of Indonesia.  Besides, Suharto was accused of coming to power through the covert actions of the then declining hegemon, the U.K., and one of the superpowers, the United States.  In that capacity, he was seen as the “stooge” of the West.  Indonesia was thus denied the major role it might have played if its political order were not shaped by those countries to fulfill the Anglo-American requirements of winning the Cold War. 

In the early-to-mid 1990s, Indonesia emerged as one of the countries showing promise of economic progress.  Then it became one of the victims of the economic crisis of 1997-1998.  The promise of progress of Suharto’s “new era” turned into a pipedream.  But the Indonesians still came out on top by using that economic calamity to return to democracy, which was introduced in that country through an admirable demonstration of popular will.  Suharto was ousted and democracy marched in with promises of worldwide support so crucial for Indonesia’s future.

The Indonesians that I met during my visit belong to two groups.  The first one depicts Suharto as a dictator and a person responsible for holding back the introduction of democracy.  But they also regard him as a president who allowed a controlled political interaction and tug-and-pull among various parties and pressure groups in his country.  He was not a maverick, but his regime, wittingly or unwittingly, laid the ground for a time when Indonesia would become a democracy.  The second group—arguably a minority—regards Suharto as a great leader, whose aspirations for the role of Indonesia was interrupted as a result of the economic crisis of 1997, which also brought the regime change in that country.

In my estimation, Indonesia is a natural place for the continuation of democracy.  It is a laid-back culture.  People, as a matter of general practice, are polite toward each other.  They almost invariably smile when they speak to each other, even to strangers.  The plural nature of its polity makes it essential that democracy should thrive there.  There are, to be sure, angry groups and voices of extremes in Indonesia.  However, their very presence underscores the fact that it is a very complex country, and a place where a variety of human contradictions coexist.  It is also a country that defies simplistic categorizations, explanations, and descriptions.

I went to Indonesia for political and cultural education. I wanted to develop a reasonable sense of what the country is all about.  I wanted to meet its political, military, and academic leaders to ask them probing questions on a variety of issues of “high politics” of that country.

Indonesia is one of the largest countries in East Asia.  Yet I heard virtually nothing about the potentials or promise of its emergence as the next rising power of Asia from its citizens.  Sitting in Honolulu, Hawaii, I regularly scan the political horizons of East Asia via the Internet, and capture the essence of almost all major events affecting most countries.  However, most of the press coverage on Indonesia I found dealt with topics related to the Jemah Islamiyya (JI).  I did not find adequate coverage of other substantive issues.

But Indonesia is much too large and enormously complex to have been reduced by the international media as a place where a terrorist organization still exists.  I wanted to know why the world is not hearing from Indonesia about its aspirations to become the third rising power of Asia.  It has the physical size, it has a very large population, and it has an important strategic location stemming from its proximity to the Strait of Malacca.  Both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have long recognized that country’s significance.  Yet, I did not encounter any discussion inside that country on that topic.

During the days of the Suharto dictatorship, the Indonesian economy was doing quite well, before it was hammered by the economic crisis of 1997.  The economic turbulence made the Indonesians angry enough to throw the dictator out and bring democracy to their country.  It is possible that the evolution of democratic leadership will take some time before a visionary leader emerges in that country. 

Indonesia, in my estimation, needs a Deng Xiaoping, who would not only give that country a blueprint for modernization, but would motivate its citizens to strive for it.  I recognize that the spectacular success of the Deng Xiaoping template is largely the result of the fact that the PRC is a communist system, where mobilization of the economy is done from the top down and through autocratic means.  I am also aware that the very democratic characteristic of Indonesia forces that country to look for a different path. 

In my quest for explanations regarding Indonesia, I was looking for a leader who would challenge the Indonesians to aspire for modernization, for fast-paced economic development, and for regional leadership.  I was looking for a leader in that country who would inspire the Indonesians to think big as Deng did, or as Nehru did, when he talked about India’s “tryst with destiny.”  Leaders inspire a nation.  In a democracy, the legislature plays a crucial role in transforming that inspiration and that vision into specific public policies and programs.

I found no major debates inside that country about Indonesia’s big dream or mega-aspirations.  Indonesians are not cynical about thinking big.  In these uncertain times, perhaps they are too focused on daily survival at the expense of everything else.  Perhaps they think that the time for dreaming big dreams has not yet arrived.  But leaders are responsible for dreaming big visions and sharing them with their people.  In autocratic societies, those dreams are shared through a process of propaganda and regimented mobilization.  No one believes that a developmental model that pushes Indonesia toward mobilization from the top is feasible.  In democracies, leaders attempt to persuade their constituents to believe in their vision. 

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, depicted as a cautious man, might be doing just that.  Perhaps he is too cautious to indulge in thinking big ideas.  I do not know much about the type of people that are assembled around him to plan the future modalities of Indonesia’s growth.  Since there are no voluble conversations about Indonesia’s “tryst with destiny,” it is reasonable to deduce that the President’s advisors are like him.  As technocrats, they are overly cautious and are driven by a steely sense of realism about what is feasible and achievable for their country in the near future.

While I noticed this lack of proactivism, or zeal, at the top leadership level, I was very impressed with the evolution of civil society in Indonesia, which is a vital requirement for the sustenance and permanence of democracy. 

The young Indonesians are highly curious and interested in what is transpiring in their region and the world.  I gave a lecture at a Christian university.  The topic of discussion was how China’s military modernization will affect Asia, especially Southeast Asia.  The average age of my audience was between 18-20 years. 

They were very curious about China, especially its ties with their country. 

I was equally impressed when I spoke at a gathering of the mass organization, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) or Islamic Students Association.  This is described as a moderate Islamic party and an entity that is a strong advocate of modernizing Indonesia.  Once again, the average age of the attendees was between 18-20 years.  They were quite inquisitive about how Indonesia is seen by the United States and by the world of Islam at large.  They wanted to know why Americans refer to Islam as a religion that “endorses” terrorism.  They were very interested about the prospects of visiting the U.S. for higher education.  I was told that the HMI was one of the most vibrant Islamic entities of Indonesia.  It had produced several luminaries, including Dr. Fuad Bawazier, an American-educated economist who was Finance Minister in Suharto’s cabinet.  It should be noted, however, that his detractors call him “a crony of the Suharto family.”

My advice to the young members of the HMI was that they should continue to pursue religious moderation and work hard to push their country to become a highly productive member of the globalized world.  At one point, I cannot remember exactly why, but I asked them how many of those youngsters regard Jemah Islamiyya as a terrorist group.  I wanted a show of hands. 

To my surprise (and I might add, to my dismay), no one raised a hand.  The environment in the room became palpably awkward.  One young man raised his hand to ask me how I define terrorism.  As much as I did not want to fall into the definitional trap, I defined terrorism as an act that is aimed at perpetrating violence in order to publicize a cause without any regard to the consequences.  The same young man smiled nervously and told me that there was no evidence of the JI’s perpetration of violence in his country.  When I heard that type of response, I knew I had reached an impasse and needed to move on to another topic.

Other than few awkward moments, my interaction with those youngsters was highly positive.  Since I do not know what type of pressure they are under on the issue of the JI, and since I have no way of judging the exact reason why no one wanted to be seen by others as a person agreeing to the proposition that JI is a terrorist organization, I am neither going to become pessimistic about my audience, nor am I willing to pass any harsh judgment.  Besides, it is very easy for a visitor to ask even awkward questions and leave.  But the honest respondent has to live in the society and face the consequences of being honest.

Islam not only is an important religion in Indonesia, but it also makes the observant very proud of their faith.  They remain both on the defensive and annoyed about the fact that their religion is under attack.  They have too many stories of bigotry and chauvinism to narrate with visitors to prove their point.  During my meeting with fifteen professors from three universities in Bandung, one young academician told me how racist Australians had been toward him during his two-year stay in that country.  One immigration officer at an Australian airport kept calling him Mohammad, which was his middle name.  He also asked him whether he was a terrorist.  I have never been to Australia.  Thus, I have no unhappy anecdotes to share along those lines.  However, hearing similar stories with a number of Muslim acquaintances that have lived in Australia, I know some Australians have a problem on this issue.

Indonesia is undergoing a revolution in the realm of modern education.  A number of its universities are given high marks by outside assessors for ceaselessly incorporating qualitative changes in their standards of excellence.  In a meeting with the Rector of the University of Indonesia, I had the pleasant experience of getting acquainted with his ambitious plans in the realm of escalating the pace of research in the hard sciences, as well as in the social sciences,, in the coming years.

The Indonesian press is vibrant and free.  Reading English newspapers in Indonesia, I had to remind myself that I was visiting a Muslim country (since in most Muslim countries absence of freedom of the press is a sine qua non of daily life).  There was front-page coverage of prostitutes in Jakarta demanding rights to practice their trade, and protection from harassment or abuse.  I am sure, followers of various religions had definite views on the subject.  However, the fact that the topic was given front-page coverage spoke volumes about the freedom of the press in that country.

Indonesia is an unassuming giant that is in the process of transforming itself.  Unlike China and India, that transformation is not coming along with a bang.  However, it is, indeed, in the making.  If its economy is not jolted in the coming years by any unanticipated calamity (as it was during the economic crisis of 1997-1998), it promises to become the third rising power of Asia within the next two decades.  It does need an Indonesian version of Deng Xiaoping to offer it a list of modernizations.  It does need a Nehru-like leader to give it a clarion call of a “tryst with destiny.”

President Yudhoyono is performing a very important task of solidifying the democratic framework and nourishing democratic egalitarianism.  In the process, he is likely to slip and falter.  But that is how democracies evolve: through a process of trial and error.  Throughout that process, the commitment to democracy should not be allowed to break or to be interrupted.  In that fashion, Indonesia is likely to reach the promise of greatness that it and its people deserve.

When my trip came to an end, I had more questions than I had answers.  My next trip to Indonesia should be more interesting, in the sense that I can assess how correct I was in arriving at a number of conclusions during this one.  When I left that country, I wished I had had more time to see those whom I could not, and visit more places.  But such a feeling also becomes a good reason to revisit Indonesia, for which I have a special place in my heart.  As my plane was speeding down the runway, I gave one last good look to its fertile ground.  Until next time, au revoir, Indonesia!

History repeated itself in a similar fashion when the U.S. went back to Pakistan in 2001, that time with a symbolic bazooka in its hand, and told its dictator General Pervez Musharraf to cooperate in America’s invasion of Afghanistan or his country would be bombed back into the stone age.  Musharraf joined the fight and got $10 billion worth of assistance from Washington. 

But Pakistan of the post-9/11 era was a hellish place for America.  People of that country remembered only too well that country’s “deceptions” of the past and they did not want their government to lift a finger to help the Americans.  Besides, in 2001, the United States went to Afghanistan for the explicit purpose of defeating the same type of people (Islamists) that it zealously nurtured and trained in the 1980s to defeat the Soviet Union.  Since then, Pakistan served as a visible base of support for the Islamists.

If Pakistan had been a democracy in 2001, the U.S would not have so cavalierly threatened to bomb it back into the Stone Age.  However, it knew how to deal with dictators who love to play tough guy in dealing with their citizens but are softer than melted cheese in cooperating with regional or global hegemons.

But this time, Pakistan has a gift for the United States.  That gift is wrapped in a lot of blood and gore; it contains threats of rising regional turbulence that can spillover into Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as the South of Pakistan into India. 

During the first presidential debate, John McCain called Pakistan a “failed state” before Musharraf came to power.  Barack Obama did not pause to explain how his frequently mentioned option of launching attacks on Pakistan is superior to what George W. Bush did in Iraq.  If the use of power is the solution, then Iraq should have been a haven from the American perspective.  As it happens, it is barely a quiet place with a highly uncertain future.  How can a bad option for Iraq becomes a good option for Pakistan?  But Obama is not in a reflective mode, and the media is in no mood to probe Obama on this issue.

This time, Pakistan’s gift (or revenge stemming from America’s policy of use and abandon) to the U.S. is coming in the form of a guaranteed failure of all short-range options and quick fixes, like the palpable (short-term) positive consequences emanating from the application of the Surge option in Iraq. 

This time, the issues in Pakistan are how to reverse the tide of radical Islamism without appearing to be doing America’s bidding.  Musharraf must have known that he was a doomed man the day he decided to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Lal Masjid (mosque) massacre of July 13, 2007, was the clincher.  Some say Musharraf had to use excessive force to satisfy the Americans.  But that may be only partially true.  By the time that event exploded, Musharraf was driven largely by his greed to stay in power, no matter the cost.  He knew that the only way he could to ride out the storm of protest (even though, as it turned out, it was wishful thinking) was to make sure that America remained on his side.  America, on the contrary, decided to cut its losses by forcing him to doff his uniform.  That was the day his rule was tacitly over.

A derisive adage in Pakistan describes the power of Allah, America, and the Army inside that country.  The manner in which Musharraf was dispatched to his retirement does not bode too well for the power of the Army, which is also increasingly coming under attack from the side of the Islamists.  In addition, the Army might end up using force to discourage America’s use of power inside their borders.  Unless the United States and the Pakistani Army reach a new modus vivendi, America’s power in Pakistan will become a myth or fairytale. 

If Pakistan remains a democracy, it will have to find its own niche away from the U.S.  Pakistan’s new President, Asif Ali Zardari, does not appear to hold much promise in terms of his ability to cultivate his image as an independent in the eyes of his constituents.  He might turn out to be a short-lived president. 

Even if democracy is ousted from Pakistan, once again, the next strongman will have to think hard and long before he decides to become America’s “stooge.”  This time, if Pakistan comes out intact from the current tumult and chaos, it might have to concern itself only about pleasing Allah and its own citizens, no one else.  Perhaps not even its Army.

That tragedy thrust Zardari into the limelight.  As the interim Co-Chair of Pakistan’s Peoples Party (the other co-Chair is their 19-year-old son Bilawal), he handled himself with ample adroitness and class.  But Zardari also has a clouded (some say shady) past, which includes an accusation that he might have been behind the murder of one of Bhutto’s brothers. 

As a politician, he is a totally unknown quantity, aside from serving as a minister of environment in Bhutto’s government (1993-1996), when he earned the moniker “Mr. Ten Percent.”  In his new position as President, which is not a powerful office in Pakistan, he is expected to indulge in a balancing act with the Prime Minister, parliament, and, above all, the Army, which remains the most powerful entity in Pakistan.  How sophisticated is he likely to be is one source of concern.  The other is whether he will become just another tool in the hands of the Army, or whether he will push Pakistan toward another crisis, if he is not to get his way in the power game with the Army.

From its very creation, democracy has been in a constant power struggle with the Army in Pakistan.  In that struggle, the Army has always won.  However, Pakistan’s current volatility stems from the fact that, since the 1970s, the phenomenon of “Islamization” has emerged as the chief challenger of both democracy and the Army. 

Benazir’s father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, initiated this phenomenon, and it was brought to a point of no return by General Zia ul-Huq.  Both Bhutto and Zia used Islamization purely to achieve objectives of solidifying their political power and sabotaging democracy.  Bhutto was fearful of the Army, whose chief—Zia—eventually hanged him on a trumped-up charge in 1979.  Zia was fearful of democracy and went through all sorts of shenanigans to postpone its return.  He planned to stay in power indefinitely, only to be assassinated in 1988.  In the interim, Pakistan emerged as a place where democracy faces a grim future.      

In the domestic politics of Pakistan, Islamic parties emerged as major players as a direct outcome of Islamization.  The educational institutions—which were never given primacy in the government’s expenditure priorities, suffered even more in the sense that religious education emerged as a major requirement in the curricula.  Scientific education was given a secondary role, while the Mullahs became increasingly vocal about the primacy of religious education.

Islamization came in handy as a tool for the United States, when it entered Pakistan for the purpose of defeating and expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, starting in 1979-1980.  America militarized the doctrine of Jihad to the hilt to fight and win that war.  Ultimately, it was the fighting zeal of the Mujahideen, the doctrine of militant Jihad, and American weaponry and money that defeated the Soviet Union.  Pakistan was the chief facilitator and a major player in that bloody war.

After the Soviet ouster from Afghanistan, America left the battlefields of Pakistan-Afghanistan, but Islamization of both countries became a permanent phenomenon.

After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the lone superpower realized that Islamization had to be curtailed in Pakistan by, inter alia, introducing curricular reforms.  However, the top priority was given, once again, to fighting and defeating the Taliban-al-Qaida nexus. 

General Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in 1999 by ousting democracy, agreed to fight the Taliban-al-Qaida alongside the U.S.  But he took no earnest and sweeping measures to eradicate Islamization from his country.  In fact, he followed a duplicitous policy of forming a political alliance with the Islamists in the Northwestern Frontier Province and Waziristan regions domestically, while maintaining the façade of fighting them, for external consumption.

Indeed, in the post-9/11 era, Pakistan has continued its march toward becoming “Talibanistan.”  That is a phenomenon that made that country a battleground between Islamic radicals of the Taliban and their ilk, and the Army.  The decision of the Pakistani Army to fight the Taliban—taken under Musharraf—is the chief reason why it is envisaged by the Islamists as the “enemy” of Islam.  The Taliban forces of Pakistan have been accused of carrying out two assassination attempts on Musharraf.  They could very well have been responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.  

The worsening political climate, American schizophrenic demands of fighting the Islamists, and bringing democracy back to Pakistan forced General Musharraf to retire as the Army chief.  On that very same day, he also signed the death certificate of his political career as the strongman of Pakistan.  He clung to power a little longer and maintained the bravado of fighting the growing demand of impeachment, only to succumb to the reality that his rule has been formally put to rest.

Now the baton of American demands to fight the Islamists has been passed to a civilian government, with Zardari as the new President, and the Army.  Under Musharraf, the Bush administration had a target to heap on rewards and anger whenever the circumstances deemed necessary.  Musharraf received billions of dollars in aid and assistance and was also blamed often for “not doing enough to fight al-Qaida.”  Now, Washington will be hard-pressed to place that blame on any one actor in Pakistan. 

The current Army chief, Ashfaq Kayani, though portrayed as a pro-American General, will be well advised to remember the fate of Musharraf.  Anyone—civilian or military official of Pakistan—who sticks his neck out for the United States, will sign the death certificate of his career, a la Musharraf.  Zardari, even though he is also described as pro-American, will be forced to rethink his own course of action in dealing with the Islamists.

The good news about Pakistan is that it has just started a new phase of democracy.  The bad news is that U.S. officials will find it hard to deal with the democratic Pakistan, as they have been finding out in democratic Iraq.  Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is also on the rise.  Zardari will have to keep that fact in mind while he sets the course of his country’s policy toward the lone superpower.  In this interaction, the Army will also remain an important but very cautious player.  A democratic Pakistan may someday emerge as a stable and serene place.  Sadly, that day seems to be in its distant future. 

Such hyperbolic suggestions aside, it is apparent that the global power structure is moving from the post-Cold War unipolarity, when the United States dominated world affairs, to multipolarity.  Under this arrangement, Russia and China will have an increased say about a number of global issues.

The emergence of multipolarity is not exaggerated or overstated.  It has nothing to do with the fact that the administration of President George W. Bush will only be in office for a few more months.  It has to do with a number of mistakes made by the United States during his presidency, especially in terms of some of the decisions associated with the terrorist attacks on America’s homeland.  

The U.S. invasion of Iraq caused an enormous amount of resentment, not only in the Muslim world, but also in other parts of the globe.  Between 2003 and 2006, Iraq emerged as the chief battlefield between the insurgents and Islamists and the Western occupation forces.  As a result, the entire issue of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was not even a serious issue for discussion and debate.  However, as Iraq is seemingly calming down, the U.S. appears quite intent to remain there as an occupying force.  Even during the American presidential campaign, Republican presidential candidate, John McCain, is using the palpable success of the “surge” in Iraq as a ticket to indefinitely occupy that country.  The Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama, on the contrary, favors a phased withdrawal.  However, even for Obama, America’s military presence in Iraq is open-ended.

Russia’s invasion of Georgia, more than anything else, has established the fact that Moscow’s assertiveness in its immediate neighborhood is likely to intensify in the coming years.  Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States has used every opportunity to its advantage regarding Russia.  All the promises that George H. W. Bush made to Russia–that NATO would not expand eastward–were systematically ignored.  As Russia protested the NATO expansion, Russia was consistently told by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush that it should not be wary of NATO; that NATO no longer envisages itself as an anti-Russian alliance.

Those assurances notwithstanding, Russia always regarded the NATO expansion as a continuation of America’s design to contain it.  NATO’s role in the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts left no doubt in the minds of Russian leaders that, even if NATO is not intended as an anti-Russian alliance, it will certainly be used to establish American hegemony in Europe, especially in the countries bordering Russia.  That was not acceptable to Moscow.

Most recently, NATO’s invitees included Georgia and the Ukraine, two bordering states of Russia.  Georgia’s President, Mikheil Saakashvili, misread NATO’s overtures toward his country and, despite American pleas against it, was audacious enough to send troops into South Ossetia in order to bring about its forced integration into Georgia.  That was a provocation that Moscow was not about to take lightly.  The result was Russia’s retaliatory response, which seems to have created a permanent fissure in the geographic map of Georgia.  Now, the United States has to figure out how to calculate and respond to the long-term implications of the impetuous action of an insignificant ally, who did its very best to create tensions between the U.S.-Russian ties.

Then there is another simmering issue of America’s stationing of missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic.  Once again, Washington dismissed Russia’s objections by pointing out that those systems are aimed at defending Europe from Iranian attack.  Moscow never accepted the explanation that Iran would attack any European country when Tehran knows the resultant enormity of a U.S. retaliatory response.  Now Russia has threatened to include those two East European countries on its list of missile targets.

General Pervez Musharraf’s ouster from office has created a serious power vacuum in Pakistan.  He managed to stay in office in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States by conducting a duplicitous policy of confronting the Islamists to please Washington, but also of cooperating with them whenever it suited his purpose.  While he stayed in power, Washington, despite its ambivalence toward his Janus-faced role regarding Bush’s war on terror, depicted him as a major ally of the United States.  Now that he is gone from the political scene in Pakistan, the United States is groping to find another approach to its counterterrorism-related policies there.  Washington has a clear preference for Asif Ali Zardari (since he is expected to continue the pro-American policies that his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, was expected to carry out), but is wary of becoming as much dependent on him as it became on Musharraf.  In the meantime, both Pakistan and Afghanistan remain unstable and volatile.

As the preceding analysis indicates, the United States’ global stock is currently low.  However, there is no other major power to take its place in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  Of the three major powers—The U.S., Russia, and China—neither Russia nor China is capable of playing a major role in attempting to resolve the world’s major problems. 

The lowering of American prestige in different regions of the world has not resulted in the escalation of clout of any other great power.  Russia is manifesting its resolve to assert itself in its immediate neighborhood.  However, it has very little clout to influence major regional conflicts.  China is making a visible presence in the Middle East and Africa, but the chief focus of that presence is to gain access to oil.  It is not interested in becoming a major party in any attempts to resolve key regional conflicts.

The United States, on the contrary, is still capable of creating momentum in the PLO-Israeli conflict, largely because of its special ties with Israel, and also because it is the chief provider of military and economic assistance for the Jewish state.  Iran, another major anti-American country, is very much interested in reaching a rapprochement with the lone superpower, and so is North Korea. 

In the resolution of all major global crises, such as food and oil price hikes and global warming, the United States can still play a leading role in at least creating a new momentum toward their resolution. However, the unipolar global order is slipping away. In the coming years, Russia, China, the EU, and India are likely to play a visible role.  The multipolar global power arrangement is clearly in the making.  From the vantage point of conflict resolution, that is a good thing.     

The end of history will be the end of human civilization.  Ideas of all sorts—even the noble ones like liberal democracy, and the pious ones, like all religious beliefs—only underscore the twists and turns of history, its ups and downs, or even its evolution.  However, world historians and strategic thinkers, out of their respective idiosyncrasies or cultural hubris, regard an idea, an ism, or a religion so important that the beginning and the end of the world is interpreted through their upsurges and failures.  The reality is that the success of an idea is just that, its temporary success until another idea comes along  to challenge it.

The end of the Soviet Union did not guarantee the endless triumph of liberal democracy–a Western idea.  To be sure, in terms of human participation and the will of the governed, it was (and remains to be) an idea superior to the non-democratic ones.  However, non-democratic systems prevail in Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.  More important, they are not likely to disappear anytime soon.

Even when democracy emerged as a “victorious” system over the communist totalitarian system at the end of the Cold War, there was no chance that the country that was the worldwide champion of that system—the United States—would have an easy time promoting it. 

The Bush administration did promote democracy in the Middle East in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq, at a time when the United States was desperately searching for a cause to rationalize the invasion of Iraq, especially when it failed to find weapons of mass destruction.  But that strategy (which was more of a convenient tactic than a strategy) was abandoned in the aftermath of the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing.  That dark event led to the “Sunni cleansing” by the Shia militia.  The U.S. occupation officials of Iraq correctly concluded that they had to adopt a strategy promoting heavy participation of Sunni groups in the emerging power structure of Iraq.  At that time, it also became crucial to gain the political support of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq, who were quite concerned not only about the deteriorating political situation in Iraq, but also about the rising tide of clout and influence of Iran in Iraq.  The U.S. and Sunni Arab states had to fall back on the old-style symbiotic politics of the Cold War years, which became highly relevant especially from the U.S. point of view.  Consequently, the preference for democracy was traded in by Washington for the conventional politics of supporting autocratic regimes.  In other words, the conventional politics of giving preference to pragmatism over the principle of promoting democracy reemerged as a driving force. 

As the political situation seems to be improving in Iraq, while it is deteriorating in Afghanistan, the great power relations are becoming important, but not to the extent that is claimed by Robert Kagan.  Kagan is also wrong in suggesting that China and Russia have not become more pragmatic.  But he is right in arguing that the autocratic rulers of those countries “believe in the virtues of a strong central government and disdain the weaknesses of the democratic system.”  In this sense, the great power relations are likely to follow a different path from now on than they did in the past.

The quest for superpowerdom is driving China and Russia.  China has adopted the market-style capitalistic system as its blueprint for emerging as a world-class economic power.  However, it has remained a firm practitioner of totalitarian politics.  The Communist Party of China is least interested in loosening its control of political power, even when the world was visiting China to watch the Olympic Games.  For the rulers of the PRC, their management of the Olympic Games was to become further “proof” of the “superiority” of China’s management system.  It also complements their perception of governance, which is all about management.  For them, a system should be judged on its pragmatic ability to handle large and complex issues and, most important, for its adaptability.  They don’t wish to be bothered by the nuisances related to democracy or the will of the people.  They have invariably preferred stability and have never understood the concept of legitimacy, which is at the heart of democratic governance.

Russia is similarly driven by its aspirations to become a superpower.  Its current preoccupation with de-democratizing itself stems from the fact that it envisages—no matter how wrongly—its post-Soviet romance with democracy as a reason for its loss of superpowerdom.  Its invasion of Georgia is another example—a crude one, but an example nonetheless—of its resolve to shape events to even the dynamics of the balance of power in its immediate neighborhood.

It is possible, as Kagan argues, that China and Russia will return to a liberal democracy someday.  But, if both countries emerge as superpowers in the next decade or so by remaining totalitarian or semi-totalitarian, what other reasons would they have to become a democracy, unless pressured by internal demands?  However, if they can suppress such demands for liberalizing their systems now, why should they reconsider them in the future? 

Where do the Islamists fit into this debate?  Their role in Iraq might have faced a setback for now.  But there is no reason to believe that they have accepted defeat and will fade away in that country.  In Afghanistan, however, the tide of the battle is very much in favor of the Islamists for now.  Any serious victory over them has to include wiping out their power in Pakistan.  However, knowing that reality does not enable either Pakistan or the United States—the chief partisan for stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan—to develop a strategy aimed at acquiring a convincing victory over them.  In addition, the rest of the Muslim countries must develop their own respective strategies to fight the Islamists within their borders, co-opt them, reintegrate them, or eradicate them.

These are all twists and turns of history, not its end or its return.  The only constant is the struggle on the part of some countries to rise to the top of the hierarchy of nations, while those at the top strive to stay there by best utilizing the technological and intellectual strides at a given time, and then enabling their institutions and their forces to adapt accordingly.  In this realm, the United States has done quite well.  Now, it seems China promises to do even better.  But that is just an expectation.  It has not yet become an inexorable reality.  In the meantime, history continues to march on.

I. The Extremist-terrorist Takeover Explanation:  Of the three explanations offered, this one is most alarmist and equally unrealistic in nature.  Any redeployment of American troops from Iraq can and will be done only after a careful implementation of another security arrangement, most probably under the U.N. mandate.  But this time, it is most likely to be done with the caveat that the U.N. mandate will be backed up by a multinational force presence.  More to the point, Iraq’s neighbors would fully participate in the making of such an arrangement, since they must also guarantee the security of borders through which extremists and terrorists entered Iraq in the past in order to destabilize it.  The active participation of Iraqi neighbors in the new arrangement would also means that they would be held accountable by the international community if there were to fail to live up to their guarantees.  It should be noted that they had no such interest or any stake in guaranteeing the security of Iraq that was occupied by the lone superpower.

The United States can negotiate for itself a role of a protector of the sovereignty of Iraq, but without acquiring military bases inside that country.  The over-the-horizons capabilities of America’s military would enable the lone superpower to carry out operations without acquiring a military base in Iraq, but only when asked by the U.N. to do so.  So the prophets of gloom and doom—who see an end to Iraq as a nation if the U.S. were to pull out—should stop crying wolf.  Iraq is the keeper of one of most ancient human civilizations, it carries the legacy of being a capital of one of the major Muslim dynasties (the Abbasids), and it remains a major Arab state and the owner of the second or third largest oil reserves in the world.  All these characteristics make it vital for its neighbors and the United States (there is no role for any other major power here) to ensure that Iraq’s security, stability, and territorial integrity is not jeopardized, and that it does not become a long-term, if not a permanent, colony of the United States or any regional power.

Iraq is likely to be unstable after the U.S. exit, but not any more unstable than it is while the U.S. remains there as an occupying power.  Its stability would stem from the ability of its elected government to enhance its legitimacy through good governance.  That can only happen if all the major powers contenders in Iraq have ample stakes in its stability.  

II. The U.S. Withdrawal as its Defeat Explanation:  Those who equate America’s withdrawal from Iraq as a defeat of the hegemon and as damaging to its reputation may have a point.  However, they are carrying that argument to an extreme.   The United States’ ouster from South Vietnam was also its defeat.  But the world does not exactly come to an end.  There were no falling dominos there, contrary to the predictions of the Cassandra callers of that era.  If one takes an even longer view of what happened to the Cold War itself, an argument can be made that America’s “defeat” in South Vietnam still enabled it to emerge as an eventual “victor” of the Cold War, while its chief rival, the Former Soviet Union, imploded.

Thus, a withdrawal of the United States from Iraq might be depicted as its defeat, but the world will continue to march on.  The Middle East will continue to be misruled by corrupt and nepotistic monarch and equally inept and nepotistic dictators.  Religious extremists would continue their challenge to the current status quo, but the status quo would remain undisturbed, except for minor turbulences.  In other words, the defeat of the United States in the Middle East would not result in serious upsurge in political instability.

The reputation of the United States would be damaged, to be sure.  However, that damage is least likely to be debilitating for the lone superpower.  It would not keep from asserting its influence in the future when its stakes are in jeopardy.  The only difference would be that the United States would be forced to make a persuasive case before it goes to the extreme of intervention in another country in the future. And that is not bad outcome, indeed. In fact, given the discovery of abuses of the Iraqis in Abu Ghraib prison and those of the “detainees” in Guantanamo prison, one should welcome even more constraints on America’s predilections for a “ war of choice” under the Bush administration. 

The only catch related to the U.S. withdrawal and defeat proposition is that the next U.S. president has to decide to bite the bullet and take that plunge and withdraw.  The best way to handle it—with minimum possible dame to his/her electability in the second term in the case of Obama or Clinton, since they are committed to make radical changes in America’s military in Iraq—is to make decision of the withdrawal within the first year.

III. The “Rising” Iran Explanation:  Since Iran has become the new boogeyman of American electoral politics, neither McCain nor Clinton manifested any sense of proportionality or thoughtful moderation toward it.  In fact, the silly season of one-upmanship (or one-uppersonship, since one of the major presidential contenders is a female), McCain has wisecracked by recalling the Beach boy ditty, bomb bomb bomb Iran, in response to a serious question about to respond to that country; while Clinton threatened to “obliterate” it if it were to launch an attack on Israel.  Only Obama has demonstrated any amount of suave by thoughtfully asserting to engage it. 

What befuddles all American presidential candidates is that no one really knows how to deal with ran, a country whose clout is very high in the Middle East.  In an era, when the idea of facing down the Bush administration sends shivers down the spines of autocrats and dictators of Middle East, Iran has maintained an attitude of constant confrontation.  It wishes to be treated in the diplomatic arena as an equal, not as a third-rate power, while the lone superpower’s diplomatic maneuverability (or the lack thereof) is only manifested in the inane bumper sticker phrase that depicts Iran as one of the “axis of evil.”

Such obtuse phrasemaking cannot become a basis of diplomatic exchanges.  By backing Hezbollah’s confrontational policies toward Israel and by being equally assertive toward the United States about its interests and stakes in Iraq, Iran is showing the world of Islam its own way of dealing with the lone superpower.  The fact that the United States wishes to negotiate with Iran the modalities of peace and stability in Iraq assigns Iran a heightened primacy in the Middle East.  If the U.S. were to get out of Iraq, Iran can legitimately argue that its own intransigence toward Washington has played a crucial role in its decision to get out of Iraq.  That is one reason why there is that urgent necessity of negotiations between the two countries.  In the absence of such negotiations and a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran, any American withdrawal from Iraq would be highly beneficial to Iran.  However, even in the absence of such a rapprochement, the United States may not wish to postpone its withdrawal, especially if that measure appears vital from America’s vantage point.

There are, to be sure, various minuses and pluses associated with all preceding explanations.  The next U.S. President would have to weigh them strictly in the light of what is best for America.  The time for making that choice would be right after the new President enters the White House, and at a time when America is not pressured by the tsunami of events in Iraq forcing it to withdraw from there, as was the case in the weeks and months preceding America’s withdrawal from South Vietnam.